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Learning from Philosophical Schools

Roughly 2,400 years ago, philosophy grew and flourished in philosophical schools, that is, as the result of collaborative theoretical endeavours around a master figure. Socrates' philosophical teachings played a fundamental role not only in the establishment of Plato's Academia, but also of the Stoic and the Cynic Schools. In its turn, Aristotle's school, the Lyceum, stemmed from Plato's school. With some upheavals, this pattern continued in such a way that the history of philosophy could be interpreted also as a history of philosophical schools.

The second half of the 20th century witnessed the flourishing of several significant philosophical schools, mostly in Europe and the Americas. Marxist schools, such as the Praxis School, the Budapest School, and the Frankfurt School; schools of phenomenology (e.g., in Paris) and of historicism (e.g., in Naples); schools of logic, such as the Polish School of Paraconsistent Logic, the Brazilian School of Paraconsistent Logic, and continuators of the Lvov-Warsaw School; Thomistic schools, such as the Laval School in Canada and the Lublin School in Poland. Some of these schools experienced important evolutions: their topics shifted over time, their members changed, and they even underwent diasporas for political reasons.

Today, after a few decades, philosophical schools seem to have lost momentum. Philosophy departments around the world hire scholars with research agendas in a plurality of philosophical areas. Such heterogeneity allows departments to present a richer, more diverse, and, thus, more attractive didactic offer. Moreover, early career researchers in philosophy focus their investigation around very particular philosophical topics, in order to become world specialists in these domains, to have more opportunities for their research to stand out, thus increasing their chances of getting a position. But this tendency towards specialization is dictated by the philosophical *Zeitgeist* rather than by the continuity along the

line of the supervisors' teachings and reflections. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether the phenomenon of philosophical schools is still relevant in today's philosophical investigation and practice.

The editorial team of "Edukacja Filozoficzna" decided to open a debate around this topic, first in a two-day international congress at the University of Warsaw, and then in this special issue, which collects some of the congress papers. The contributions to this special issue explore the historical and theoretical vicissitudes of philosophical schools after 1950, and deduce from the life of these schools important lessons for the future of philosophy.

On one hand, the articles collected here analyze the essential features of the philosophical schools they focus upon, and clarify the synergy between the identitarian unity of the school and the individual positions of each member of the school, including the case of dissent. This contributes to outline the idea of a "model" for philosophical schools which depends on taking into account not only the events and circumstances of the school's birth, but also the language, the nationality, the culture, in which the school developed.

On the other hand, this historical investigation into 20th-century philosophical schools renews the idea of philosophy as a collaborative endeavour, and thus helps to recalibrate our current methods and approaches in philosophy. Moreover, the varieties of "gemmations" from these philosophical schools challenge the idea of school as a monolithic identity, widening our scientific horizons and academic classifications and expectations. This connects the relevance and the future of philosophy to the destiny of the phenomenon of "philosophical school" in our modern world.

We open this volume with an article which provides a framework for the debate on philosophical schools after 1950. The author, Franca d'Agostini, critically analyzes the division between two philosophical traditions: the analytical and the continental one, and reflects on the past and present interactions between them.

The following articles examine the phenomenon of philosophical schools using various examples, such as the famous Japanese philosophical school (Kyoto, by Agnieszka Kozyra), European schools or milieus from former Yugoslavia (Praxis School, by Nevena Jevtić and Mina Đikanović), Germany (the Berlin Complex Logic Group, by Max Urchs and Klaus Wuttich), and the Brazilian Southern School in the Philosophy of Physics (by Decio Krause). The last paper from this group is written by one of the founders of the Brazilian school. It is an outstanding opportunity to get to know the story of a school from a personal perspective of someone who formed such a group.

The next contributions refer to Polish schools, including the Lublin Philosophical School (by Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik), as well as the continuation of the Lvov-Warsaw School (by Anna Brożek), the Polish School of Paraconsistent Logic (by Ricardo Nicolás-Francisco), the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science (by Paweł Polak and Kamil Trombik) and the Polish School of Praxiology (by Wojciech Gasparski and Marcin Bukała). It is worth adding that most of these texts are composed by authors who personally knew the representatives of the schools they discuss or even can be called their continuators, which can mean that those schools are still active.

The final four articles focus on a unique event in the history of philosophical schools: the Australian "diaspora" of four members of the Budapest School. Ágnes Heller, Ferenc Fehér, Maria Márkus, and György Márkus, pupils of Hungarian philosopher György Lukács (the leading figure of the so-called "Budapest School") decided to flee from post-1956 Hungary in order to be able to develop their post-Marxist reflections. The chance came as a job offer from three Australian Universities: La Trobe, the University of Sydney, and the University of New South Wales. The articles by Peter Murphy, John Rundell, John Grumley and Peter Beilharz (who were pupils and colleagues of the four Hungarian philosophers) explore different facets of the challenges and changes of the philosophy of the Budapest School in Australia, not only as a change of language but also as a change of framework for their work, for instance from philosophy to sociology. How did their Australian diaspora impact their philosophical ideas? What new theories did they develop, and how their identity as members of the Budapest School nourished and resisted these changes?

All texts, when taken together, provide both a rich theoretical background and varied experiences of different groups of scholars from the last few decades. We all can learn from them what are the advantages of such a form of collaboration, what holds such a group together, how they work in different models and various conditions. However, we are convinced that it is only a part of possible benefits.

We believe that this volume will be a starting point for a larger debate on the presence of philosophical schools and the future models of academic collaboration. We also hope that it will be a pleasant and inspiring adventure across many different traditions unified by at least one idea: the pursuit of wisdom.

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Is There Still (if There Has Been At All) an Analytic–Continental Divide?

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Abstract: In this paper I reconstruct the nature, origins and survivals of the divide between the "analytic" and "continental" traditions – a famous dualism which has affected the development of philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. I also present a theory of it, stressing that its intra-philosophical causes are to be found in the mutual resistance between critical (transcendental) and semantic (logical) approaches in philosophy. I conclude by noting that good philosophers (more or less knowingly) are and have always been sensitive to the transcendental and logical aspects of the philosophical work.

Key words: analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, birth of modern logic, transcendental philosophy

1. Introduction

The "analytic–continental divide" is a historiographical and metaphilosophical label frequently used to interpret the situation of academic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. It intends to capture a dualism between the analytic (hereafter: A) tradition, especially active in English-speaking countries, and the leading currents of European philosophy at that time, globally called "continental" (hereafter: C). The divide possibly originated in the late 19th century,[1] but it became clearly observable in the last decades of the 20th. As Michael Dummett wrote in 1993, "we have reached a point at which it is as if we are working in different subjects."[2]

[1] See P. Simons, *Whose Fault? The Origins and Evitability of the Analytic-Continental Rift*, "International Journal of Philosophical Studies" 2001, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 295–311.

[2] M. Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, p. 193.

Nowadays philosophy is a globalized set of specialized disciplines, so one may say there are no philosophical systems, schools or traditions anymore (see Section 4). And yet, the conceptual couple is still adopted to explain the intuition of a difference between metaphilosophical views that can be traced back to the old dichotomy.[3] In my diagnosis, this happens because the underlying problem is still unsolved. What is this problem? Can/should we solve it?

The literature on the theme is quite rich,[4] but it is sparse and not convergent; there is no clear assessment of what the conceptual couple ultimately means and why it still captures relevant metaphilosophical concerns.[5] So I first offer a synthetic account of the nature, origins and survivals of the dualism. The reconstruction will enlighten that what some observers called "the great divide" has involved a series of historical and cultural factors, but the deepest elements of mutual resistance between the exponents of the two traditions have been strictly intra-philosophical, and they can be identified by the diverging consequences of two

[3] The A–C dualism frequently appears in historical reconstructions and definitions of A philosophy, as in H.-J. Glock, *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, pp. 61–88; M. Beaney, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, pp. 49–50; S. Soames, *Analytic Philosophy in America: And Other Historical and Contemporary Essays*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2014, p. 7; B. Dainton, H. Robinson, eds., *The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy*, Bloomsbury, London 2014, pp. 569–570.

[4] Some texts of the last twenty years: A. Biletzki, ed., *Bridging the Analytic-Continental Divide*, special issue of "The International Journal of Philosophical Studies" 2001, Vol. 9, No. 3; C. Prado, ed., *A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, Humanity Books, Amherst, NY, 2003; B. Babich, *On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy*, in: *A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, ed. C. Prado, Humanity Books, Amherst, NY, 2003, pp. 63–103; N. Levy, *Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences*, "Metaphilosophy" 2003, Vol. 34, pp. 284–304; B. Leiter, M. Rosen, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, pp. 1–4; S. Overgaard, *Royaumont Revisited*, "British Journal for the History of Philosophy" 2010, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp. 899–924; B. Babich, *La fin de la pensée? Philosophie analytique contre philosophie continentale*, L'Harmattan, Paris 2012; S. Overgaard, P. Gilbert, S. Burwood, *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 115–144; J.A. Bell, A. Cutrofello, P.M. Livingston, eds., *Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century*, Routledge, Oxford 2016; G. D'Oro, S. Overgaard, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017 (specifically R. Piercey, *The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic-Continental Divide*, pp. 274–292); the special issue of "Borderless Philosophy" (2022, Vol. 5) entitled *The End of Analytic and/or Continental Philosophy, Yes, or No? And if Yes, Then What's Beyond?*

[5] Some lines are suggested by R. Piercey, *The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic-Continental Divide*, op. cit. I will say something more about his reconstruction later (sub-section 2.1).

metaphilosophical *turns*: the *transcendental turn*, and the *logical turn*. The two turns have been inherited and developed (also critically) in the two traditions, and respectively informed C and A conceptions of philosophy.[6]

The logical turn was launched by Russell at the beginning of the 20th century, the transcendental turn was conceived by Kant, and began to inform European philosophy at the beginning of the 19th. I speak of "turns" because they created the canons, the methodological tendencies, the basic metaphilosophical conceptions of the two traditions. In both cases, there have been revisions and criticisms (not by chance, we speak of "traditions" and not of "schools": see sub-section 2.1). Some of the main lines of the transcendental-idealistic approach (Kant and Hegel) have been rejected by C philosophers; and in the central decades of the 20th century A philosophers criticized "the received view" (Russell's basic realism or descriptivism). But undeniably, the mutual ignorance or underestimation of each turn generated what has been called "the divide," because the transcendental (critical) philosophy stemming from Kant and developed by Hegel was conceived (by A as well as by C philosophers) as incompatible with the logical (semantic) approach to philosophy launched by Frege and Russell. With this interpretation, we get a largely shareable if not quasi-canonical image of the two traditions, and we can begin to reflect on what we ought to do nowadays (if something should/could be done).

In the next section, I specify the main methodological features of the A–C theory, I briefly reconstruct a possible "history" of the divide and specify the opposed aspects of A and C (as they appeared in the late 20th century). In Section 3, I give some details about the underlying problem, then, in Section 4, I say something about the current conditions of the A–C question.

2. A–C?

What do we mean, exactly, when we talk about the historical and still partially surviving dualism between A and C? What are (have been) exactly A, and C? Why do we speak of an incompatibility between them? There is no clear accor-

[6] On the definition of "transcendental" or "transcendentalism" (as referring to Kant and/or medieval philosophy, and not to the American movement centred around R.W. Emerson), there is no clear accordance. For a recent account, it is advisable to refer to the essays collected in S. Gardner, M. Grist, eds., *The Transcendental Turn*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015.

dance about these questions. I will try to give answers, but some peculiarities of the *A–C theory* are to be specified in advance, to avoid misunderstandings.[7]

2.1. What Kind of Theory Is the A–C Theory?

The conceptual couple seems faulty at first, as apparently we oppose a philosophical school (A) to a territorial determination (C). Bernard Williams famously noted the oddity of the bipartition: "a strange cross-classification – rather as though one divided cars into front-wheel drive and Japanese."[8] In fact, the weird asymmetry is justified. The use of C is historically grounded, as after Nazi seizure of power the European exponents of what was going to be called "A philosophy" moved to America and England, and what remained in Europe was what was later called "C."[9] But evidently, the term has no strict geographic reference.

The second relevant point is that in speaking of A and C we do not speak of philosophical "schools," but *traditions*. The "traditionalist conjecture" (typically adopted in A-reconstructions of A philosophy) has been discussed.[10] To make the term more precise, I suggest intending by "tradition" a group of different trends or schools, whose members altogether acknowledge themselves (or are able to acknowledge themselves) as engaged in the same subject, and share, over time, a certain canon. So to have a tradition, we should have *mutual acknowledgement*, relative *persistence*, and shared *canonical references*. Consequently, there could be more or less closeness and affinity among exponents of a tradition, but in virtue of their mutual acknowledgement they can conceive and practice a substantially identifiable idea of what philosophy is and should be, and this idea over time works as *distinctive*, hence eliminative of others.

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7 My account differs from the one proposed by R. Piercey in the quoted essay about "the metaphilosophy" of the divide. The main difference is related to the characterization of A and C, so that, for instance, he holds Richard Rorty was an "A" philosopher, while in my view he was not.

8 B. Williams, *Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look*, in: *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, eds. N. Bunnin, E.P. Tsui-James, Blackwell, Oxford 2003, p. 23.

9 In this respect, as noted by Michael Friedman: the divide was generated, and consolidated, "in the extraordinary uneasy political climate of the early 1930s" (M. Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways*: *Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger*, Open Court, Chicago, IL, 2000).

10 S. Lapointe, *On the Traditionalist Conjecture*, in: *Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretative History*, ed. A. Preston, Routledge, New York 2017, especially pp. 284–285.

Third, as I have mentioned at the beginning, the "A–C divide" is a *historiographical* and *metaphilosophical* label.[11] Like any other distinction involving history and culture, it concerns *ideal-typical* predicates, that is, predicates that have no clear and strict reference to empirically observable properties but denote the various combination of different features subsisting to certain (various) degrees in one or another object.[12] If you prefer, "real-world" philosophers have some *family resemblances* which authorize us to locate them in one or the other field.[13] This means that not all philosophers we may call "A" or "C" instantiate paradigmatic cases. As we will see in sub-section 2.3, we can locate one or another author in the A or C side by referring to a list of ideal-typical requisites, and to identify some philosopher as A or C, the joined subsistence of at least *two* of the issues in the list (in particular *canon* and *style*) could be enough.[14]

Finally, we can approach the A–C theory with a variety of aims, and maybe the main reason one is interested in historical and metaphilosophical subjects of this kind is that one thinks something is to be done. In this case we have a project in what Nicholas Rescher has called *normative metaphilosophy*:[15] we are interested in a (relatively) neutral reconstruction of what philosophy is, but in consideration of what it ought to be. Now the most obvious utility of a research on the "A–C question" is to solve what can be called *the bridge problem*, intended as the

[11] Useful clarifications about the notion of "metaphilosophy" are given by S. Overgaard, P. Gilbert, S. Burwood, *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy*, op. cit.; G. D'Oro, S. Overgaard, eds., *Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*, op. cit. Specifically for the A–C question: R. Piercey, *The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic-Continental Divide*, op. cit.

[12] The notion of *ideal-typical* objects and predicates, launched by Wilhelm Dilthey, has remained a critical concept of hermeneutical historicism. See on this J. Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT–London 1994 [1991], pp. 76–90.

[13] The Wittgensteinian notion of *family resemblances* is used by Glock to characterize the apparently vague notion of "A philosophy" as implying "overlapping similarities" more than "common characteristic marks" (*What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 42). I think the reference to ideal-types is more useful, methodologically, in history-sensitive analyses. For instance, R. Piercey in the quoted essay holds that looking at the divide as a metaphilosophical issue we can find similarities between A and C, such as the reference to history, and the idea of philosophy as an "ameliorative" enterprise. But if we keep to A and C as ideal-typical predicates, we have that these two views are typically C, and are generally ignored by A.

[14] I have specified this point in F. d'Agostini, *From a Continental Point of View: The Role of Logic in the Analytic-Continental Divide*, "The International Journal of Philosophical Studies" 2001, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 349–367; see in particular pp. 350–352.

[15] "Prescriptive or normative metaphilosophy is the inquiry that deliberates about what is to be thought regarding the conduct of philosophizing" (N. Rescher, *Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective*, Lexington Books, London 2014, p. 14).

problem of providing some encounter or synthesis or combination of the two approaches. Various strategies of this kind have been proposed. But we will see that not all features of the A and C ways of conceiving and practising philosophy are (were?) perfectly acceptable. Which means that the bridge project might not be profitable for the progress of philosophy: the risk of producing contaminations, or hybrids, in which faults outweigh benefits cannot be excluded.[16]

2.2. Who Are (Were) A and C?

Who are (were) A and C? Can we consistently identify them? Here is a substantially plausible reconstruction.

Table 1. Reconstruction of the analytic tradition (A) and the currents called "continental" (C). Source: own work.

	A	C
I	Frege, Russell, Moore (1900–1920)	Neo-Kantianism–neo-Hegelianism, phenomenology (1900–1920)
II	Wittgenstein – logical positivism (1920–1940)	Heidegger – existentialism (1920–1940)
III	Analytic philosophy of language (1950–1970)	Critical theory, structuralism, hermeneutics (1950–1970)
IV	Post-analytic philosophy (1970–1990)	Post-structuralism – postmodernism (1970–1990)
V	The self-acknowledgement of A tradition – the rebirth of metaphysics and philosophy of mind (1990–2000)	A+C, speculative realism – transhumanism (1990–2000)

[16] "While there might be a premium on reconstructing philosophy as a unified sphere of discourse, this must not go at the expense of rigour, clarity, scholarship and intellectual honesty" (H.-J. Glock, *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, p. 260).

There have been other currents, schools and philosophical systems in the 20th century, but we are only interested here in those which generated the appearance (or effectiveness?) of the A–C dualism.[17]

I – At the origin of the A story we have Frege, Russell, Moore and their grounding action during the first decades of the century. About the birth of A tradition the canonical version is that

> Frege's creation of quantificational logic and the rebellion of Russell and Moore against British idealism are the two most significant events in the emergence of analytic philosophy.[18]

Note two elements: the discovery of *modern logic*, and the rejection of *idealism* (which altogether became rejection of the transcendental-dialectical approach in philosophy). Note also that in virtue of the former, A philosophers are identified by what they embrace (logic), and in virtue of the latter, they are identified by what they reject (transcendental idealism). The two aspects have been the first grounding components of what we may call the *A paradigm*, as opposed to C (Section 3).

On the C part, as correlative to A, we ought to consider the revitalization of Kant's and Hegel's philosophical approaches, in neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism, both conceived at the turn of the century, and variously active in the subsequent twenty years. And we also have the birth of the phenomenological school, launched by Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900). The so-called "first" Husserl is sometimes considered a quasi-A philosopher,[19] but at least from 1905 onward Husserl acknowledged the "transcendental" nature of his phenomenology. These facts considered, we may confirm that what (at least nominally) Russell and Moore rejected was revived and re-launched in a significant part of European philosophy.

II – The second phasis marked the first expression of a somewhat "A style" as opposed to a "C style." Frege–Russell semantics, developed by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (1921), offered the "logical construction of the world" launched by neopositivism, and inspired a number of authors in Central Europe, all variously en-

[17] The periodization and characterization of the mentioned schools or currents have no absolute categoricalness. There might be overlappings, the dates are not to be assumed as referring to sharp time boundaries, and some issues in the table mark a tendency more than a single and uniform line of thought.

[18] M. Beaney, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, op. cit. p. 9.

[19] See P. Simons, *Whose Fault?*, op. cit.

gaged in creating a new image of logic, philosophy and scientific rationality. On the C side, we have Heidegger, who belonged to the "second" phenomenological school. His *Being and Time* (1927) became canonical for that version of phenomenology called "existentialism," and later (in phases III and IV) for hermeneutics and the developments of structuralism.

The first symptom of the A–C incompatibility has been often considered Carnap's harsh criticism of Heidegger's *What Is Metaphysics?*, in the famous article published in "Erkenntnis" in 1929. Carnap showed that Heidegger's metaphysics (rather metaphysics in general) was based on a logical misunderstanding (what he calls "the material way of speaking"), and he noted that the "new logic" created by Frege and Russell could easily reveal and dismantle the mistake. By the help of the new logic a new "scientific philosophy" was going to emerge.

We get another distinctive aspect of C philosophy as opposed to A. While the latter developed by assuming a specific logical and subordinately meta-scientific concern, the former has been marked by ignorance or rejection of the new logic (Frege–Russell semantics), and by a programmatic criticism of the primacy of "scientific" rationality in modern culture. We have thus the duality or symmetrical opposition between A and C: *what the former embraced, was rejected by the latter, and vice versa*.

III – The third phasis was characterized by the official birth of a new philosophical school named "A" philosophy, and hence the first public acknowledgement (especially in C philosophy) of the divide. The first document we have of an open confrontation between A and C is the 1958 international conference of Royaumont about *La philosophie analytique*, in which exponents of C philosophy (in particular, phenomenology and existentialism) encountered some of the most important A philosophers.[20] The idea of A–C working in terms of "traditions," and not of specific currents or schools was already clear. And the mutual resistance of the two perspectives was clear. As it seems, the conference was not a complete success. Charles Taylor – who attended the meeting – later wrote: "the dialogue did not come off."[21]

[20] L. Beck, ed., *La philosophie analytique*, Minuit, Paris 1962. The number of important authors who took part in the conference is impressive: on the A side we have, among others, J.L. Austin, W.V.O. Quine, G. Ryle, F. Strawson, B. Williams; on the C side J. Wahl, M. Merleau-Ponty, C. Perelman, C. Taylor, among others.

[21] See S. Overgaard, *Royaumont Revisited*, op. cit., p. 914.

I have mentioned *critical theory*, intending the School of Frankfurt, and its developments in the work of Karl O. Apel, Jürgen Habermas and other authors. The first critical theory had a definitely Hegelian inspiration and expressed a paradigmatic "C spirit." From the 1970s onward, things slightly changed. While the original critical theory was distinct from and somehow opposed to neopositivism and all its consequences, Apel and Habermas began a fruitful dialogue with A philosophy. But their proposal has remained irreducibly "C"; A philosophers, at least the most typically "A" of them, have generally ignored it. I also mention *structuralism* and *hermeneutics*. The latter was launched by Hans Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (1960) and became mostly important for our concern later. The same to a certain extent holds for *structuralism*. The mathematical and logical movement called with this name emerged in the 1950s, but its philosophical inheritances became later some of the most unequivocally "C" expressions of the dualism.[22]

IV – From the 1970s onward we see the most paradigmatic C philosophy to appear, and it was dominated by what Hans-Joachim Glock has called "the twentieth century avant-garde movements inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger."[23] Most part of the classical literature about the divide was published in this phase. Historical-cultural facts have been decisive. With the advancing of globalization, exponents of post-structuralism and hermeneutics became known in territories previously colonized by A philosophy (especially in the United States), so that the *stylistic differences* (see sub-section 2.3) appeared in all clarity. C philosophy revealed itself as the philosophy of "humanities," of literary criticism, of art, of architecture and cinema.

The confrontation was not profitable for A nor was it for C. The last two decades of the century can be labelled as an age of "post." Under the impact of the "European" style of philosophizing, and the influence of the self-critical work launched by Richard Rorty, A philosophy has been led to reconsider its own identity. A new process of self-awareness began, and one of the first steps was the collection with the title *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, edited by John Rajchman and Cornel West.[24] It was intended to illustrate the "end" of a certain conception of language, being

[22] Significantly, hermeneutics and structuralism, like A philosophy, have been crucially interested in language and logic: but the hermeneutical conception of language and the structuralist use of logic has been different from A ideas about logic and language.

[23] H.-J. Glock, *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 17.

[24] J. Rajchman, C. West, eds., *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, Columbia University Press, New York 1985.

and thought, which was typical of the most traditional A tradition, and which most clearly opposed A to C. On the other side, the extra-philosophical success of C philosophy favoured the deconstructive and relativistic drift called *postmodernism* (basically a socio-cultural more than philosophical movement). Even some C philosophers formed in the Nietzsche-Heidegger line of thought began to see the damages of these extra-philosophical uses of philosophy.[25]

V – In the last decade(s) of the century the "reaction" of A philosophers against the spread of C expressed itself also in terms of a self-reconstructive effort. It is not by chance that the most well-known historical surveys of A philosophy, conceived from a definitely A perspective, appeared at the end of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st centuries. But the increasing processes of globalization and specialization of philosophy were making the conceptual couple less evident. So the A novelties in this period concern philosophical disciplines: the new attention to mind and consciousness and the rebirth of ontology and metaphysics, on new bases. On the C part of the story, we have first the diffusion of A philosophy in European countries once colonized by some versions of C (French, Italy, Spain, Germany). So one may say the novelty in European philosophy has been the emerging of A+C positions, that is, what Jeffrey Beall, Andrew Cutrofello and Paul Livingston call a "synthetic" attitude. Globalization obviously favoured this synthesis, and many C philosophers nowadays can be labelled as A + C in some sense. The other two lines I mention are only some of the most recent C tendencies. However, there are also reasons to believe the territory of philosophy nowadays is no longer (strictly) A, nor is it C, and it is not even A + C, but there is a sort of "explosion" of programmes, styles, products (Section 4).

2.3. The Dualism

Which were the real elements of the divergence? The A–C distinction, especially as it appeared in the last three decades of the 20th century, involved two series of canonical authors; two ways or styles of arguing and writing; two ways of relating philosophy to science, to culture generally intended (literature, cinema, art), or the public sphere (politics, and public debate); two different ways of conceiving the philosophical practice. More generally and altogether, two conceptions of

[25] See G. Vattimo, *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1997 [1990].

what philosophy is and ought to be, of what philosophers do and should do. We would say: two *normative metaphilosophies* in the specified sense.

Let's consider these aspects in detail, and in contrastive terms.

1. Canons – Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, other European classics, typically belong to the C canon, and are generally ignored, misinterpreted or underrated by A philosophers; Hume, Frege, Russell, Quine, Austin and other authors belong to the A canon and are generally underrated, ignored or misunderstood by Cs.

NB – the non-belonging of certain authors to a canon means they *can be ignored*, which does not mean they *cannot be studied*, or that they are *not criticized* by people in the tradition. There has been a variety of anti-Hegelianisms in C tradition, but Hegel has always been considered an inevitable reference. An important movement in A tradition arose from the rejection of Frege and Russell's semantics, the so-called "received view," but the view was criticized just because it was "received."

2. Styles of arguing and writing – "Styles" includes different features:[26]

2a – A philosophers address their colleagues, as any scientist does, while C philosophers have the ambition of addressing the "universal audience" (a traditional feature of philosophical discourse according to Perelman's and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *Traité de l'argumentation*, 1958).

2b – A philosophers feel the need of specifying any thesis or theory by examples ("cases") and open arguments; Cs often present challenging theories without worrying so much about the explicit justification of what they claim: they adopt more *associative* than *argumentative* strategies.

2c – As a consequence, A philosophers preferably author articles or short papers, about specific, well-determined problems, while Cs publish books and wide explorations of wide themes (such as "the end of modernity," "the crisis of reason").

[26] About the scientific and epistemic role of style in logic, mathematics and philosophy in general, see P. Cantù, *What Is Axiomatics?*, "Annals of Mathematics and Philosophy" 30.07.2022, Vol. 1.

Altogether, A philosophy is distinctively characterized by "a piecemeal approach" to problems, "encouraging small-scale investigations rather than grand system-building."[27]

3. Relations to the extra-philosophical – The consequences can be already inferred, but again I suggest distinguishing.

3a – A philosophers underrate the dialogue with *culture*, so with art, cinema and the humanities ("soft" sciences), which is favoured by Cs; they prefer to dialogue with natural or formal ("hard") sciences, ignored by Cs or considered (in some cases) as belonging to an "anti-philosophical" paradigm.

3b – *Science* and *common sense* ("intuition") offer shared premises for A arguments, while being irrelevant for Cs; reference to current *socio-cultural facts* gives typical premises (and legitimation) to C arguments, while being hardly mentioned by As.

3c – A philosophers underrate or ignore *public philosophy*: a philosophical practice systematically interacting with public debates, which is typical of Cs and of European culture in general.[28]

3d – As a consequence, A philosophers tend to think that one thing is what philosophers say as *professionals*, and another is their public engagement as intellectuals; there is no difference of this sort in the C tradition (or if it were, it would be blurred and easily crossed).

These aspects confirm what has been sometimes said: that "unlike analytic philosophy, continental philosophy has never turned away from culture, tradition, literature. By contrast, analytic philosophy has tended to think about language in abstraction from such matters."[29]

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[27] M. Beaney, *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, p. 19.

[28] Especially in French culture. "Les philosophes" of the 17th century have turned into "les intellectuels" in the 19th, and "les maîtres à penser" of the late 20th.

[29] C.B. Sachs, *What Is to Be Overcome? Nietzsche, Carnap, and Modernism as the Overcoming of Metaphysics*, "History of Philosophy Quarterly" 2011, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 303.

4. The use of logic and the use of history (of philosophy) – This is a point which I consider most significant.

4a – For Cs the history of a philosophical issue or concept is "a substantial and even indispensable element for the analysis," while As tend to treat concepts "as if they were ahistorical entities."[30] Cs normally ignore or even resist the use of formal logic in philosophy, whereas modern logic has been grounding for the birth and development of A philosophy.

4b – As a consequence, A and C differ in *educational strategies*: As normally favour logic and the study of argumentation, whereas Cs consider the history of philosophy as didactically primary.

NB – What is lacking in A metaphilosophy is not "history" or "historiography" as such, but the meta-scientific (heuristic and explanatory) role of history of philosophy for philosophy. In contrast, for most European philosophers the history of philosophy offers invaluable resources for the progress of philosophy.[31]

[30] C. Dutilh Novaes, *Conceptual Genealogy for Analytic Philosophers*, in: *Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide*, eds. J.A. Bell, A. Cutrofello, P.M. Livingston, Routledge, Oxford 2016, pp. 75–108. So that "one's stance towards genealogical projects can be seen as one of the main differences between so-called continental and so-called analytic philosophers" (p. 77).

[31] Michael Beaney discusses the prejudice of A tradition's ignorance of history (*The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, pp. 35–38), but he refers to historiography, and not to history as a method or resource for philosophical analyses, that is, the commitment to what Charles Taylor has called "the historical thesis about philosophy" (see R. Piercey, *The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic-Continental Divide*, op. cit., p. 277). Gary Gutting (*Philosophical Progress*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Methodology*, eds. H. Cappelen, T. Szabó Gendler, J. Hawthorne, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, Ch. 17) criticizes the fundamentally "C" "engagement with the history of philosophy," but clearly is not speaking of history as a resource for solving philosophical problems (and for metaphilosophical and methodological considerations). That the meta-scientific role of the history of philosophy is underrated in A tradition is one of the "wrong" aspects of that tradition has been significantly noted by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, Barry Smith (three A philosophers who know European philosophy well) in *What's Wrong in Contemporary Philosophy?*, "Topoi" 2006, Vol. 25, No. 1–2, pp. 63–67. An efficacious but evidently reductive version of the idea is given in T. Williamson, *Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018: "If you really ignore all past philosophy, that includes the past thirty years […] with luck, you would reinvent the wheel. Alternatively, you might invent the square wheel" (p. 104).

Each distinction is arguable, and has been discussed,[32] but the A–C dualism well captures the situation of philosophical research in the late 20th century. At that time, the effects of the divide were clear and unquestionable. To mention a marginal but significant example, if someone wanted to know something about a philosophical problem, and if they wanted to receive exhaustive information, one had to refer to two main bibliographical repertories: the *Philosopher's Index*, and the *Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie*, the former mainly recording A researches, the latter mainly C, with poor or null intersection.[33] So, besides being an interesting phenomenon of historical and cultural relevance, the divide represented a practical problem: a question one ought to solve, if one wanted to consider "philosophy" a reasonable part of our collective knowledge.

3. The Underlying Problem

In the reconstruction of sub-section 2.2, we have seen that what Russell and Moore (and later A philosophers) rejected and what they embraced were what Cs, respectively, embraced and rejected. And I suggest they were, respectively, the *transcendental* and the *logical* conception of philosophy.[34] (They can be labelled differently: we may also speak of a *critical* and a *semantic* turn, but as I will explain in a while, the former term is too wide, the latter too narrow.)

3.1. Is Philosophy an "Exceptional" Science?

The first step of my interpretation consists of seeing the A–C dualism as an effect of the institutional and meta-scientific *weakness* of philosophy in late modernity.

[32] I have explored and discussed each distinctive criterion in *From a Continental Point of View*, op. cit. See also B. Dainton, H. Robinson, *What* Is *Analytic Philosophy?*, in: *The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy*, eds. B. Dainton, H. Robinson, Bloomsbury, London 2014, pp. 569–570. A clear presentation of all the reasons the characterization of A philosophy in contrastive terms is arguable but somehow inevitable, is given by H.-J. Glock, *Geography and Language*, in *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 61–88.

[33] Another marginal but significant case is the use of different citation systems: in paradigmatic A cases, author-date; in many C cases the notation system, which is still generally preferred in the humanities.

[34] One may say that my reconstruction in sub-section 2.2 is opinionated, already oriented by the thesis. In fact, it corresponds to a largely shared interpretation of the dualism. More details will be found in *From a Continental Point of View*, op. cit., pp. 354–357.

This was basically the underlying problem: the dualism has been the expression of the uncertain status of a subject named "philosophy" in the late modern settlement of science.

Philosophy has been considered a "non-normal" (vague, unspecified, ambiguous) subject since the beginning of its history. Aristotle himself spent many pages (fourteen or eleven books named *meta-ta-physika*) in trying to fix the nature of what he variously calls "first science," or "first philosophy" or simply "philosophy": the science of the "first principles" generally intended (*Met*. I), or "the science of truth" (*Met*. II, 993a), or also the paradoxical science whose specificity consists in dealing with "non-specified" objects (see *Met*. IV, 1003b). But any epoch has its own metaphilosophical difficulties. And there are reasons to believe that in late modernity the science or intellectual activity called "philosophy" risked disappearance. "Science" (as cultural fact and set of academic subjects) definitely distinguished from "philosophy," and its specialized sectors and technological applications gained a new cultural relevance.[35]

I am not saying that the A–C question is interpretable as the conflict between, respectively, a scientific and an anti- or extra-scientific philosophy. Theories about the scientific (normal) or non-scientific (non-normal) nature of philosophy are sparsely present in both traditions. Yet, considering the distinctive factors I have mentioned in sub-section 2.3, we can see well that A philosophy *is more easily adaptable to the system of "normal" sciences*, and to the consequent requirements of specialization and methodological accuracy (see sub-section 4.2). In the C tradition, instead, the idea of *the anomalous status of philosophy has been generally accepted*, on occasion defended, and progressively *radicalized* in the central decades of the century. Why has this happened?

The diagnosis I intend to favour is that while C philosophy has inherited (and in some cases emphasized) Kant's idea of *self-critical reason*, that is, a kind of rationality (and a consideration of science) that includes and implies the critique of reason, A philosophers have been extraneous to this idea, and so have remained substantially faithful to the principles of rationality ruling modern science, tech-

[35] This is a Heidegger-inspired account of the situation of philosophy in late modernity close to the one proposed by G. Vattimo in *Beyond Interpretation*, op. cit., and *The Responsibility of the Philosopher*, ed. F. d'Agostini, transl. W. McCuaig, Columbia University Press, New York 2010 [2000].

nology and common sense.[36] If we adopt this line of thought, then the interpretation of the A–C dualism changes: we do not simply have a "scientific" or "normalized" philosophy (A) as opposed to an anti-scientific or "non-normal" (C), rather we have a deeper reason of divergency.

3.2. The Two Turns: Philosophy and the Self-Criticism of Reason

Adopting this line of thought, we can see that the controversial point is the position of philosophy among sciences, and thus, the first origin of the A–C divide is located in the age in which German thinkers tried to give philosophy the status of a specific science. Or rather: they tried to redefine the nature of "science" in general, by locating philosophy in it, with a new, foundational role. This role was intendedly given by the idea of self-critical – transcendental, and later dialectical – reason.

A philosophers may have some difficulty in accepting this narrative. In A-mainstream account, the "transcendental" view has been most frequently seen as a position in metaphysics or in epistemology, but it was a wider programme.[37] Kant's philosophy launched a new conception of self-reflective reason, including a particular philosophy of science with meta-scientific relevant consequences.[38] And his legacy also conveyed, specifically with Hegel, the idea that philosophical discourse deserves a particular (dialectical, dynamic) logic.

In this diagnosis, *the first intra-philosophical reason* of the A–C dualism has been the resistance of A philosophers against this attempt to ground philosophy on critical bases: the resistance against Kant's seminal idea of philosophy as

[36] Historical and cultural facts justified the typically C move from "self-criticism" to "self-destruction" or "deconstruction" of reason. Faced with the ruinous effects of totalitarianisms, the idea that "there was something wrong" in Western rationality seemed evident. See, classically, T.W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Verso, London 1989 [1947]; H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, Viking Press, New York 1965 [1963].

[37] As S. Gardner and M. Grist stress, "the transcendental turn should not be identified with any specific epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but rather concerns the fundamental standpoint and terms of reference of philosophical inquiry" (S. Gardner, M. Grist, *Introduction*, in: *The Transcendental Turn*, eds. S. Gardner, M. Grist, op. cit., p. 1).

[38] See the reconstruction of the transcendental-idealistic metaphilosophy in *Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus* (ed. E. Ficara, Königshausen & Neumann, Wurzburg 2011). The *Wissenschaftslehre*, the doctrine of science, has been a crucial motive in the development of German philosophy.

a critique of reason (wherein "critique" in transcendental sense means *grounding*, i.e. explanation and justification). There is no need here to give details about the transcendental turn. For now, we can keep to the basic thesis: that what has been called the Anglo-American "allergy" to transcendentalism[39] has been the first source of the divide. The particular status of philosophy in relation to science established by Kant (and by the consequent *deutsche Bewegung*) was not acknowledged and accepted in the birth and development of A tradition.

3.3. The Two Turns: A New Metaphysics for Logic and Philosophy

In fact, the "allergy" would have been rapidly overcome, if there had not been, at the end of the 19th century, a similar and equally influential metaphilosophical turn. The second intra-philosophical cause of the split is related to the role of formal logic in grounding the A tradition, providing a new method and a new image of philosophy.

The "logical view" for A philosophy did not simply imply the explanatory and heuristic role of mathematical symbols and structures to approach philosophical problems; it has not been properly or exclusively the idea of promoting some kind of generalized "logicist philosophy," "formal philosophy" or "scientific philosophy" either. As Ernst Tugendhat has stressed in his *Lectures* on analytic philosophy[40] the logical consideration of language offered new methodological suggestions for conceptual analysis, basically launching the predicative account of concepts (Frege's theory of quantification, and of predicates-concepts as *functions*) but it also gave new grounding ideas in ontology and in metaphysics.

Even more radically, I would say that the new logic in the A tradition provided a *paradigmatic turn*, as complete and fruitful as was the one provided by transcendentalism: new ideas in metaphysics and epistemology, but also new methodological resources, new terminology, and consequently, a new way of locating philosophy with respect to science and culture in general. Philosophy discovered a new "exactness," at the same time the opportunity of approaching old questions and programmes, while locating itself in the general development of late-modern scientific spirit. All this, clearly, generated the stylistic and methodological A-features I have listed in 2.3 as opposed to C.

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[39] O. Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, transl. J. Bailiff, Humanity Press, 1997 [1987].

[40] E. Tugendhat, *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language*, transl. P.A. Gorner, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982 [1975], pp. 5, 170–176.

3.4. The Rivalry

Was there true incompatibility? Maybe no, there was not. But significantly (also for the above-mentioned historical and cultural reasons) the two turns have developed in irreducible rivalry.

The new logical approach was launched and conceived in opposition to the transcendental turn: or rather, to what of transcendentalism had been absorbed in the English-speaking world. Russell found in Peano's and Frege's new mathematical logic an antidote to the confounding vagueness of the theories of British idealism and of traditional (European) philosophy, and this was also the intuition at the basis of neo-empiricism.[41]

On the other hand, in the transcendental-idealistic (and hence phenomenological) tradition, logic was considered an extra-philosophical discipline (following Kant's suggestion), or there has been a clear distinction between formal and transcendental logic (Husserl conceived them as respectively objective and subjective), or a declared enmity towards the logical approach (held "intellectualistic," reductive, mechanic, fundamentally of no use in philosophy: "formulette," in Benedetto Croce's words; "technique of specialists without conceptual awareness," in Theodor W. Adorno's words). What is worse, the same meaning of "logic" in C philosophy began to diverge from the meaning used in A tradition. While A philosophers have accepted the idea that there is no other "logic" than mathematical (symbolic) logic, basically conceived as "the science of validity in virtue of forms," for many C philosophers "logic" has been conceived as "science of pure thought," or of "the a priori elements of thought" (as in the old terminology adopted by Kant), or of "the concept of concept" (in Hegel's view).[42]

4. The Divide Today

The point is not that there have been two turns, but that each of them was grounded on the rejection of the other. The logical turn, extremely important for the history of philosophy and culture of the 20th century, has been misrep-

[41] What consolidated Russell's and Moore's "rebellion" has been a complex series of cultural and practical factors, such as the resistance of pre-transcendental empiricism; bad translations; the objective difficulty of German classical thinkers' language; and eventually, the above-seen historical circumstances, which definitely strengthened the rejection.

[42] I have specified all this in F. d'Agostini, *From a Continental Point of View*, op. cit.

resented, ignored or underrated in the development of C philosophy. And in the same way, the transcendental turn, equally important for the self-understanding of philosophy in the age of science and information, has been ignored, misinterpreted or underrated in the A tradition. Now we can begin to see what remains of this mutual resistance nowadays.

4.1. End of A and/or C?

Theories about the end of the A–C dualism are of various kinds.[43] One may say it has disappeared

- because of the disappearance of A and C *separately* (each term becoming obsolete);
- because of the end of the *incompatibility* between them; or also
- because one tradition (in particular A) *wiped out* the other.

There might be reasons in favour of all of these options. (And there is also the normative version of the end-theory: if the divide has not ended, it must end now.)

In his introduction to *The Future for Philosophy*, Brian Leiter gives a well-argued presentation of the first hypothesis: the A–C interpretation of philosophical facts is obsolete for the vanishing of both A and C.[44] In the collective volume *Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide*,[45] we find a version of the second diagnosis: the editors claim the old distinction makes no sense, because there can be a "synthetic" philosophy, given by joined consideration of A and C products, themes, authors; and what is more, such a synthetic view is already practised, nowadays. A recent special issue of the online journal "Borderless Philosophy" is titled *The End of Analytic Philosophy and/or Continental Philosophy, Yes or No? And if Yes, Then What's Beyond?*[46] The shared point of the articles is a normative end-theory of the third kind: what distinguishes A philosophy, ultimately, is the idea that "professional philosophy" is the only philosophy one has to consider, which is uselessly diminishing for all practices that are not A.

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[43] A general and detailed consideration of the relevance of the distinction is also given by H.-J. Glock, *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, op. cit., pp. 1–22. The contemporary failure of "geo-linguistic conceptions" is also well pictured there, on pp. 80–88.

[44] B. Leiter, *Introduction: The Future for Philosophy*, in: *The Future for Philosophy*, ed. B. Leiter, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, pp. 1–23.

[45] J.A. Bell, A. Cutrofello, P.M. Livingston, eds., *Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide*, op. cit.

[46] "Borderless Philosophy" 2022, Vol. 5: *The End of Analytic and/or Continental Philosophy, Yes, or No? And if Yes, Then What's Beyond?*

In fact, if we look at the current conditions of philosophy we cannot say A and C have totally disappeared as such (jointly or separately). Rather, we have now paradigmatic examples of A and C (say, respectively: Timothy Williamson, Judith Butler); A-formed philosophers who consider and read C (e.g., Graham Priest, Penelope Maddy) and C-trained philosophers that read and consider A (such as Günter Abel, Markus Gabriel). And we also have many A + C philosophers, people who are not necessarily bridge-builders, but show, *de facto* or *de jure*, the implausibility of the old distinction, combining authors, stiles or approaches of the two traditions (some examples: Nicholas Rescher, Christopher Norris, Robert Brandom). But to have clearer ideas, we should still consider the third position, and the current situation of philosophy in general.

4.2. A without C?

In favour of the third hypothesis, we can say that two unquestionable facts have occurred in the recent development of academic philosophy:

- Analytic philosophy has become "the dominant kind of philosophy in the English-speaking world."[47]
- English has become, definitely, the official philosophical language, all over the world.

The connection of these two facts might be worrying: the dominant philosophy is the one which speaks the dominant language. Could it import some problems for the science-discipline we still call "philosophy"? As a matter of fact, many relevant things might get lost. Without the rich plurality of European languages, the best expressions and novelties of C philosophy risk disappearing. One would say that if there has ever been an "A–C war," then A has simply won, and even if nominally there is still "C" philosophy, its impact in academic philosophy is becoming marginal.

"The success of analytic philosophy" is justified, according to Michael Beaney, because it is "democratic and meritocratic." There might be reasonable doubts about both features. If we keep to the characterization of A and C suggested in subsection 2.3 we can find an alternative and more realistic explanation of the current dominance of A philosophy. All the mentioned distinctions do confirm that the

[47] M. Beaney, *What Is Analytic Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 11. Scott Soames writes "by the mid-1960s the analytic tradition had become the dominant philosophical force in America" (S. Soames, *Analytic Philosophy in America*, op. cit., p. ix).

metaphilosophical approach of A philosophy is more adaptable to the procedures and methods of normal science than C philosophy. The "scientific" settlement of academic philosophy – in the way in which it is practised nowadays – gives clear advantages to A philosophers, while is obvious hindrance for Cs.

Science in principle does not admit of any *universal audience* (2a); in strictly "scientific" perspective the largely "sociological" reflections of *public philosophers* are seen as belonging to pop-sociology or to an extra-philosophical activity (3b); *wide C themes* – such as the nature of "modernity" or "the crisis of reason" – are held irrelevant (2c); *genealogical* and *historical* considerations are useless in formal or natural (hard) sciences and are admitted only in specific historiographic territories (4). And yes, science as such is "democratic and meritocratic" *in principle*, because it is ruled by truth, and so it is (should be) indifferent to powers and privileges, but *in practice*, science is (to a certain extent must be) ruled by epistemic oligarchies and selective criteria that can (should) be discriminatory. And finally, philosophy speaks English, everywhere, just because *English is the language of science*, everywhere, as Latin was in medieval times. Maybe it is a good thing or it is not, but it is a fact, and its simple occurrence imports relevant changes for philosophical styles and practices. The negative consequences are foreseeable: the destiny of theories and theses produced in the "periphery," or "semi-periphery" of the English-speaking world is uncertain.[48]

4.3. Is There Still "Philosophy"?

In fact, the real problem is whether, once we admit the "victory" of A philosophy, this dominant "A" has really any kind of identity or enjoys any shared metaphilosophy. It is not clear whether there is still some "A" philosophy in any non-nominal sense. The big volume edited by Beaney (1,161 pages) shows that actually there still are "purely" A philosophers, and as I have said (sub-section 4.1) it is

[48] This problem has been frequently treated, by sociologists and philosophers of science, but it seems these studies have not had decisive impact in metaphilosophy. "The material and institutional constraints affecting researchers in economically disadvantaged parts of the globe" ought to stimulate a decisive revision of the institutional principles that rule sciences and disciplines in general. K. Bennett, ed., *The Semiperiphery of Academic Writing: Discourses, Communities and Practices*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2014. See also the seminal work of A.S. Canagarajah, *A Geopolitics of Academic Writing*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2002; the problem has been tackled later by many other authors of different perspectives. See also A.S. Canagarajah, *The End of Second Language Writing?*, "Journal of Second Language Writing" 2013, Vol. 22, pp. 440–441.

basically true, but as far as I can see, they are "A" mainly because there is a certain nominal acknowledgement of their belonging to A tradition, but it is not clear whether these "A" philosophers really enjoy shared ideas about why they are doing what they do, and how they can do it "well."

As a distinguished A philosopher has declared recently:

> After all, we are still learning to do philosophy well. To see how far it can take us, we have to keep doing philosophy.[49]

This is an interesting and honest observation. A philosophical literature nowadays seems to be unusually interested in metaphilosophical themes and research, but the field of normative philosophy is still unexplored and extremely uncertain a territory. This should not be surprising: to have it one would require a *reflexive*, *generalistic* (universalistic) and *prescriptive* attitude, which is hardly adoptable by the "piecemeal approach" of A philosophy and with the specialized language of science. But note that, namely, the combination of reflexive and normative attitudes has been typical of the C-accounts of philosophy inspired by the transcendental programme.

In this respect, if we consider the two factors I have mentioned at the beginning: the *globalization* and *specialization* of philosophy, we can see how the divide is doomed to encounter a simultaneous and paradoxical survival and disappearance. Actually, the A–C dualism involved differences concerning mentalities, languages, cultures. But in the global world incompatibilities of this kind are not relevant. And in the current specialization of the philosophical research, "generalist" debates that animated late-modern culture do not make much sense. The field of philosophy is now a wide area of disciplines that parallel each other, often without any mutual acknowledgement of their respective results. One could consistently say that the A–C divide postulates the existence of "philosophy" as a general subject, but there is no more "philosophy" nowadays. There are philosophical disciplines that work with poor or null communication, sometimes adopting different methods, canonical authors, basic tenets, etc. And since there is no A–C without (general) philosophy, we may state that there is no A–C because there is no "philosophy" anymore.[50]

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[49] D.J. Chalmers, *Why Isn't There More Progress, in Philosophy?*, in: *Philosophers of Our Times*, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, pp. 347–370.

[50] Nicholas Rescher has claimed that philosophy is a lively sector of studies nowadays, but the current conditions of philosophical practice make the role of "philosophers" unthinkable, so there is

5. Summary and Conclusion

I have interpreted the A–C problem as the result of the uncertain status of philosophy in late modernity, and I traced back the meta-philosophical differences between A and C to the dualism between the transcendental turn and the logical turn, which respectively occurred in contemporary philosophy: at the beginning of the 19th century, and at the beginning of the 20th. The two turns have conveyed diverging ideas of philosophy. They have positively framed two different images of reason (in principle and for a certain time as based on two different conceptions of language).

I have suggested that today the differences between A and C (as ideal-typical properties) are definitely more shadowed, and there are contaminations and integrations, due to the general process of globalization of philosophy. There are reasons to favour an idea of philosophy as a sort of *exploded* territory,[51] wherein A philosophy survives, but more nominally than substantially, or as a perspective that is not able to correct its own "explosion." All this happens in the context of an alleged dominance of A philosophy, so that C philosophy has no say in the matter, and thus, its traditional resources of critical and foundational rationality cannot help.

Chalmers's doubts about "doing philosophy well" are justified because, as we see in the *Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology* there is no accordance about philosophical methods[52] and for universal admission philosophy has no definite episteme (subject matter).[53] So Chalmers is right in thinking that what

a lot of philosophy, but no "philosopher" as such (see N. Rescher, *Philosophy without Philosophers*, "American Philosophical Quarterly" 2016, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 213–214). I overturn the diagnosis: there are many (at least nominal) "philosophers," but no trace of the field they are held to share.

[51] I use "explosion" in the meaning of paraconsistent logicians and dialetheists, to mean a general trivialization whereby everything becomes true, everything is proved (and the problem does not only regard philosophy). See G. Priest, F. Berto, Z. Weber, *Dialetheism*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022 Edition), eds. E.N. Zalta, U. Nodelman, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/dialetheism (substantive revision on 13.08.2022).

[52] J. Dever, *What is Philosophical Methodology?*, in: H. Cappelen, T. Szabó Gendler, J. Hawthorne, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Methodology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016. Exploring the many and not convergent definitions of "methodology" J. Dever discovers that there is no definite answer even about the meaning of the term: "there is no obvious and straight forward fitting of an account of Philosophical Methodology onto the way in which philosophers use 'methodological' talk" (p. 23).

[53] In the authoritative picture provided by Williamson in various works (see, e.g., T. Williamson, *Doing Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 141–142) philosophy is a set of different methods to be applied to an unspecified variety of subject matters.

A philosophers can do is going on doing what they do. What I would add, is that the vagueness and wideness of the discipline and the unsupported "going on" of philosophers are the first reasons of the impressive redundancy of the field. The philosophical jungle remains unexplorable, until philosophy regains its own identity, and as it seems, the dominant philosophy cannot provide any solution.

All this may answer to the question proposed by the title of this article: yes, there has been an A–C problem, and yes, such a problem still persists (in some sense). But I would like to conclude by suggesting that "good philosophers" have never been strictly A or C: they have always practised some transcendental- and logic-sensitive philosophy, even if without naming the two aspects in this way. So nothing is to be changed in the action of good philosophers, nowadays. Rather, something is to be changed in how "philosophy" is culturally and institutionally conceived. Because if there still are "good" philosophers (in the intended sense), but the dominantly A philosophers do not have clear and shared ideas about what doing philosophy well means, then these good philosophers and their products might pass unnoticed or be systematically ignored.

In the current "information explosion" or "data flood" which affects philosophy (just like any other science or discipline), the resources for selecting what is "philosophically" good or bad, right or wrong, are exploded too. (Explosion is a *conservative* property: if a system is exploded, then the means to normalize it are exploded too.) Maybe the development of philosophy (and of science in general) will find some optimal *eskaton*, thanks to the internal wisdom of human history. This is a Hegelian thesis that is not easily acceptable (on ground of our experience). What we can do, for now, is to promote normative metaphilosophical reflections, and try to establish, with a certain categoricalness, what "doing philosophy well" means. A reconsideration of the A–C question may help us in this direction.

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The Kyoto School after 1950: The Problem of Its Unity and Methodology

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Abstract: The Kyoto School (*Kyōto-gakuha*) is a group of Japanese thinkers who developed original philosophical theories inspired both by Western philosophy and the philosophy of East Asia, especially by Mahāyāna Buddhism and Daoism. As is reflected in the name of the School, its founding members were associated with Kyoto University. The Kyoto School originator, Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), did not think of himself as a founder of any school and always encouraged independent thinking in his students. In the beginning, the so-called Kyoto School philosophers studied and taught at Kyoto University, they developed their thinking under the influence of Nishida as well as in dialogue and debate with him and with one another. However, after 1964, when Nishitani Keiji, Nishida's student, retired from the Chair of Philosophy of Religion, Kyoto University has ceased to be the main place of Kyoto School philosophers' activity. The aim of this paper is to prove that after 1950 we should understand the Kyoto School mainly as a specific theoretical frame and methodological approach. All thinkers branded as "Kyoto School philosophers" studied Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially Zen and Shin (True Pure Land) schools, in a non-dogmatic and non-sectarian manner. One of the characteristic methodologies of the Kyoto School is "selective identification," by which I mean explaining Buddhist concepts using selected Western terms or theories but taking them out of their original context. Another method of the Kyoto School philosophers is to develop Western philosophical theories in a new direction (sometimes quite unexpected by Western philosophers) by confronting them with the Buddhist worldview.

Key words: Kyoto School, Nishida Kitarō, absolute nothingness, overcoming modernity, Mahāyāna Buddhism

1. Introduction

The Kyoto School (*Kyōto-gakuha*) is a group of Japanese thinkers who developed original philosophical theories inspired both by Western philosophy and the philosophy of East Asia, especially by Mahāyāna Buddhism and Daoism. Initially, Kyoto School philosophers studied and taught at Kyoto University and developed

their thinking under the influence of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) as well as in dialogue and debate with him and with one another.[1]

The following criteria roughly characterize the features of the Kyoto School:

1. Teaching at Kyoto University and/or being related to Nishida in some intellectual way.
2. Sharing some basic assumptions about using East Asian thought (mainly Mahāyāna Buddhism) in the framework of the Western philosophical tradition.
3. Introducing and rationally investigating the meaning of "absolute nothingness" and its importance in the history of philosophical debate.
4. Expanding on the philosophical vocabulary introduced by Nishida.
5. An ambivalent attitude towards Western modernity (or towards modernization as Westernization).

It was Tosaka Jun (1900–1945)[2] who first time used the designation "the Kyoto School," because he wanted to draw attention to the fact that the pioneering work of the celebrated Nishida Kitarō was being advanced in no less creative form by his principal student, Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), who succeeded Nishida in the Chair of Philosophy at the Kyoto Imperial University. Tosaka, who was Tanabe's student, felt that the expression "Nishida's philosophy" did not do justice to Tanabe and Nishida's other followers.[3]

There are many polemics regarding the membership of the Kyoto School but usually the following philosophers are mentioned, among others: Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), Hisamatsu Shin'ichi (1889–1980), Kōsaka Masaaki (1900–1969), Kōyama Iwao (1905–1993), Shimomura Toratarō (1900–1925), Suzuki Shigetaka (1907–1988), Takeuchi Yoshinori (1913–2002), Ueda Shizuteru (1926–2019), Tsujimura Kōichi (1922–2010).

Since Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945) and Tosaka Jun both turned to Marxism they are excluded from the Kyoto School by some researchers but sometimes they are regarded as members of the "left wing" of this school.

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1 J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 2001, p. 5.

2 Tosaka was teaching at Hōsei University but he was removed from this post and imprisoned because of his activity in the socialist movement. He died in prison in 1945.

3 J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 4.

Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960)[4] and Kuki Shūzō (1888–1941),[5] who taught philosophy and ethics at Kyoto University for some time, are usually treated as peripheral to the Kyoto School. They both were brought to Kyoto University by Nishida and both developed philosophies that were more or less influenced by Nishida's thought. According to James W. Heisig, their thought and activities "remained too independent to count them among the inner circle of the school."[6] Robert Carter does not agree with Heisig and treats Watsuji, who also wrote about "absolute nothingness," as a very important representative of the Kyoto School together with Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani. Heisig points out that the inclusion of Hisamatsu Shin'ichi in the Kyoto School seems to be the doing of his student, Abe Masao (1915–2006), who started to be regarded as "the leading representative" of the group.[7] Abe, a student of both Hisamatsu and Nishitani, was not related to Kyoto University (he taught at the Educational University in Nara), but no one can deny that during the 1980s the Kyoto School enjoyed its greatest blossoming in the West mainly due to the efforts of Abe, who lectured in the USA. A collection of essays entitled *The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto School* published in 1982 included not only pieces by Hisamatsu and Abe but also by D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966), who did not teach at Kyoto University. Suzuki maintained a long personal relationship with Nishida since their days as schoolmates and helped introduce Nishida to the practice of Zen.[8] They kept in touch all their lives and shared the same interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The problem with Suzuki is that generally he refused to write about philosophy and stated that "to understand Zen one must abandon all he has acquired by way of conceptual knowledge and stand before it stripped of every bit of the intellection he has patiently accumulated around him."[9] Suzuki warned that any philosophy of Zen will be nothing more than a castle in the sand. This statement, however, appears to be contradicted by what Suzuki himself said in his article *The Philosophy of*

4 Watsuji graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. He was invited by Nishida to teach ethics at Kyoto University from 1925 until he was appointed professor at Tokyo Imperial University in 1934.

5 Kuki graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and started to teach at Kyoto University in 1929 after his stay in Europe where he had studied under Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

6 R.E. Carter, *The Kyoto School: An Introduction*, Suny Press, New York 2013, p. 10.

7 M. Abe, *Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1995, p. 122.

8 M. Yusa, *Zen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 2002, p. 49.

9 D.T. Suzuki, *A Reply to Van Meter Ames*, "Philosophy East and West" 1956, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 349.

Zen.[10] The problem lies in the meaning of the phrase "to understand Zen." When Suzuki rejects rational thinking, he means that it is an obstacle on the way to the experience of Enlightenment. Of course, he is right to claim that only direct insight, and not rational discourse, is the path to the Enlightenment experience – all true Zen masters, past and present, would agree with this conclusion. Yet as Zen is also a form of human expression, it is meant to be communicated and articulated in concepts and notions that belong to the so-called rational sphere. Suzuki was aware of the unavoidability of a philosophical aspect in Zen, as these words of his demonstrate: "The conceptualization of Zen is inevitable: Zen must have its philosophy. The only caution is not to identify Zen with a system of philosophy, for Zen is infinitely more than that."[11] Although Suzuki calls the philosophy of Zen "the philosophy of 'emptiness,'"[12] he was first of all a Zen teacher concerned with leading people to the experience of Enlightenment itself and his method can be labelled as "Missionary Zen." In my opinion Suzuki's writings on "the conceptualization of Zen" should be included in the Kyoto School heritage.

Other recent affiliates of the Kyoto School, who could be seen as belonging to its fourth generation, include Ōhashi Ryōsuke, Hase Shōtō, Horio Tsutomu, Ōmine Akira, Fujita Masakatsu, Mori Tetsurō, Hanaoka (Kawamura) Eiko, Matsumura Hideo, Nakaoka Narifumi, Okada Katsuaki, and Keta Masako.

Fujita Masakatsu points out that "there are almost no works [in Japan – A.K.] on the Kyoto School, which define its scope and characteristics […] while in the United States and Europe there is much interest not only in particular representatives of the Kyoto School but also in the philosophical school itself."[13] One of the reasons could be the fact that the Kyoto School "has never had any competing philosophical schools and therefore has never bothered to define its own identity."[14]

[10] D.T. Suzuki, *The Philosophy of Zen*, "Philosophy East and West" 1951, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 2–15.

[11] Ibid., p. 4.

[12] "Emptiness" (*kū*) and "absolute nothingness" (*zettaimu*) are synonyms in the Kyoto School writings.

[13] M. Fujita, *Kyōto gakuga no tetsugaku* [The Philosophy of the Kyoto School], Shōwadō, Kyōto 2001, p. i. (transl. A.K.).

[14] Ibid., p. ii.

2. Is Kyoto School in Kyoto?

After 1964, when Nishitani Keiji, who was one of Nishida's students, retired from the Chair of Philosophy of Religion, Kyoto University is no longer the main place of the Kyoto School philosophers' activity.

It should be noted that the Department of Philosophy at Kyoto University is proud of the heritage of the Kyoto School, which can be testified by the following introduction on its website:

> Before World War II the department, which became known as the Kyoto School of Philosophy, flourished under Professors Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime. However, when Kōyama Iwao was expelled from office following the war, an academic shift took place in the department.
> […]
> Detailed information on the history of the department can be found in Kyoto University's Clock Tower Centennial Hall. There, Nishida and Tanabe's philosophical contributions, as well as documents showing the expulsion of the Kyoto School philosophers from public office, are displayed. […]
> A look at the various research areas our staff members in the department have focused on over the last 30 years shows that analytic philosophy was done in parallel with research relating to classical modern philosophy such as 17th century epistemology and metaphysics, British empiricism, Leibniz, Kant, German Idealism, Heidegger, and American pragmatism. At its heart, the department strives to tackle contemporary philosophical problems based on accurate and extensive knowledge of classical philosophy.
> […]
> To sum up, Kyoto University's Philosophy Department encourages students to acquire a deep understanding of the history of the philosophy gained through access to information in multiple languages, and with an open mind to other academic and ideological traditions, including those of science. It is only after one has successfully acquired these skills that it is possible to build one's philosophical position. It is this attitude that has persevered in the department since the era of Nishida and Tanabe, and that continues to be passed down to students today.[15]

[15] *Studying Philosophy in Kyoto*, The Department of Philosophy, Kyoto University, URL: http://www.philosophy.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en_home/en_history/ (accessed 5.08.2022).

The creation of the Department of the History of Japanese Philosophy, in 1998, at Kyoto University, under the direction of Fujita Masakatsu, a specialist in the Kyoto School, makes evident that the tradition of this school is still important at this university.

One can say that there is more than one specific place associated with the Kyoto School. The Kokoro Research Center (Kokoro means "the Self")[16] at Kyoto University can be regarded as inspired in some aspects by the focus on the Self (human cognition and consciousness) in the Kyoto School, but its methodology is more diverse: "from neuro and cognitive science to Buddhist studies, from cultural and social psychology to clinical psychology, from aesthetics to public policy."[17] This is proof that Buddhist studies are treated at Kyoto University not simply as a part of religious studies but in the context of the philosophical analysis of the Self.

The groups that have formed among students of Nishida and Tanabe can be regarded in a sense as a continuation of the Kyoto School. The first of the "Nishida Kitarō Commemorative Lectures" was delivered by D.T. Suzuki in 1945, the year of Nishida's death. The following year, some of Nishida's students and interested scholars formed a group to preserve their teacher's memory and perform memorial service for him each year. The group called itself "Sunshinkai" (Society of Inch-Mind – after Nishida's lay Buddhist name) and took over the responsibility of hosting the annual commemorative lectures and discussions, which continue to this day.

Nishitani Keiji after his retirement from Kyoto University in 1965 took over as chief editor of "The Eastern Buddhist," a journal published by Ōtani University (Pure Land Buddhism) in Kyoto at which D.T. Suzuki had served as editor during its formative years. Until 1999 the journal regularly published translations of works of the Kyoto School members and articles about the philosophy of Nishida, Tanabe, or Nishitani, so at that time it could be called "the journal of the Kyoto School."

In 1980 the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture in Nagoya held the first post-war conference in Japan with Nishitani and others associated with the Kyoto School, and the same year it began publishing English translations of

[16] *Kokoro* in modern Japanese means "heart" but as a Buddhist term it means total human consciousness including both mind and heart (emotions).

[17] *Kokoro Reasearch Center*, Kyoto University, URL: https://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/research/fields/centers/kokoro-research-center (accessed 5.08.2022).

the Kyoto School's original works. A seven-volume series of essays on the Kyoto School and Japanese philosophy was published in this institute (2004–2010). So Nagoya can also be regarded as an important centre that propagates the Kyoto School philosophy.

However, Nagoya was not the only place where conferences on the Kyoto School were organized. Starting in 1983, a series of international conferences known as the Kyoto Zen Symposia were organized by Abbot Hirata Seikō of Tenryūji Temple in Kyoto in collaboration with a team of local scholars headed by Nishitani Keiji and after his death by Ueda Shizuteru. Scholars from abroad were also invited and a third of published articles after such conferences were devoted to the Kyoto School.

In 2002 the Nishida Kitarō Museum of Philosophy and its Research Center (Kahoku, Ishikawa prefecture) were established. This is where the Nishida Philosophy Association was founded in 2003.

One could conclude that the name "the Kyoto School" is not adequate anymore but it is recognized worldwide so it would be difficult to change it. I agree with Bret W. Davis that the most fundamental of the Kyoto School philosophers' shared and disputed concepts is that of "absolute nothingness," "a notion that has, in fact, most often been used as a point of reference for defining the school."[18] Therefore, it might be that the name "the School of Absolute Nothingness" would be more adequate nowadays.

3. The Kyoto School and Japanese Imperialism and Nationalism

Many foreign researchers studying the Kyoto School have overlooked the political implications of their thought, especially during World War II.[19] There is no doubt that Nishida supported the idea of a nation-state and Japan's mission as the leader of East Asia. However, he tried to prove that the spirit of Japan is not a spirit of imperialism that aims to suppress other countries. "One country tries to subjugate others, this is imperialism. If this country is powerful, it is able to

[18] B.W. Davis, *The Kyoto School*, in: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds. N. Zalta, U. Nodelman, URL: http://plato.stanford.edu./entires/kyoto-school/ (accessed 5.08.2022).

[19] J.W. Heisig, J. Maraldo, *Editors' Introduction*, in: *Rude Awakenings, Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism*, eds. J.W. Heisig, J. Maraldo, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1994, p. vii.

maintain peace for a while, but this leads to the enslavement of other nations, and this means the loss of humanity. You cannot keep power indefinitely in this way, resistance arises and war breaks out, and this leads to the collapse of culture."[20] For Nishida, the nation-state should be an "ethical subjectivity," and the primary basis of morality in the social dimension is not a duty, but a willingness to serve others, which results from readiness to dedicate oneself to the community.[21] In Nishida's vision of a multicultural world, neither the West would subsume the East nor vice versa – he believed that "various cultures, while maintaining their own individual standpoints, would develop themselves through the mediation of the world."[22]

Nishida did not question the value of the nation-state, because in his opinion, from the 19th century, it was the nation-state that became the main factor of historical and social progress.[23] He believed that Japan's destined world-historical role was to bring new order to East Asia, but it should not be interpreted as the expression of imperialism and chauvinism. One should not forget that the idea that a particular nation may be the bearer of a noble mission of civilization or liberation, and that, therefore, its actions in history serve a higher purpose, is often found in world history, unfortunately often mainly as an expression of idealistic wishful thinking.

After World War II, Nishida was criticized for his nationalist views. It cannot be said that Nishida completely cut himself off from politics, as he believed that intellectuals should try to influence the government. In 1933, he re-established contacts with his former protégé Konoe Ayamaro (1891–1945),[24] who was Prime Minister of Japan in 1937–1939 and 1940–1941. At the request of a friend, Kido Kōichi (1889–1977), who became Minister of Education, Nishida agreed to enter

[20] K. Nishida, *Nihon bunka no mondai* [Reflections on the Culture of Japan], in: *Nishida Kitarō zenshū* [The Collection of Nishida Kitarō's Works], ed. Y. Abe, Vol. 12, Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1979, p. 373. Unless stated otherwise, all translations of Japanese quotations are my own.

[21] Ibid., p. 379.

[22] K. Nishida, *Keijijōgakuteki tachiba kara mita Tōzai kodai no bunka keitai* [The Patterns of Ancient East and West Cultures as Seen from a Metaphysical Perspective], in: *Nishida Kitarō zenshū* [The Collection of Nishida Kitarō's Works], ed. Y. Abe, Vol. 7, Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1979, pp. 452–453.

[23] Ibid., p. 382.

[24] Nishida helped young Konoe Ayamaro transfer from Tokyo Imperial University to the Law Faculty of Kyoto University. After the war, Konoe Ayamaro was declared a war criminal by the Tokyo Tribunal but he did not recognize the accusations and committed suicide in prison as a sign of protest according to samurai tradition.

the Board of Consultants of the Ministry of Education, although he had refused many times before. During this period, however, Nishida was severely criticized by ultranationalists, for example, in 1938 by Minoda Muneki (1894–1946) for demanding the liberalization of educational policy. Ultranationalists were also disturbed by the activities of the Shōwa Era Scientific Society (Shōwa Kenkyūkai), as they considered its message inconsistent with the national spirit. Nishida was actively involved in the founding of this association, which, due to its ties to the Konoe Ayamaro government, was often criticized by post-war historians as nationalist and even fascist. It should be noted, however, that the Shōwa Era Scientific Society was supposed to be a counterbalance to the far right, as the society's members shared Nishida's view that Japan cannot isolate itself from the world by looking only at its own tradition. Nishida's statement that the word "worldly" (*sekaiteki*) "is now considered a disgusting phrase that a decent man should not use"[25] indicates the climax of the nationalist hysteria that prevailed in Japan at the time.

Nishida had great respect for the imperial family, but he discussed its merits in a different context than official proponents of "national structure" (*kokutai*). When the imperial house donated a significant amount from its private resources to the development of education, Nishida wrote that "the unbroken imperial line is a symbol of mercy, altruism, and partnership."[26] During a public speech in Tokyo's Hibiya Park in 1937, he proclaimed that in Japan the imperial family was the foundation of Japanese national identity, but he also emphasized that Japan needed contact with the world for its spiritual growth and development of individualism and liberalism, concepts criticized at the time as Western ideas that threatened traditional Japanese morality. In a 1941 speech delivered directly to the emperor, he stated that: "Any totalitarian system that negates outright the role of the individual is but an anachronism."[27] He was not arrested only because he had influential sympathizers within the moderate ranks of the government who protected him.

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[25] K. Nishida, *Shokan 1* [Letters 1], in: *Nishida Kitarō zenshū* [The Collection of Nishida Kitarō's Works], ed. Y. Abe, Vol. 19, Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1979, p. 86.

[26] M. Yusa, *Zen and Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 168.

[27] K. Nishida, *Rekishi tetsugaku ni tsuite* [On the Philosophy of History], in: *Nishida Kitarō zenshū* [The Collection of Nishida Kitarō's Works], ed. Y. Abe, Vol. 12, Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1979, p. 271.

Nishida's ideas were carried forth into even more controversial political engagements by his students, such as Nishitani Keiji, Kōyama Iwao, Kōsaka Masaaki, Suzuki Shigetaka, and to a lesser extent Shimomura Toratarō. Nishitani affirmed that the war was imperative to establish the supreme ideal of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the war, he was accused of having supported the wartime government and in July 1946 he was banned from holding any public position by the United States Occupation authorities. In 1952 Nishitani was reinstated to his post as the head of the Chair of Philosophy of Religion at Kyoto University. According to Heisig, "Nishitani brought his considerable learning and youthful idealism to bear on the political ideology of the day, only to be swept along in currents much stronger than he had prepared for."[28] Tanabe Hajime, who retired about five months before the end of the war in 1945, was labelled "a racist," "a Nazi" and "a Fascist."[29] In 1946 Tanabe started to develop his theory of "philosophy as Metanoetics (beyond reasoning)" being influenced by the Pure Land Buddhist notion of "Other Power,"[30] which is related also to his personal regrets. In 1951, he wrote: "But as the tensions of World War II grew even more fierce and with it the regulation of thinking, weak-willed as I was, I found myself unable to resist and could not but yield to some degree to the prevalent mood, which is a shame deeper than I can bear. […] I can only lower my head and earnestly lament my sin."[31]

It should be noted that many philosophers of the Kyoto School were criticized by the right-wing scholars and politicians for not supporting Japan's turn to militarism and rightist ideology, and immediately after the war for having supported it.[32] Heisig does not agree with the conclusion that anything approaching or supporting the imperialistic ideology of wartime Japan belongs to the fundamental inspiration of the Kyoto School philosophers' thought. "Insofar as any of them

[28] J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 5.

[29] R.E. Carter, *The Kyoto School*, op. cit., p. 66.

[30] In Pure Land Buddhism, the idea of "Other Power" (*tariki*) is related to Buddha Amida (Sanskr. Amitabha), who made a vow that all who call upon him will be reborn in his Pure Land (Buddhist paradise), where everybody will be able to attain Enlightenment. Thus conceived "Other Power" is inseparable from Great Mercy.

[31] J.W. Heisig, *The "Self That Is Not-a-Self": Tanabe's Dialectics of Self-Awareness*, in: *The Religious Philosophy of Tanabe Hajime: The Metanoetic Imperative*, eds. T. Unno, J.W. Heisig, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990, p. 284.

[32] R.E. Carter, *The Kyoto School*, op. cit., p. 94.

did willingly add support, it may be considered an aberration from their own intellectual goals."[33]

In my opinion, not only Nishitani or Tanabe but also Nishida believed in the uniqueness of Japanese culture and its mission in world history. They were concerned with the imperialistic presence of Western powers in Asia, and they certainly did not want Japan to become a colony. The opening to the world after a long time of isolation, the forced modernization in Western style, and all historical circumstances were also the source of the preoccupation with the Japanese identity and nationalism – this was the atmosphere in which the Kyoto School philosophers lived and thought. However, I agree with Heisig that the philosophy of the Kyoto School should not be reduced to the rationale for Japan's expansion in East Asia.

Only in the past few decades the reputation of the Kyoto School has been significantly rehabilitated in Japan, due to a general reaffirmation of cultural identity and a new debate on "Japanese uniqueness," as well as the positive attention the School has received from Western scholars.

4. Overcoming Modernity (*kindai no chōkoku*)

In July 1942, a group of Japanese intellectuals (including some representatives of the Kyoto School, such as Nishitani Keiji and Kōyama Iwao) was brought together by the magazine "Literary World" ("Bungakukai") as part of a symposium on modern Western civilization and its reception in Japan. The papers and discussions were published under the title *Overcoming Modernity*.[34] At that time the idea of overcoming modernity developed in conjunction with their wartime political theories, which typically saw the nation of Japan as playing a key role in the historical movement through and beyond Western modernity. This problem was also related to their critique of the contradictions and hypocrisies of Western imperialism.

After the war, the idea of "overcoming modernity" has proven to be one of the stimulating theories of the Kyoto School. In 1997 the international conference

[33] J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 6.

[34] R. Minamoto, *The Symposium on "Overcoming Modernity"*, in: *Rude Awakenings, Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism*, eds. J.W. Heisig, J. Maraldo, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1994, p. 197.

"Logique de lieu at dépassement de la modernité" (The Logic of Topos and Overcoming of Modernity) was organized in Paris by Agustin Berque and scholars from the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto as part of a larger project (1996–1998) on this subject. The following problems were discussed:

- Japanese perspective as crucial to debates on postmodernism in philosophy and post-colonialism in cultural studies;
- the critical stance on modernization as Westernization;
- the need for a critical and creative retrieval of the traditions of the East, which would enable the new religious and philosophical theories to move through and beyond the limits and problems of Western modernity.

The Kyoto School philosophers did not nostalgically plea for a return to a premodern age but they believed that creatively appropriated selected elements of Japanese spiritual tradition should be combined with the best of what Japan could learn from the West. Especially important was the problem of the redefinition of the Self as No-Self (Jap. *muga*; Sanskr. *anātman*) in the Buddhist context of overcoming subject–object dualism, since such theories could lead to a more harmonious vision of the co-existence of all elements in the universe (including the co-existence of humankind and nature), than the philosophical paradigms of a subject alienated from the world of objects of cognition.

5. The "Originality" of the Kyoto School

James W. Heisig's rather ambivalent approach to the Kyoto School has become very influential among Western researchers. On the one hand, Heisig claims that "[i]n the Kyoto school we have the making of a school of thought able to stand shoulder to shoulder with major schools and currents of philosophy in the west."[35] On the other hand, he regards the work of the Kyoto School as a "derivative philosophy."[36] "In the context of Western philosophy, the Kyoto philosophers need to be seen as a derivative school of thought. None of them represents the

[35] J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 7.
[36] Ibid., p. 259.

kind of revolutionary originality we associate with the thinkers who were most influential on them: Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, James, and Heidegger."[37]

According to Heisig, the Kyoto philosophers are Eastern and Buddhist but their aim and context are neither Eastern nor Buddhist. "To see their non-Christian and non-western elements as a kind of oriental spice to enliven certain questions on the menu of western philosophy might be the simplest way to open one's mind to their writing."[38] Such an approach to the Kyoto School justifies, in Heisig's opinion, the omission of the "oriental spice," that is, passages on Zen, Pure Land, Kegon, and Tendai ideas that the Kyoto School philosophers used to explain their reinterpretation of some Western philosophical concepts. Heisig decided to keep his book within the confines of Western philosophical thought since he believed it is there that Kyoto School philosophers find their place more than in the circles of Buddhist scholarship.[39]

I agree that the philosophy of the Kyoto School should not be reduced to "the circles of Buddhist scholarship," but, in my opinion, it is a grave mistake to ignore or diminish the importance of the influence of Eastern philosophy in their writings. The original meaning of words can be lost if they are taken out of their original context. It seems to me that Heisig and many other Western scholars do not understand that the Kyoto School philosophers often use a methodology of what I call "selective identification." By this method I mean a rather instrumental usage of selected Western concepts – they are taken out of the original context to explain a theory that is grounded in Eastern philosophy. That is why Nishida quotes so many Western thinkers, treating their theories rather superficially. William James's notion of "pure experience" was for him only a useful tool to start a discourse on Mahāyāna Buddhism's idea of non-dualism (negation of subject–object dualism). Therefore it is a misunderstanding to look for a coherent presentation of James' thought in Nishida's writings, as Heisig does in his reviews of Ueda Shizuteru's work on Nishida. Heisig states that "[t]he idea of pure experience as we find it in James's essay on *The Stream of Consciousness* when compared with Nishida's treatment in *A Study of Good*, seems to oblige the conclusion that either Nishida never finished reading James or that he did not really get what

[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., p. 8.
[39] Ibid., p. 25.

James was saying."[40] I would rather say that Nishida simply took from James what suited his discourse on Buddhist non-dualism and did not mind the rest.

By using the "selective identification" methodology the Kyoto School philosophers introduce various Western theories only to show that they can be interpreted in a different way in the Buddhist context or can be developed in a new (Buddhist) direction. For instance, Abe Masao reinterprets some elements of the Christian doctrine (such as *kenosis*) in a Buddhist context. For him, the universal religious experience as the foundation of interreligious dialogue has nothing to do with the idea of God as the supreme, transcendent, personal being, but it has much in common with the notion of No-Self in Mahāyāna Buddhism.[41] Another example is Nishitani Keiji's study of nihilism, which, according to him, is now an overwhelming reality in the modern world. Nishitani concludes that "only Buddhist thinking can purely reverse our nihilism by calling forth the totality of Śūnyatā [Sanskrit term meaning: "emptiness," it is a synonym of "absolute nothingness" – A.K.]."[42]

According to Carter "absolute nothingness" cannot be apprehended directly, but only indirectly as the unseen "lining" of all things. Absolute nothingness is never itself a form, a being, but is always formless and known only through the formed beings that are manifestations of it.[43] Such interpretation may be called "Western" because it is close to Plotinus's idea of the One that transcends all beings, and is not itself a being, precisely because all beings are its manifestation. I think that such an interpretation is mistaken because I agree with Suzuki Daisetsu's opinion that Nishida's vision of the Self as the absolutely contradictory self-identity of "one" and "many" has much in common with the teaching of *The Garland Sutra*, which describes the Enlightenment of Buddha Gautama as the state in which "one is all and all is one." "The topos of absolute nothingness" is a paradoxical state, in which all individual entities are unique and separated, and yet they are "one." All elements are mutually unhindered and interfused – a state that cannot be grasped as an object separated from the subject of cog-

[40] J.W. Heisig, *Ueda Shizuteru, Nishida Kitarō: Ningen no shōgai to iu koto* [Ueda Shizuteru, Nishida Kitarō: *On What We Call Life*], "Japanese Journal of Religious Studies" 1997, Vol. 24, No. 1–2, p. 201.

[41] M. Abe, *Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata*, in: *The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation*, eds. J.B. Cobb Jr., C. Ives, Wipf & Stock Publishers, Eugene, OR, 2005, pp. 10–11.

[42] J. Shore, *Abe Masao's Legacy: Awakening to Reality through the Death of Ego and Providing Spiritual Ground for the Modern World*, "The Eastern Buddhist" 1998, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1998, p. 295.

[43] R.E. Carter, *The Kyoto School*, op. cit., p. 155.

nition. "Many [all elements – A.K.] remain many, and yet many are one; one remains one, yet one is many."[44] Nishida stressed that such a vision of reality has nothing to do with mysticism. He was aware that some Western philosophers condemned mysticism because it was not directly confirmable through ordinary sense perception, and particularly because it often challenged the teachings of the orthodox religions. Many mystics claimed that it is a knowledge of the hearts and not of the minds, more feeling than a thought, and yet it is claimed to have noetic value – that is, value as a kind of knowledge.[45] Nishida's critics argued that his deliberations on overcoming the dualism of subject and object of cognition were irrational or mystical, and therefore he started to defend his "scientific attitude" by referring to results of quantum mechanics experiments. He saw them as bringing forth scientific proof that a subject is not an independent observer, separate from the object of cognition. Nishida wrote many essays on the philosophy of modern physics.[46]

I agree with Heisig that the Kyoto School philosophers have positioned themselves in a place as unfamiliar to the Eastern mind as it is to the Western. However, it does not mean that one should ignore all Eastern elements in the Kyoto School philosophy, regarding them as "oriental spice." For instance, Nishida's reinterpretation of Shinran's thought from the perspective of reality as absolute contradictory self-identity may be astonishing to Pure Land Buddhists, but they are able to compare Nishida's redefinition of Shinran's crucial terms with traditional interpretation.

In my opinion, Eastern philosophy is the starting point of the Kyoto School philosophers' analysis, and so without knowing such starting point one cannot understand what they continue and what they abandon. Therefore, I do not agree with Heisig that a lack of background in the intellectual tradition of the East is not a major obstacle to understanding the rather peculiar language of the Kyoto philosophers.

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44 K. Nishida, *Zettai mujunteki jikodōitsu* [The Absolutely Contradictory Self-Identity], in: *Nishida Kitarō zenshū* [The Collection of Nishida Kitarō's Works], ed. Y. Abe, Vol. 9, Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1979, p. 170.

45 Ibid., p. 156.

46 For more about this problem, see A. Kozyra, *Nishida Kitarō's Philosophy of Absolute Nothingness (Zettaimu no tetsugaku) and Modern Theoretical Physics*, "Philosophy East and West" 2018, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 73–85.

Heisig points out that "Nishida is clearly the least indebted to eastern sources,"[47] but I think that this is not true in the case of his so-called "last writings," where he presented his philosophy of "absolute nothingness." The problem is that Nishida does not bother to introduce exhaustively philosophical theories of any pre-modern Eastern thinker, because for him this is the task of a historian of philosophy, not a philosopher par excellence.

6. The Lack of Sharp Separation between Philosophy and Religion in the Kyoto School

Robert Carter emphasizes that religion in Japan is not only about belief but mainly about consciousness transformation.[48] He should rather say – Japanese Buddhism is about consciousness transformation because Shinto is mainly a religion of worldly benefits due to the grace of gods and of harmony with nature considered to be divine.

According to Carter, "For the Japanese, religion is not a matter of faith or reason, belief or dogma, but of experience, the sort of experience that is truly transformative, the kind that can truly be said to cause one to see oneself and the world differently."[49] For Carter, the Kyoto School philosophers are not content with a web of analysis and rigorous thinking if it does not transform the individual. The Western emphasis on reason alone tended to make philosophy "a purely cerebral affair," while the starting point of the Japanese was that knowledge is also an experimental affair that can be achieved and honed through practice rather than reason alone.[50] For Carter, the knowledge gained through practice is achieved through the use of the body, by which he means also meditational practice. He also argues that the Kyoto School philosophers inquire into the culture in its many forms, religious and nonreligious, to abstract from them a coherent, philosophically rigorous account that would stand the test of criticism. "It is always more than an intellectual activity, and yet, unlike religion, there is no limit as to what is to be investigated and no prescribed texts or rules to be followed in one's inquiries except to be true to the evidence. Even reason, while important,

47 J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 20.
48 R.E. Carter, *The Kyoto School*, op. cit., p. 6.
49 Ibid., p. 7.
50 Ibid.

is not the final arbiter of truth, for truth is to be found in experience, as well."[51] Carter agrees with Heisig that the philosophy of the Kyoto School is an ultimately serious and vital activity; it seeks the transformation of awareness.[52] Heisig points out that "for Kyoto philosophers, thinking either transforms the way we look at the things of life, or it is not thinking in the fullest sense of the world."[53] For Heisig, the transformation of awareness of the things of life erases the need for distinguishing between philosophy and religion as distinct modes of thought. He claims that it is the transformation of awareness that justifies specific doctrinal and historical traditions, not the other way around.[54]

Both Heisig and Carter argue that the Kyoto School philosophers do not separate religion from philosophy because they think that the goal of religion in Japan is the transformation of awareness/consciousness. The following question should be asked in this context: do they mean *any possible* transformation of awareness?

Heisig quotes the following words of Takeuchi Yoshinori, a leading student of Tanabe: "Philosophy has served Buddhism as an inner principle of religion, not as an outside critic. […] Philosophy in Buddhism is not speculation or metaphysical contemplation, but rather a metanoia of thinking, a conversion within reflective thought that signals a return to the authentic self – the no-self of *anātman* […] It is a philosophy that transcends and overcomes the presuppositions of metaphysics."[55]

It should be notated that Heisig ignores the original meaning of the Buddhist terms Takeuchi used because he regards them as a spice added to Western philosophy. According to Heisig, "the 'authentic self' to which Takeuchi alludes as the goal of the religion-philosophy enterprise is less confession of faith in fundamental Buddhist teaching of 'no-self' than a metaphor of the concern with clarity of thought and transformation of consciousness."[56] "The coincidence of terminology is not to be taken lightly, since it does point to the reinterpretation of a classical idea, but neither should it be made to bear the full weight of tradition surrounding the idea of *anātman*."[57] For Heisig, the state of No-Self is

[51] Ibid., p. 11.
[52] J.W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 14.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid., p. 15.
[57] Ibid.

mere "awakening to the world as it is without the interference of utility or other preconceptions,"[58] which is in accord with his interpretation of the Kyoto School philosophy as a kind of phenomenology.

Heisig states that the Kyoto School philosophers avoided all reference to psychoanalytical theory or any connection between No-Self and abnormal or paranormal psychic states,[59] and so for him, the traditional Buddhist notion of "No-Self" is not a mystical (that is, abnormal or paranormal) psychic state. In my opinion, the reason why the Kyoto School philosophers do not treat "No-Self" as an abnormal state of mind is different – they think that the Buddhist notion of No-Self, as absolutely contradictory self-identity of a subject and all objects of cognition, is the true self and therefore is "normal." Surely they do not think that "No-Self" means Mind that differentiates (the state of the dualism of a subject and all objects of cognition), even if it is differentiating without the interference of utility or other preconceptions.

Such a conclusion can be drawn only if one loses the true meaning of "Ordinary Mind" in Zen tradition – since nirvana (the absolute) and samsara (the relative) are not to be separated, the Enlightened Mind is in unity with all that exists (no differentiation) and at the same time the mind does not lose its samsaric nature – it differentiates. The problem is that many scholars seem to be afraid to accept the paradoxical (or rather paradox-logical) structure of No-Self because training in Western philosophy and classical logic makes them immediately reject inner contradiction as a philosophical absurd. Heisig's approach is an example of such interpretation – Zen "seeing things as they are" is understood as Husserl's phenomenology spiced with Oriental/Buddhist flavour.

In my opinion, the problem of the lack of any sharp separation between philosophy and religion in the Kyoto School can be explained not only as a problem of consciousness transformation crucial to both religion and philosophy. What is most important is that according to the doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism only direct insight reaches the ultimate reality, while the abilities of reason are useful but limited. Truth in Buddhism is not a revelation, which should be believed because of religious authority; the truth is to be experienced in the act of Enlightenment, and such truth is verifiable and "repeatable" – Buddha's experience of Enlightenment is repeated by Zen masters, and Zen masters verify their disciples'

[58] Ibid., p. 16.
[59] Ibid., p. 15.

Enlightenment. From such a point of view, the so-called Buddhist truth is no different from philosophical truth (or even scientific truth). It should be noted that also due to such an understanding of intuition in Buddhism, there was almost no conflict between religion and reason in pre-modern Japan.

The Kyoto School philosophers should not be regarded simply as "Eastern" philosophers, although their theorical foundation is very often Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the search for truth, they managed to build a unique philosophical "bridge" between West and East Asia, trying to rise above any cultural, philosophical, or religious constraints.

The Kyoto School originator, Nishida Kitarō, did not think of himself as a founder of any school and always encouraged independent thinking in his students. The Kyoto School started as spontaneous academic vitality that so often emerges around great thinkers. The mentor–student relationship in the Kyoto School was for its members a fruitful occasion to discuss freely Nishida's theories and develop them in new directions. Tanabe criticized Nishida's philosophy as a kind of mysticism but it was important for Nishida, who answered such criticism by showing the links between the philosophy of "absolute nothingness" and modern physics.

Assuming that in the case of a philosophical school, the mentor–student relationship is more important than association with a centre, such as a university, it can be said that after 1950 in the case of the Kyoto School such necessary condition was fulfilled in many cases. For instance, Abe Masao, who died in 2016, was a student of both Nishitani Keiji and Hisamatsu Shin'ichi and maintained close contact with D.T. Suzuki during the last ten years of Suzuki's life. However, nowadays mentor–student relations are becoming rather rare. Some Japanese philosophers who were inspired by the writing of the Kyoto School philosophers are members of associations such as Sunshinkai (Society of Inch-Mind) and regularly meet to discuss the results of their research; therefore, they may be counted as members of the Kyoto School circle. However many philosophers interested in the Kyoto School study independently and only occasionally meet at international conferences – they may be counted in the Kyoto School philosophical current.

In my opinion, after 1950 the main distinguishing characteristics of the Kyoto School are a specific theoretical frame and methodological approach of selective identification. All thinkers branded as "the Kyoto School philosophers" study Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially Zen and Shin (True Pure Land) schools,

in a non-dogmatic and non-sectarian manner. They tried to reveal what they regard as the potential hidden in traditional Buddhist philosophy but in the wider context of the search for truth and in dialogue with Western philosophy. The influence of Nishida Kitarō is also essential because many of the Kyoto School philosophers elaborated new philosophical terms and theories that can be regarded as further answers to philosophical questions he had asked – for example, Nishitani Keiji's study of nihilism in Western and Eastern philosophy and Abe Masao's theory of interreligious dialogue.

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Praxis School and the Lifelong Critical Philosophical Attitude of Milan Kangrga

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Abstract: Milan Kangrga was one of the foremost members of the Yugoslavian Praxis School, a school of philosophy active in the 1960s and 1970s. Members of the school founded the journal "Praxis" (1964–1974) and declared their goal in the first editorial: "The primary task of Yugoslavian Marxists is to critically discuss Yugoslavian socialism." It fuelled their theoretical work, their monumental translating achievements, and their commitment to strengthening the philosophical culture of the region in decades to come. Kangrga's book *Ethical Problem in the Works of Karl Marx*, published in 1963, became an outline of the school's programme for an alternative reading of Marx. He related Marx to the philosophical tradition of German idealism, mainly Hegel's philosophy. Twenty years later, Kangrga published *Ethics or Revolution*, further arguing in favour of the fundamental significance of German idealist thinkers for understanding Marx (being the first one who brought Johann Gottlieb Fichte's practical philosophy to the Yugoslavian public). Kangrga maintained a lifelong critical philosophical attitude and his example is a part of the Praxis School's living legacy at the University of Novi Sad to this day.

Key words: Yugoslavian Marxism, Praxis School, philosophy, revolution, socialism, Milan Kangrga

1. Philosophical Orientation of the Praxis School

In the whole of western philosophical tradition, main tendencies and great philosophers rarely came from "small" countries. Yugoslavian culture, during the first half of the 20th century, was one of those small philosophical cultures, having mostly an epigonic status. Yet, thanks to one outstanding generation, during the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslavia was placed on the philosophical map of Europe and the world. After the horrendous experiences of World War II and following the clash with the Soviet Union, the young republic of Yugoslavia was setting forth to find its own way of building a society on Marxist principles.

In the situation where Marxism was a state project, philosophers were all but forced to follow the Marxian legacy. That resulted in a somewhat poor and sterile philosophical production at first. However, the need of the Yugoslavian communist party to break ideological and political ties with the USSR created an opportunity for a new and critical approach to official Marxist doctrine. One member of the emerging generation of Yugoslav philosophers of the time, Mihailo Marković, described this situation in the following way:

> At that time, an utterly simplistic, vulgarized interpretation of Marxism produced by Stalin and his followers dominated the radical scene. Trotsky and Gramsci were dead, Lukacs compelled to conform, Korsch lost in America, Bloch little known, the Frankfurt School disintegrated. For the first postwar generation of Yugoslav philosophers who came from the partisan army to the universities in Belgrade and Zagreb, there were hardly any authorities around.[1]

According to this author, this new and critical rereading of Karl Marx's opus resulted in a "rediscovery" of its humanistic contents that included ideas of free creativity, universal human emancipation, various forms of alienation, etc., which became central to the emerging conceptual platform of humanist Marxism as an alternative to Soviet Stalinism.[2] Furthermore, according to Marković, "Yugoslav humanism, which developed as abstract philosophy in the fifties, gave ground to a concrete critical social theory and became the foundation for social critique."[3] This generation's social critique was meant to show and problematize similar models of alienation that socialist societies shared with most of the capitalist world. Sustained efforts of these scholars brought an overflow of Marxist literature and an abundance of philosophical classics from history into Yugoslav philosophical culture. Judging from the contemporary reception and later re-evaluation, this produced a relevant and internationally acclaimed philosophical school of enduring importance.[4] The subject of this school's critique were Yu-

1 M. Marković, *Introduction*, in: *Praxis: Yugoslav Essays in the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences*, transl. J. Coddington, D. Rouge et al., eds. M. Marković, G. Petrović, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1979, p. xi.

2 Ibid., p. xi.

3 Ibid., p. xiv.

4 As an example of how the legacy and philosophical reach of the Praxis School is still very much a subject of lively discussion, it is worthwhile to mention the recent collection of articles, more or less critically aligned against that legacy, published by a group of authors in Zagreb: *Aspekti*

goslav political structures that, from the perspective of emerging intelligentsia, just started their ossification into a power system usurped by a bureaucracy that allowed social inequalities to rise and resisted "the new socialist culture."[5]

It is quite telling that Rudi Supek, who would go on to become one of the founding figures of the Praxis group more than a decade later, began his seminal essay *Material, Social and Personal Grounds of Socialist Culture*, published in 1953 in the journal "Pogledi," by repurposing Marx's famous definition of communism from the *German Ideology*:

> Socialist culture is neither a state of affairs that we will reach in the distant future, nor some abstract ideal that we oppose to the concrete social development in the present, but a real movement through which we transcend class society and its culture, and build a classless society and its culture. Thus, when we define that which is specific to the ideological and cultural content of our socialist revolution, it is necessary not to forget that which is universal, humanistic in it, which represents an element and an example of the socialist cultural will.[6]

Supek envisioned building a socialist culture, not as, according to the orthodox Marxist theory, a reflection of the base in the ideological superstructure, but as a *real movement* in which a very important role was to be played by the theoretical endeavour of Yugoslav post-revolution Marxist intelligentsia. This real process of building such a culture was supposed to represent "a deliberate, critical effort of raising human consciousness and sentiments to a higher level in the sense of emancipation from various forms of alienation of man in class society."[7] According to Supek, one of the key elements of the scientific foundation for this

praxisa. Refleksije uz 50. obljetnicu, eds. B. Mikulić, M. Žitko, Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb 2015. However, in discussions such as this, it is important to keep the original sources, ideas and problems of Praxis philosophy in mind, so that we do not allow, as one opponent of this collection of papers puts it, "sterile criticism" to degrade the legacy of this school to a mere "footnote in the history of philosophy" (L. Perušić, *Being Praxis: The Structure of Praxis Philosophy – Outlined by the Refutation of Contemporary Criticism*, in: *Karl Marx – Philosophie, Pädagogik, Gesellschaftstheorie und Politik*, eds. D. Novkovic, A. Akel, Kassel University Press, Kassel 2019, pp. 173–195).

5 M. Marković, *Introduction*, op. cit., p. xiii.

6 R. Supek, *Materijalni, socijalni i personalni osnovi socijalističke kulture*, "Pogledi. Časopis za teoriju društvenih i prirodnih nauka" 1953, No. 4, p. 236. Unless stated otherwise, all quotations have been translated by Mina Đikanović and Nevena Jevtić.

7 Ibid.

process included critical, that is, philosophical, mediation of "everything and anything of significance during the two-millennium long development of human consciousness and culture."[8] More specifically, this critical and philosophical mediation of pre-socialist social development was understood as "dialectics of negation and synthesis of pre-existing cultural values, ideas and tendencies,"[9] with the goal of "making man freer."[10] Supek opened his article with a definition of socialist culture that underlined its universal, humanistic character, and closed his argument by restating its fundamental universal significance for the whole of humanity. At the same time, in his closing remarks, he distinguished this concept of socialist culture from Soviet orthodox Marxism. For him, the difference was a "radical one": the Soviet variant "tramples on every individual initiative, disables any kind of 'deviation' and necessarily leads to cultural restraints and sterility of creative personhood."[11] In opposition to it and in line with his humanistic orientation, Supek believed that socialist culture should nurture individual creative freedoms and be a strong guide towards new forms of culture.

An important aspect of this "radically" different approach to socialist culture was a freer interpretive approach to Marx and philosophical tradition in general. In order to grasp individual creative "deviations" in socialist society and deal with them critically, rather than oppressively, a new philosophical synthesis of Marxism and philosophical tradition was needed. This would define the whole intellectual circle of the Praxis philosophical school: a belief that radical political and social struggles need radical philosophical principles. Deeper insight in Marx's work allowed some of the bright minds to start questioning dominant thoughts on Marxist philosophy and its relations to philosophical tradition in general, especially to German idealism. Therefore, some of the main tasks of Praxis philosophy, which produced common grounds and solidified what was a collective endeavour of a heterogeneous group into a proper school of thought, were the following: (1) interpretation of Marx's philosophy in its connection to the philosophy of German idealism and particularly Hegel:

> Without understanding Marx's thought there is no humanist socialism. However, our programme is not to get to the "correct" understanding of Marx

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 243.
10 Ibid., p. 244.
11 Ibid.

> through interpretation and simply defend it in its "pure" form. We do not care for conserving Marx, but for developing a live revolutionary thought inspired by Marx. Development of such a thought demands a wide and open discussion in which non-Marxists also take part;[12]

(2) application of Marx's conception of "critique of everything that exists" to the very organization of state; (3) discussion on philosophical, sociological, economic, and cultural problems of socialism; and (4) critical analysis of contemporary problems, such as alienation, inequality, wars, repression, (ab)use of technology in capitalist societies, etc. In the editorial of the first issue of the "Praxis" journal, which was written by Gajo Petrović, the group proclaimed their ambitions as follows:

> One of the basic origins of the failure and deformation of socialist theory and practice in the course of recent decades is to be found in overlooking the "philosophical dimension" of Marx's thought, in open or insidious negation of its humanistic essence […] If philosophy wants to think of the revolution, it has to turn itself towards important problems of the contemporary world and man, and if it wants to grasp the essence of everyday life, philosophy must not hesitate to give the illusion of distancing itself, to plunge itself into the alleged "metaphysical" depths […] Therefore we want a journal of philosophy in the sense of philosophy thinking about the revolution: a *ruthless critique of everything in existence*.[13]

They wanted to, and effectively did, cover the main problems of societies such as they were, both socialist and capitalist, and perhaps, by envisioning their philosophical praxis as interventionist and radically critical, they believed that they were in a proverbially unique position to actually exert political pressure on socialist institutions and party organizations and further the revolution – of Yugoslavian society, of course – but also of the rest of the capitalist Europe. According to Gerson S. Sher, who in the 1980s published a comprehensive study on this generation of young Yugoslav dissidents, philosophy was the field in which "the conflict between the Party [Communist Party – N.J., M.Đ.] and the intel-

[12] G. Petrović, *Čemu Praxis*, Praxis, Zagreb 1972, p. 14.

[13] Ibid., pp. 11–12, 13. In 1969 this group started the "pocket edition" of "Praxis." This was a way to print books of its members, published formally as a separate edition of the journal. It was most likely a way to bypass increasing difficulties in publishing via official channels.

lectuals within Yugoslavia was to have its most lasting impact."[14] Young Yugoslav dissidents were invested *explicité* in the transformation of consciousness itself and the cultural revolution, while expecting an adequate transformation of political structures. In one of his later interviews, Predrag Vranicki, another important figure from the same intellectual circle, described this conflict with the political establishment as a "paradox": the same political establishment that famously broke ties with Cominform in 1948, was now paradoxically unwilling to acknowledge the necessity for further theoretical breakthroughs and innovations.[15] Polish Marxist Leszek Kołakowski, a contributor and supporter of the Praxis School's work, remarked in his *Main Currents of Marxism* that:

> Their writings often struck a utopian note, expressing the conviction that it is possible to do away with "alienation," to assure everyone of full control over the results of their actions, and to remove the conflict between the need for planning and the autonomy of small groups, between individual interests and long-term social tasks, between security and technical progress.[16]

While "politics" became something in which most Praxis Marxists had disavowed any active interest, their vision of criticism as a social institution gave them a sense that their adherence to this critical attitude was a political act of the first order.[17] First public attacks against the Praxis orientation can be traced as far back as February and March 1965, when Mika Tripalo, then Secretary of the Zagreb City Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, and Savka Dabčević-Kučar, famous Chairwoman of the Ideological Commission, ap-

[14] G.S. Sher, *Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington–London 1977, p. 16.

[15] P. Vranicki, *Revolucija i kritika. Sto godina marksizma posle Marksa*, Marksistička misao, Beograd 1983, p. 124. One of the distinguished members of the Praxis School wrote about the relationship between politics and philosophy in a manner which is indicative of a certain divide: "Consequently, if questioned about the relationship of philosophy and politics in communism (socialism, humanism), my answer would be that philosophy as man's critical self-reflection should direct the entirety of his activity, including his political activity. However, I do not think that political acts could or should be prescribed by any philosophy or by a philosophical forum. These should come about by a democratic, free decision of all those interested" (G. Petrović, *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings*, Anchor Books, New York 1967, p. 166).

[16] L. Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth, and Dissolution*, Vol. 3: *The Breakdown*, transl. P.S. Falla, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, p. 478.

[17] G.S. Sher, *Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. xviii.

proached them concerning that which was deemed their "destructive" attitude towards the task of social criticism. Tripalo famously reported that the Praxis orientation could:

> Create the objective conditions, regardless of the intentions of the individuals concerned, for "Praxis" to become the core of an oppositional group about which all the oppositional and dissatisfied elements of our society are gathering.[18]

As time went by, many of the members left the communist party and lost their footing in established political organizations, relegating their critical attacks from the internal position based on party membership to the position of an intellectual outsider.[19] What followed is by now a very well documented history of persecution and marginalization of most of the school's members by socialist and subsequent regimes.[20]

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[18] Ibid., pp. 48–49. Original source translated by G.S. Sher.

[19] This landed them in similar circumstances of loosened political ties of their theory to real social struggles, the circumstances that Perry Anderson described with respect to representatives of the so-called Western Marxism. In his study *Considerations on Western Marxism*, he claimed: "Formal incorporation in working-class parties (Lukacs, Della Volpe, Althusser), exit from them (Lefebvre, Colletti), fraternal dialogue with them (Sartre), or explicit renunciation of any connection to them (Adorno, Marcuse) were all equally incapable of uniting Marxist theory and mass struggle" (P. Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism*, Verso, London 1979, p. 43).

[20] There are many internationally published studies on the history and philosophy of the Praxis School that could be of interest to international audiences: S. Sirovec, *Ethik und Metaethik im jugoslawischen Marxismus*, Ferdinand Schöningh, Padeborn 1982; D. Crocker, *Praxis and Democratic Socialism: The Critical Social Theory of Marković and Stojanović*, Humanities Press, Harvester Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ–Brighton 1983; O. Gruenwald, *The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism in Contemporary Yugoslavia*, J.F. Bergin Publishers, South Hadley, MA, 1983; R.J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1971; W.L. McBride, *From Yugoslav Praxis to Global Pathos: Anti-Hegemonic Post-Post-Marxist Essays*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD, 2001. There are, also, many personal reports on the events and autobiographical material documenting the persecution. For example: R. Leposavić, S. Ristić, *Šverceri vlastitog zivota*, interview with M. Kangrga, "Vreme," 20.9.2001, No. 559; almost every article of the first part of the recently published book of proceedings from a conference dedicated to the philosophy and activities of the Praxis School, including contributions from Predrag Matvejević, Ivan Kuvačić, Nebojša Popov, Zagorka Golubović. See: *Praxis. Društvena kritika i humanistički socijalizam. Zbornik radova sa Međunarodne konferencije o jugoslavenskoj ljevici: Praxis-filozofija i Korčulanska ljetnja škola (1963–1974)*, eds. D. Olujić Oluja, K. Stojaković, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Beograd 2012, pp. 15–128.

2. Width of the Praxis School's Activities and International Acclaim

The most famous philosophers of the Praxis group were Milan Kangrga, Gajo Petrović, Vanja Sutlić, Vladimir Filipović, Danilo Pejović, Danko Grlić, Branko Bošnjak, Svetozar Stojanović, Mihailo Marković, Ivan Kuvačić, and of course the aforementioned sociologist – Rudi Supek. Literary critics and artists were also among the members. A watershed moment in the history of the school was when they announced and started publishing a journal entitled "Praxis: filozofski dvomjesečnik" ("Praxis: A Philosophical Bimonthly"; the international edition was called "Praxis: Revue philosophique"), which was active from 1964 to 1974, when the authorities cancelled financial support for the journal. The first Chief Editors were Gajo Petrović and Danilo Pejović (in 1966 he was replaced by Rudi Supek). The original editorial board consisted of Branko Bošnjak, Danko Grlić, Milan Kangrga, Danilo Pejović, Gajo Petrović, Rudi Supek, and Predrag Vranicki.

The concept of *praxis* was chosen as the title and mobilizing idea of the philosophical journal in accordance with the school's vision of philosophy. This notion underlined the historical movement of societal change and placed human agency at its centre.[21] As Mihailo Marković put it: "The term 'praxis' refers to both the subject, the man who acts, and also the object, the environment in which he acts and which is transformed by his action."[22] In their general understanding, philosophy was not an abstract theory or *Weltanschauung*, but a "revolutionary consciousness of praxis" and a way to steer human agency in the proper historical direction.[23] The struggle for revaluation and reinterpretation of Marxist philosophy classics was conceived as part of a broader struggle to further emancipate people's creative and revolutionary agency. The width of their philosophical interest was enormous, encompassing Marxist and non-Marxist literature alike. For example, the first issue of "Praxis" contained reviews of books by Alfred Schmidt, Ernst Bloch, Henri Lefebvre, Kostas Axelos, and Eugen Fink, covering therefore Marx-

[21] B. Bošnjak, *Ime i pojam Praxis*, "Praxis" 1964, Vol. 1, pp. 7–20.

[22] M. Marković, *Dialectic Today*, in: *Praxis: Yugoslav Essays in the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences*, transl. J. Coddington, D. Rouge et al., eds. M. Marković, G. Petrović, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1979, p. 6.

[23] M. Kangrga, *Program SKJ – oslobađanje stvaralačkih snaga socijalizma*, in: *Humanizam i socijalizam. Zbornik radova*, Vol. 2, eds. B. Bošnjak, R. Supek, Naprijed, Zagreb 1963, p. 19.

ist thought, Yugoslav literature, Nietzsche's philosophy, and trending sociologic themes. Issues that followed generally maintained this wide interest in works of authors such as Serge Mallet, André Gorz, Herbert Marcuse, Lucien Goldmann, Edgar Morin, Marek Fritzhand, Erich Fromm, Georg Lukács, José Ortega y Gasset, John Kenneth, etc.

They also organized a famous philosophical summer school on the island of Korčula in 1963, which lasted until 1974 and received substantial international acclaim. Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Ernst Bloch, Jürgen Habermas, Lucien Goldmann, Ernest Mandel, Tom Bottomore, Maximilien Rubel, Kostas Axelos, Serge Mallet, Franz Marek, Leszek Kołakowski, Karel Kosik, Umberto Cerrone, R. Lombarde-Radice, Ágnes Heller, Helmut Fleischer, Marx Wartofsky, Robert Tucker, Norman Birnbaum, and others took part in the conference over the years.[24] At the same time, international acclaim that the school received provided moral and intellectual support for its members. There is an interesting anecdote recalled by Kangrga – when he and Rudi Supek initially debated about the Korčula summer school, Kangrga protested the "school" part of the name, while Rudi Supek allegedly said that this was the way to mask their intended dissident theoretical activity and ensure much-needed funds from the state.[25]

Their intentions to widen the scope of philosophical culture of their days were very clear and ambitious. The term "school" was an adequate signifier of their self-understanding in that sense. It is quite possible, furthermore, that this motivation was also behind the quite strict division of labour among the group's members. Almost every student of philosophy today, in Serbia as well as in Croa-

[24] Interestingly enough, one member of the Praxis School (Žarko Puhovski) stated in a recent interview that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer had never shown any substantial interest in the work of the group. When he asked Adorno in 1967 to join the summer school on Korčula, the latter replied something along the lines of: "In the Mediterranean, philosophy died over 2000 years ago, there is only tourism now" (Z. Arbutina, "Puhovski: Habermas je zakasnio u Jugoslaviju," interview with Ž. Puhovski, "Deutsche Welle," 18.06.2019, https://www.dw.com/bs/puhovski-habermas-je-zakasnio-u-jugoslaviju/a-49248083 (accessed 24.11.22)). For a detailed overview of the relationship and exchange between the Praxis School and the Frankfurt school, see N. Stefanov, *Yugoslav* Praxis *Philosophy: Critical Theory of Society and the Transfer of Ideas between East and West*, in: *Entangled Protest: Transnational Approaches to the History of Dissent in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, eds. R. Brier, Fibre Verlag, Osnabrück 2013, pp. 109–126.

[25] Kangrga's report on the concept, organization and successes of the Korčula summer school can be found in M. Kangrga, *Izvan povijesnog događanja. Dokumenti jednog vremena*, Feral Tribune, Split 1997, pp. 278–294.

tia, knows of this "labour division": if interested in something regarding logic – go to Gajo Petrović, ethics – refer to works of Milan Kangrga, aesthetics – Danko Grlić, philosophy of right – Ljubomir Tadić. When one looks at the range of their interests and ambitions, it gives the impression that they wanted to develop – alongside a humanist socialist alternative – almost a complete curriculum, a programme for studying philosophy as a whole based on those new alternative principles. They themselves translated some of the most important works of western philosophy; they organized and were pretty much, one way or another, behind the truly monumental translating and publishing activity throughout the country during this period. Through their translation efforts, they practically created a philosophical vocabulary for themselves to further their own position and of course for posterity (for example, Milan Kangrga translated G.W.F. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a feat that required him to create much of the philosophical terminology in Serbo-Croatian language that is still very much in use today). This was one of the most important traits of this philosophical school and part of the answer to the question of what distinguished this movement as a school – a school almost in a literal sense of the word.

3. Militant Subjectivity of Milan Kangrga

Milan Kangrga was one of the most famous representatives of the Praxis School, although he himself was against the representation of thinkers gathered around the "Praxis" journal as a homogenous group. Yet, with all their differences and discrepancies taken into account, those intellectuals really did have one uniting principle, and that was *critique*. Following Marx's remark from one letter to Arnold Ruge, they committed themselves to the "ruthless criticism of the existing order,"[26] even, or especially, when it meant criticizing themselves.[27] Kangrga was

[26] Marx writes as follows: "If we have no business with the construction of the future or with organizing it for all time, there can still be no doubt about the task confronting us at present: the ruthless criticism of the existing order, ruthless in that it will shrink neither from its own discoveries, nor from conflict with the powers that be" (*Letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge*, Marx Engels Archive, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09-alt.htm (accessed 24.11.22)).

[27] In his unusual autobiography – which is at the same time the portrait of not only the Praxis group but also of one turbulent historical period – *Šverceri vlastitog zivota* [Smugglers of Our Own Lives], Kangrga testified that he once gave a negative review to his most admired associate

born in 1923 and died in 2008. In all of the regimes under which he lived, he was notorious because of his uncompromising leftist political orientation. In both philosophy and life, he was dedicated to the idea and practice of freedom. That often caused him serious problems, but he remained firm in his beliefs until his death. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, he remained the same honest Marxist, oriented towards the idea of freedom and antagonistic to every form of nationalism. In one interview from 2001, he claimed: "The proletarian is the last historical situation that enables you to be either nothing or human. You are cut from everything; you are neither a little Serb nor a little Croat, nor a rich man. You are left to your own devices, so you are what you are. Fight and be something – become a human."[28]

He never betrayed noble ideas of the Praxis group, which cannot be said of all of his colleagues. Some of them were faithful, some – or most – remained silent, and some, like Mihailo Marković,[29] openly supported the nationalistic madness that lead to a civil war. As Kangrga testifies, Mihailo Marković, alongside many other famous philosophers of the time, was actually a member of a (wider) editorial board, and not a "full member" of the Praxis group or a true representative of Praxis philosophy. Nevertheless, in public opinion, Marković's name was always connected with Praxis, and he even began publishing "Praxis International" in America after the "Praxis" journal was banned in Yugoslavia, even though members of the original "Praxis" editorial board did not approve that idea.[30]

Kangrga lived as he worked: "With my whole life, and with my philosophy, I considered that my principle task was to fight for the truth. To fight for the truth still means – because it is already implied in the term – to fight as a free man,

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and friend, Gajo Petrović, and that he himself also received negative reviews for one article. As a curiosity, he writes that the editorial board of the "Praxis" journal refused to print Louis Althusser's discussion (at that time unknown), because they found it to be Stalinistic-positivistic! With that same article, published in the journal "La Pensee," Althusser became a star of Marxist literature in Europe (M. Kangrga, *Šverceri vlastitog života. Refleksije o hrvatskoj političkoj kulturi i duhovnosti*, Republika, Beograd 2001, p. 19).

28 R. Leposavić, S. Ristić, *Šverceri vlastitog zivota*, interview with M. Kangrga, op. cit.

29 Mihailo Marković was maybe the most famous member of the Belgrade part of Praxis group, although his true connection to the "Praxis" journal and its critical position is largely open to discussion. His investigations were focused mainly on logic and theoretical philosophy. In the 1990s, he became one of the ideologists of a strongly nationalistic political path. Kangrga claims that he thought of himself as *the greatest* Yugoslavian philosopher (M. Kangrga, *Šverceri vlastitog života*, op. cit., p. 68).

30 Ibid.

meaning to fight for freedom at the same time."[31] His very concept of philosophy is based on the idea of inseparability of thoughts, deeds and works. It is, therefore, rather hard to distinguish his "philosophical" endeavours from his social engagement, not because his philosophy was not *academic* enough, but because his life was entirely philosophical, in the context of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. To write *only* about his excellent analyses of German idealism and Marx or about the great translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* means to misunderstand his work. He himself would say: "You understand nothing!" All of his writings and philosophical work in a narrower sense have a distinctive goal: freedom. And yet, just for the record, a simple look at Wikipedia shows that he wrote fifteen books, one textbook, over sixty original scholarly papers in national and international publications, and also numerous texts and presentations. He translated the works of Kant, Hegel, Bloch, Marcuse, Lukács, Descartes, and Leibniz. Even if he had done nothing but these translations, his contribution to philosophical education in this region would still be enormous. Nevertheless, he was the co-founder of one of the best philosophical journals, not only in Yugoslavia and not only of that time, he was among the organizers of the philosophical school in Korčula, but – above all – he was a *free* man who was always ready to fight for the freedom of others, freedom of philosophy, and freedom of the state.

His PhD thesis, entitled *Etički problem u djelu Karla Marxa* [Ethical Problem in the Work of Karl Marx], represents a certain manifesto of what would become the core of his investigations and endeavours in the Praxis group, but also his lifetime preoccupation. Therein, he argues in favour of the thesis that interpretations of Marx have not tried to reach "the true source of Marx's philosophy."[32] Only radically critical and consequential thought can overcome abstract phrases and paroles on humanism and can reach the field of realization of Marx's revolutionary and humanistic points. In the years that followed, Kangrga continued to analyze the problem of "the true source" of Marx's philosophy. In that quest, he succeeded in "discovering" Johann Gottlieb Fichte for the Yugoslavian philosophical audience and he truly researched connections between Fichte, Hegel and Marx. In his more mature works, this circle of problems resolved itself in one new concept of *speculation*. He did not define speculation in the Kantian manner,

[31] Ibid., p. 8.

[32] M. Kangrga, *Etički problem u djelu Karla Marxa. Kritika moralne svijesti*, Naprijed, Zagreb 1963, p. 7.

as theory. Nor did he accept the Hegelian identity of philosophy and speculation. Following Marx's philosophy, he argued that philosophy was a pre-stage of speculation. In his words: speculation is a "philosophy that goes under the skin," while the common philosopher "walks on the surface."[33] In other words, philosophy stays on the surface, while speculation goes straight to the essence.

Immanuel Kant's concept of spontaneity is the watershed moment in the relationship between philosophy and speculation. Spontaneity is freedom, and it marks "a revolutionary twist in thinking,"[34] from which speculation would emerge as permanent revolution. However, Kant did not begin with freedom, spontaneity, and for that reason he ended up with aporia. On the other hand, Fichte started with freedom, and therefore he was the true inaugurator of this concept of speculation. Hegel, in Kangrga's opinion, only *arrived* to freedom, and therefore he falls under the philosophical standpoint that Fichte had established. Therefore, Hegel unfortunately "retreated from the position of Fichte's speculation back to his philosophical position," failing to develop this theme any further.[35]

This specific concept of speculation is actually the result of the development of the concept of praxis that was coined within the Praxis group. Speculation is a unity of theory, practice and imagination.[36] Its true coryphaei were Fichte and Marx. Kangrga claimed that Marx owes much more to Fichte than to Hegel, "although he always talks about Hegel." For him, the debt is obvious in the identity of speculation and revolution that happened with Marx. Kangrga explained the basis of this identification of speculation and revolution by arguing that philosophy must begin with freedom, continue with freedom, and end with freedom. That was precisely the main goal of his philosophical endeavour. The main themes of his philosophy were all focused on the question of freedom of humanity, along with our understanding of history and time. He argued that history is a pre-condition to time, and not the other way around. The very definition of man is that he is "a historical event."[37]

All of his philosophical investigations led to the concept of speculation as a unique relation between theory, practice and imagination. Speculation, in that

[33] M. Kangrga, *Klasični njemački idealizam (predavanja)*, FF Press, Zagreb 2008, p. 19.

[34] Ibid., p. 32.

[35] Ibid., p. 60.

[36] "And Marx wasn't really related to Fichte, although it was Fichte who gave him fundamental speculative hints, not Hegel! Yet, he permanently talks about Hegel" (ibid., p. 115).

[37] M. Kangrga, *Praksa, vrijeme, svijet*, Naprijed, Zagreb 1989, p. 11.

sense, does not belong solely to the philosophical way of thinking. He claimed, somewhat provocatively, that the first speculative man was actually the prehistoric man.[38] He revealed himself as a speculative being in the very moment he started to work on stone in order to produce a stone axe. Later, man became hunter, and maybe he was angry when he slipped on clay until he figured out that he could use that clay to make a pot, etc. "And where was the stone axe in nature before that? Where was the pot? Nowhere!" Prehistoric man created *ex nihilo* and proved himself to be a speculative mind in Kangrga's opinion, since he was "a theoretician, practician, man of imagination, a free man and absolutely his own boss."[39]

4. Praxis School Seventy Years Later

Kangrga's influence on philosophy in Yugoslavia was – and still is – invaluable, especially in Zagreb and Novi Sad. Belgrade's philosophical thought has turned its back on Marxist legacy and accepted analytical philosophy. The Department of Philosophy in Novi Sad was built on the strong belief that the core of philosophical studies must include a thorough reading of German idealists and Marx. Kangrga's philosophical endeavours to show "the missing link" – Fichte's influence on Marx – have motivated generations of students and professors of philosophy in Novi Sad to read Fichte's works and gain new insights. Kangrga's PhD student and friend, Milenko Perović, was a founder and long-time Head of the Philosophy Department in Novi Sad. He shares Kangrga's strong conviction that a true philosopher is one who always seeks freedom; consequently, many students have philosophically grown up on Kangrga's works, which simultaneously means on his life principles.

However, the Praxis School was not just of philosophical interest. This group also had a strong influence on public life in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Their standpoints were sufficiently coherent to be part of the same philosophical orientation and flexible enough to accept different approaches. As such, they were seen as subversive and dangerous elements. Freedom of thought, speech, action, work: these were common demands of the Praxis School. It was not some sort of "salon

[38] M. Kangrga, *Spekulacija i filozofija. Od Fichtea do Marxa*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2010, p. 13.
[39] M. Kangrga, *Klasični njemački idealizam*, op. cit., p. 82.

philosophy" but a revolutionary movement, with much wider implications than just theoretical ones.

This is one of the main reasons for choosing Kangrga as a characteristic representative of the Praxis School. His concept of speculation implies unity of what we can call two verticals: moral and philosophical. Ever since he was a young man harbouring strong resentment for war, and an even stronger inclination for revolution, he was a remarkable figure in Yugoslavian public life. During the years of "preparation" and actualization of civil war, he never betrayed the simple postulate of Marxist political philosophy: that a society of equals cannot stand any sort of nationalism. While Mihailo Marković somehow became the very ideologist of nationalism, Kangrga held on to his early beliefs until the last day. He was often stigmatized as an enemy of Croatian society, and he was regularly taken to court for insult. The last of those cases was particularly interesting, as he wrote that the turtledove that came to his window every day was much smarter than the Croatians were. The turtledove knew its interest and sought food, while Croatians kept voting for people who destroyed them. Of course, some "patriot" found himself insulted by this thesis and sued Kangrga. Deliberation on Kangrga's alleged "guilt" was in itself a very brief process, but the fact remains that almost everything he wrote was subjected to serious scrutiny of the so-called patriots.

There is one anecdote in our history, very dear to all philosophers and especially professors of ethics. During the German occupation of Belgrade in 1941, all of the significant intellectuals were forced to sign a document in which they proclaimed loyalty to German authorities and support for the fight against communism. One professor of ethics, Miloš Đurić, refused to sign, since more than half of his students were partisans. One of his colleagues, a music professor, tried to convince him to sign, in order to escape consequences, and Đurić famously answered: "It's easy for you – you play the clarinet, but I teach ethics!"[40] This episode testifies to a truly strong character; not many such people can be found in the history of any culture. Kangrga was also such a character, a true intellectual who could not separate what he taught from the way he lived.

Over seventy years later, while geographically and politically speaking socialist Yugoslavia is only a distant and odious memory from the standpoint of almost every contemporary ex-Yugoslav political elite, a tremendous edifice of an im-

[40] In the original statement, it is not clarinet but "diple," old national instrument.

mensely enriched philosophical culture and debate remains in that same space. Against nationalism and neo-fascist ideology that started re-emerging its malicious, and rather useful, head during the process of capitalist transition, new generations of philosophers and sociologists have an effective, however bittersweet, ideological medicine in the tremendous philosophical production and individual examples of the Praxis School.

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"Complex Logic" in Berlin: The Becoming of a Scientific School and Its Premature End

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Abstract: Building on ideas of Aleksander Zinoviev, Berlin logician Horst Wessel further developed a conception of so-called complex logic in his research group at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the 1970s. That new orientation within philosophical logic included a theory of logical consequences, a non-traditional theory of predication and a logical theory of terms. The logic group at Humboldt University disintegrated during the reorientation of higher education policy in the wake of German unification. By then, the school had produced some recognized logicians and it had educated a few highly talented young researchers among graduate students. In our paper we try to answer the question of whether the Berlin group would have had the potential to become a school of science under more favourable circumstances.

Key words: school of science, meme, menome, Berlin school of complex logic

1. Introduction

In this paper we describe the fate of a scientific community in Berlin in the 1970s and 1980s. Our research question is: would this community have turned into a school of science if it had not ceased to exist due to historical contingencies? In order to pursue this question, we need to clarify the basic notion. The novel idea is to describe, in section 2, a school of science as a living scientific organism with specific memes. That is, we individuate a school of science by its memetic struc-

* The first author was responsible for the general structure of the work, the theoretical background and the editing of the individual parts.

** The second author contributed historical data, in particular the group's genealogy and the historic bibliography, and conducted a survey among former group members.

ture. In the second part, the case of the community mentioned above is examined from this point of view.

2. School of Science

2.1. What Is a School of Science?

The term "scientific school" is widely used in the history and philosophy of science as a self-description as well as an external description, but it is hardly ever clearly explicated. Moreover, it is characterized by its Janus-facedness: on the one hand, schools serve the emergence and assertion of scientific aspirations, on the other hand, they serve their prevention and fragmentation. Different formulations try to capture the idea: an invisible college, a school of thought, a specific local intellectual tradition, Ludwik Fleck's thought collective. Sometimes a school of science is a school in the strict sense – take Abelard's school as an example. We will use the phrase "school of science" as a technical term to denote coherent social groups in the world of science across multiple generations. They are communities of scientists identified as a collective because they represent particular scientific ideas within academia or in social discourse and they influence debates in their field.[1] Perception as a group results from public advocacy of those ideas and sometimes (in addition to that) through shared behaviours and forms of scientific exchange. You may often witness charismatic teachers passing on their behavioural patterns to their students with amazing accuracy.[2] But of course it is not about personal style. In a communicative process of knowledge production, a particular scientific style emerges alongside the individually newly acquired knowledge. Scientific style is a way of doing science. Procedures, methodologies, values and norms become the, mostly implicit, basis of individual scientific ac-

[1] Concerning the inherent homonymy of the term *school of science*, i.e., the meaning of a formal educational institution, respectively of a semi-formal association of individuals who share a specific outlook on scientific matters, we will decidedly go for the second meaning.

[2] Consider the well-known episode during Ludwig Wittgenstein's visit to Ithaca. The Malcoms had invited him and he also attended a Norman Malcom seminar at Cornell University, which he commented on at length. After class, one of Malcom's students approached him, "Who was that poorly dressed little fellow who aped you so impudently in speech and gestures?" – I have often witnessed charismatic teachers passing on behavioural patterns to their students with amazing accuracy. But of course it takes more than personal style to create a school of science.

tion. In the individuation of schools and school histories this tacit knowledge plays a central role.

Ralf Klausnitzer points out the etymological connection between "school" and "sect." The term sect was understood in classical Latin alongside the Latinized *hearesis* (school, direction) in an initially completely neutral meaning. Only later was heresy used as a culpable arbitrary disturbance of the inner unity of the church.[3] Certain echoes of this very tradition seem still to be found in the term school of science. Following Klausnitzer in that respect, one should conclude that a school founder is by definition always a heretic.

Schools of science are vivid or they are inanimate. The Toruń school of discussive logic is alive and kicking, that of the Pythagoreans is as dead as a dodo (though not without influence). In the latter case, concerning extinct schools, however, they must have been alive at an earlier time. There are gradations between life and death, dialethic cases like the Lvov-Warsaw School. Schools have a lifespan. In order to develop into a scientific school, the research collective shall achieve continuance. The life of individual researchers is limited, so it needs followers who may replace the elderly. The followers, educated by their masters, perpetuate their knowledge, sometimes sublate it. Each generation alters the common knowledge – by extending it, or by revising it, even disruptively. Occasionally, such disruptions may happen to be fatal – researcher loose trust in the school's basic principles. Schools must honour their principles in order to remain schools. So they may fall out of time. Old schools, like all old organisms, lose their fertility and eventually die. But normally, people adopt to the new findings and incorporate them in the community's tenets.

A school of science is a living organism, a coherent social group which jointly strives for scientific insight. One fundamental presupposition of a fully developed school is a unified language. Practically, the elaboration of a common language will be part of the school's becoming, it serves as a regulative ideal. A strong authority, be it a charismatic leader or a code binding for all, will be of great help in this respect. Unique language does not mean uniform thinking, of course. Being composed out of individual researchers, a scientific school's output will be at times inconsistent.

[3] R. Klausnitzer, *Wissenschaftliche Schule. Systematische Überlegungen und historische Recherchen zu einem nicht unproblematischen Begriff*, in: *Stil, Schule, Disziplin. Analyse und Erprobung von Konzepten wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Rekonstruktion (I)*, eds. L. Danneberg, I. Höppner, R. Klausnitzer, Peter Lang, Berlin 2005, pp. 31–64.

For instance, the École Polytechnique under Lagrange, Fourier, Laplace, etc., was characterized by common language and common scientific beliefs. But they differed in the question of continuity of nature (Fourier) or discreteness (Laplace). Such contradictions do not disturb in any way the wholeness of the collective consciousness of the school. On the contrary, the synthesis of such different ideas gave rise to new methods and procedures in the next generation. The inherent contradictoriness of the collective creative consciousness sometimes also shows itself in the individual. This can happen if one has recognized and internalized insights and thoughts of the close colleagues as reasonable and uses them in one's own thinking process at ease, that is, unaware of inherent inconsistencies.

Any school must be ready to cope with a dynamic environment. This means resilience in case of external interference, but also the ability to take advantage of favourable circumstances. When a niche opens, it is good to be prepared to fill it. Niches in science range from grant opportunities, meeting solvent sponsors, vacant chairs to be occupied, to important journals to be boarded. A precondition for all that is attentive observation of the surroundings. Specifically: taking part in scientific exchange by reading other researchers' papers is necessary for survival. This is where a charismatic leader can be disturbing. If he has become old and mentally immobile, and at the same time self-confident enough to declare his outdated preferences to be still binding, then he puts the collective in danger. It can therefore be better for the group to adore an identity-giving idol that is very old or has already died and therefore no longer interferes in everyday matters.

Recognition as a school of science is a task for the scientific community (although ambitious scholars often tend to insist on their personal role of a school founder). Also the attribution of researchers to a school is also made by the academia. Should the individual scientist have a right to object? Or, can a community perceived as a school reject the attribution – for example, for reasons of science policy? Can a scientist ascribe to a school himself?

The first author once was a member of a scientific school. This was in the late 1970s/early 1980s in Jerzy Kotas's logic group in Toruń. A wonderful time, full of joyous research in logic and of amicable social contacts. I enjoyed it a lot to be part of this community. But it would never have occurred to any of us to think of our circle of friends as of a school of science. So I had a strong sense of belonging, but was not aware of my school membership. Witness the 2006 book *The Lvov-*

Warsaw School: The New Generation,[4] I do also belong to that wonderful school. Thanks to Jacek Jadacki and Jacek Paśniczek, I know about my membership. But in this case, it was the opposite for quite some time: I did not feel it until I was told. So it seems to be a tricky thing with being a member of a school of science. Gut feelings and normative assignment do not always match.

The notion of a school of science has the inherent conceptual power of the term to provide structure and orientation in the scientific landscape. Where do I locate myself in science? Everybody tries to ennoble one's own scientific provenance: "I am a Harvard historian" or: "I am from the Vienna Circle." As an appreciated side effect, this impresses an order on the shimmering jumble of a period's research and teaching activities. What is more, schools of science nobilitated not only their members, but also their place. "I am from Cambridge" is intended to mean: "I come from the metropolis instead of the province." In this way, Constance, Glasgow and New Haven, CT, become metropolises. The possibility of retrospective classification is also beneficial.

So the concept looks vague, but useful. This should be sufficient reason to ask for further clarification of the term. All the more so, as the term is still controversially discussed in the (not particularly extensive) literature.[5] Certainly, self-ascription of a scientific collective is insufficient to be regarded as a school of science. As Klausnitzer points out, an educated use of the concept needs a scrupulous demonstration of specified conformity in terms of conception and methodology. This requires expert scientometric methods and a lot of meticulous, time-consuming work – something that cannot be fully delivered here. So for the case study included in this paper, we use the term in a performative way.

2.2. Memes

As mentioned earlier, a school must last longer than an individual scientist's professional activity, all the more than his or her personal commitment to a research topic. The transmission of the research tradition is thus indispensable. It seems that three capabilities are crucial:

[4] J. Jadacki, J. Paśniczek, *The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation*, Rodopi, Leiden 2006.

[5] My basic sources of information were L. Danneberg, I. Höppner, R. Klausnitzer, eds., *Stil, Schule, Disziplin. Analyse und Erprobung von Konzepten wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Rekonstruktion (I)*, Peter Lang, Berlin 2005, and – extremly rich in content – L. Danneberg, *Auswahlbibliographie zu "Disziplin", "Schule" und "Stil"* (an unpublished manuscript – thanks to Ralf Klausnitzer for making it available).

1) reproduction: evolutive systems, that is, (biological) organisms or (cultural) human creations, reproduce in cycles of successive generations;
2) variation: variation processes generate variants of these evolutive systems, which are co-reproduced;
3) selection: because population size is limited by scarce resource, certain variants (the "fitter" ones) reproduce faster and displace the others in the long run.

These three skills are the Darwinian modules of evolutionary processes.[6] Evolution is a cybernetical phenomenon. The modules thus are not limited to biological evolution. They also apply to self-reproducing automata[7] and in some respects to cultural evolution in human society. In the biological world, the code of evolution consists of genes and various auxiliary mechanisms. For cultural evolution, Richard Dawkins coined by analogy the term *meme*. Memes are, as genes and self-reproducing automata, replicators. According to Dawkins, the existence of replicators is essential for the evolution of viable complex structures by selection processes.

The concept of a meme was introduced as a neologism, decently based on old Greek and Latin phrases, in Dawkins's 1976 book *The Selfish Gene*. Originally, it means something that "conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of *imitation*." Memes in Dawkins's sense include tunes, ideas, catchphrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches,[8] and – some

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[6] In Darwin's original treatise we have:
1) variation, or the introduction of new change to existing elements;
2) heredity or replication, or the capacity to create copies of elements;
3) differential "fitness," or the opportunity for one element to be more or less suited to the environment than another.
These three characteristics are sometimes misunderstood as necessary characteristics of replicators, i.e., of objects that produce (in a suitable environment) copies of themselves, or as characteristics of the concept of a replicator. However, they are the abstract aspects by which replicators can be compared; they are standards of replicator fitness, so to speak; cf. C. von Bülow, *Article Meme*, in: *Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie*, ed. J. Mittelstraß, Vol. 5, J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart–Weimar 2013.

[7] See, e.g., ch. 8, *The Rise of Replicators*, from Ananyo Bhattacharya's superb book *The Man from the Future: The Visionary Life of John Von Neumann*. There were highly interesting ideas of cybernetical replicators around already at Dawkins's times, including John von Neumann's theory of self-reproducing automata, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitt's artificial neural networks, John Horton Conway's cellular automaton, "Life."

[8] Cf. R. Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1976, p. 297.

would like to continue – political ideas and scientific theories.[9] In his 1998 book *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*, Edward O. Wilson praised the concept meme, understood as the basic unit of cultural inheritance, for its eminent role in unifying the natural and social sciences.[10] Together with Charles J. Lumsden he famously argued for a co-evolution of genes and memes.[11]

A disclaimer for young readers: at the turn of the millennium, the concept was hijacked by the internet community with very small modifications. First they called it internet meme, but now it is just meme.[12] Apparently, Dawkins shrugged his shoulders, claiming that those funny online images have a lot in common with his original idea.[13]

It is tempting to think about further analogies with Dawkins's ideas about the genome. But one should abstain from such "memetics." The meme–gene analogy freeloads on the unprecedented success story of genes in microbiology, evolutionary biology, system biology. In all these disciplines the relevant molecular causal mechanisms are scrupulously investigated and the complex interaction between genetic makeup, carrying organism and its environment are analyzed (though by far not fully understood). There can be no question of any of this in the case of memes.[14] The analogy is largely metaphoric. But hopefully, it is a metaphor that will further boost scientific imaginativeness.

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9 J. Gray, *The Atheist Delusion*, "The Guardian," 14.03.2008, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/mar/15/society. Gray is a rude critic of memes.

10 E.O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*, Random House, New York 1998, p. 352.

11 C. Lumsden, E.O. Wilson, *Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.

12 In German, you have "Mem" for the original thing versus "Meme" for the internet phenomenon.

13 In an interview with Wired magazine on the occasion of his being involved in the New Directors Showcase, Dawkins was asked "How do you feel about your word meme being reappropriated by the internet?" His reply went: "The meaning is not that far away from the original. It's anything that goes viral. In the original introduction to the word meme in the last chapter of *The Selfish Gene*, I did actually use the metaphor of a virus. So when anybody talks about something going viral on the internet, that is exactly what a meme is and it looks as though the word has been appropriated for a subset of that" (R. Dawkins, O. Solon, *Richard Dawkins on the Internet's Hijacking of the Word "Meme"*, Wired, 20.06.2013, URL: http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-06/20/richard-dawkins-memes).

14 Just to raise one point: the smallest contributors to the replication processes in genes known so far are microRNA. They consist of twenty-two base pairs only, about six Angström each. The whole microRNA is therefore ca. 12.6 nm long. Compare that to the complete genome, another actor in the replication process, which is mostly encoded in DNA double helix. If you unwind the string of a human DNA it would extend over about two metres. So, the range of size is nine orders of magnitude – that is far beyond imagination. Genetic mechanisms are well-researched

The notion of a meme has been under heavy criticism from the very beginning.[15] Dawkins does not remain unimpressed. In his 2006 jubilee session he seems to withdraw from the meme motif to some extent. Closing the session, he says:

> This is not something that I've ever wanted to push as a theory of human culture, but I originally proposed it as a kind of – almost an anti-gene point, to make the point that Darwinism requires accurate replicators with phenotypic power, but they don't necessarily have to be genes. What if they were computer viruses? They hadn't been invented when I wrote *The Selfish Gene* so I went straight for memes, units of cultural inheritance.[16]

Indeed, Dawkins's book is on genes. It is on biology almost entirely. Chapter 11 on replicators in human culture, although it became very famous afterwards, stands somewhat aside. And Dawkins could well have used alternative examples of replicators, such as self-reproducing automata. Alas, at the very end of his afterword at the same jubilee session in 2006, he reminds the auditory of the final sentences of his *Selfish Gene*:

> We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing pure, disinterested altruism – something that has no place in nature, something that has never existed before in the whole history of the world. We are built as gene machines and cultured as meme machines, but we have the power to turn against our creators. We, alone on earth can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.[17]

This is undoubtedly thrilling, but it is not purposeful, perhaps. With the very last sentence he seems to clearly undermine the leitmotif of his 1976 book. And yet, Dawkins's memes seem to offer interesting perspectives on schools as collective organisms with certain goals and behavioural patterns. It may look like a bad idea

for seventy years now. For biological systems, genes are necessary, but not sufficient for replication. Messenger RNA is involved to switch genes on and off. It is not clear what mRNA-analogues – if any – are at work in the case of memes. For memes we have the name and some vague idea of an analogy. For the time being, all the presupposed mechanisms of meme expression, variation and transcription remain educated fiction, not supported by evidence.

15 For a fair and comprehensive overview of the main criticisms, see C. von Bülow, *Article Meme*, op. cit.

16 R. Dawkins, *Afterword*, Darwin @ LSE, 16.03.2006, URL: https://www.edge.org/event/darwin-lse.

17 Ibid.

to explicate one notoriously vague term, "school in science," by the not less misty concept of "meme." But on the other hand: if the former one is essentially vague, then how to expect a stringent definition in terms which are themselves precise?

Memes in Dawkins's sense shall include, as it was mentioned above, political ideas, manners, technologies, religious doctrines and scientific theories. Here I would object. At least the last exemplification of meme would be too broad for our purposes. Memes in science should not be identified with fully elaborated theories. That's too coarse-grained a view. A scientific meme is rather a sticky new idea in some disciplines – attractive, easy to explain, easy to remember: "Speed of light is constant," "Organisms are survival machines for genes." Memes in science are compact, recognizable, scientifically significant ideas.

Some scientific ideas become memes only in due time, under favourable conditions. They are made by human mind (namely, the author's), and they make human mind (e.g., the followers' minds). They are products of the intellect and they do not exist independently. But they may survive, as hibernated information, outside the mind in all sorts of storage media. Thus, a school of science does not necessarily have to have continuity over time. Memes, as genes, are types, not tokens. So, there is no problem with sharing them.

Our aim is to use memes for individuating schools of science. This requires further specific properties for the respective memes. Such school-building memes shall form the "hard core" of the school's scientific creed, its doctrine. To that aim they must be new, but neither revolutionarily new, nor should they be weird. By definition, these memes are not mainstream, nor will they be mainstream soon. Otherwise, they become generally accepted by the scientific community – and thus cannot create a specific school: the school as such would not appear at all or it would dissolve into the discipline's mainstream soon. In the second case it would not work out either. Whoever claims all-too bizarre hypotheses will be treated by other scientists with disrespect. As a result, the group would turn into a sect and would be expelled from academia. (Although, scientific moods may swing: what was silly yesterday may be reasonable today, and, perhaps, becomes junk tomorrow.)

Let the whole of memes in a scientific discipline be its *memepool*. What is the carrier of (parts of) a memepool? Expert scientists? Certainly. Can collectives of scientists be considered meme carriers? We do think so, as long as they share scientific memes. Let us call the part of the memepool which is common for a sci-

entific collective the *menome* of the group.[18] In order to develop into a school in science, the menome has to be original, recognizable, resilient, and, most of all, replicable. A school in science is always distinguished by a menome of that sort. Modifications of the menome directly affect the school. First the new meme appears in an individual mind as an idea concerning the school's doctrine. That's heresy. But next the heresy spreads among the orthodox – thereby changing the menome, or: modifying the doctrine – or, the deviator is expelled, or something intermediate happens: the school divides. By the way, this is why schools of science are not like slime moulds – since they are individuated by their specific menome, they cannot fuse with each other without losing their identity. The merger kills them. But of course, something new can come out of it.

Certainly, the scientific menome is not all that characterizes a school. A school's fitness does not exclusively depend on the scientific replicators. It needs a sense of tradition, devotedness to the school founder, perhaps common manners and peculiarities. All of that may be considered as the school's extended menome. The central trait, however, is its scientific menome: without proper memes there will be no school.

3. Berlin Group of Complex Logic

3.1. The Rise of the Complex Logic Group

As a case study, we will apply our findings to a specific research community, the so-called Berlin group of complex logic.

The Berlin group of complex logic was a group of logicians in the Philosophical Faculty of Berlin's Humboldt University and their project was "complex logic" in the mid-1970s. At that time, the university had already had a long-lasting tradition in mathematical logic. Not so, however, in philosophy. Here, Marxism-Leninism dominated in the second half of the 20th century. The relationship of this scientific doctrine to logic was not an intimate one.

In 1967, Horst Wessel returned from Moscow, were he had obtained a PhD in logic under the supervision of Aleksander Zinoviev. His thesis was about the problem of truth in dialectics and in formal logic. He established the Depart-

[18] "Memome" would be in better analogy to genome, but it sounds too bad, perhaps. The same holds, in my view, for the somewhat similar concept of a "memeplex."

ment of Logic in the Philosophical Institute of Humboldt University and started teaching formal logic to students from the institute and beyond. This was done in a modern way. Able students liked it a lot. Lecturers had the pleasant feeling of spreading seeds of good science and rational thinking in their students' minds. Today you would call it a mission.

Wessel, the unquestioned leader of the group, was a charismatic personality, full of humour, usually pretty sarcastic. This was difficult to bear for some people. There was a saying that the most likeable thing about Horst Wessel was his wife, Ingrid. Indeed, Ingrid Wessel, a professor of Asian studies, was usually able to smooth the waters quickly. Horst Wessel was extremely well networked and socially largely fearless. His working-class background and dignified kinship relations were also helpful. Moreover, he received his blessings from Moscow University itself. The Virgin of Mercy thus extended her protective shell over the young logic department in Berlin – whoever is under Mary's pall is safe. Then, however, history allowed itself a crude joke: Zinoviev fell into disgrace because of his literary work and had to leave the Soviet Union. The protective pall momentarily turned into a sanbenito – a heretic's cloak. Wessel and Zinoviev agreed to play down these scientific relations. Only after German unification the matter was put in proper order at the occasion of Zinoviev's 70th birthday. A scientific conference in honour of Aleksander Zinoviev was organized in 1992, accompanied by a huge party. Everybody was happy at the end.

Glittering parties at scientific events was a characteristic feature of the Berlin group. They liked to celebrate together and to entertain their guests. Even according to the period's standards, when working collectives were tied together much closer than today, social life in this group was exceptional. Birthdays, end-of-term barbecues, sport contests – there were many occasions to meet your colleagues and their family members. It goes without saying that there were regular and long scientific meetings with extensive debates on individual research projects or on new results from elsewhere. All that enhanced the group's sense of belonging and mutual loyalty. The strong feeling of togetherness did not remain without consequences for the public presentations of the Berlin logicians. It was sometimes almost amusing to see that they began their papers at conferences – regardless of the respective topic – with an outline of complex logic. This not only served to hammer the basics of complex logic into the audience, but it also caused a uniform appearance of the group members. It was clear from the very outset: they belong together.

Certainly, it needs more than just a good scientific institution, a demand for teaching students proper science, and a charismatic leader to get off the ground with a novel scientific agenda. The conception planted by the Berlin group embraced a holistic, universal understanding of logic. Complex logic consisted in three parts: a theory of terms, a theory of predication, and an approach to logical entailment. The package was attractive enough to allure talented young researchers, who Wessel trained in complex logic. The naming was not very fortunate, since it's relation to the basic idea of the system was not obvious. So it did not play an outstanding role for making the brand popular.

How to characterize the basic ideas of complex logic?[19] They should be precise, short and firm enough to be ready for replication. For NTP, the non-traditional predication theory, the task is not hard: Besides "predicate P is attributed to subject s" [symb.: s↑P] and "P is denied for s" [s↓P] we may form classical negations for both. The crucial observation is that *tertium non datur* does not hold: (s↓P) ≡ ~ (s↑P) is not true in NTP. Let this be the first meme of complex logic, characterizing NTP, its first ingredient. It is easy to understand, easy to remember. No wonder NTP became well-known soon.

Also the second component, consequence theory, can easily be memorized. Logical consequence is a binary predicate □ which can occur only once in theorems. The second meme is this: A □ B is a valid rule of strict logical consequence iff$_{df}$

1) A ⊃ B is a classical tautology;
2) B contains only variables that occur in A;
3) A is no contradiction, B no tautology.

Just to avoid misunderstandings: the above definition is not fit for winning a beauty contest. But it is, again, easy to comprehend and to memorize.

The third part of the logical equipment of complex logic, the theory of terms, is different. Here we assume a distinction between subject terms, which shall denote objects, and predicate terms, which shall denote properties and relations. Next, quite a few specific relations of this theory are introduced and investigated, such as the denotation or naming relation, the relation of meaning inclusion, relations between singular, general, categorical, empty and non-empty subject terms.

[19] The technical details have been reduced to a minimum to make the text as comprehensible as possible. For a more detailed presentation of the logical background of the conception, see, e.g., K. Wuttich, *Horst Wessel: Contributions to the Theory of Logical Consequence, Non-Traditional Theory of Predication and Logical Theory of Terms*, "History and Philosophy of Logic" 2020, Vol. 41, pp. 291–300.

This seems to be somewhat overcomplex. Term theory could not be boiled down successfully into a meme. A vast amount of idiosyncratic operators is used to formulate highly specific and not always self-evident norms for term-building. It is little wonder, therefore, that the theory of terms has found comparatively little resonance with other logicians. Also for the first author of this paper, being a close scientific confederate of the Berlin group, the theory of terms was not an issue. It was largely unknown to him.

Admittedly, the potential replicators that span complex logic do not look particularly good. And yet, in combination they characterize an original research project. It is safe to say that the Berlin logic group developed pretty well towards the end of the 1980s. It attracted increasing attention for its research at home and abroad, and its members were recognized and recognizable as representatives of the concept of complex logic. Group members actively participated in national and international symposiums and conferences in the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Germany, Sweden, Italy and the USA, including the World Conferences on Logic and Philosophy of Science (Moscow, Uppsala, Florence). This also applies to the founding of the Society for Analytical Philosophy and its conferences in the early 1990s.

3.2. The Berlin Group's Genealogy

According to Ralf Klausnitzer,[20] the initial stage of a scientific school lasts usually around fifteen years. After that time, we often observe its exponential growth. So, how has the research collective of complex logic presented itself after fifteen years, that is, in 1990?

3.2.1. Head of School

Horst Wessel (1936–2019), Professor of Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin:

- PhD 1967 (Lomonossow University, Aleksander Zinoviev), *Проблема истины в диалектике и в современной логике* [The Problem of Truth in Dialectics and in Modern Logic];
- habilitation 1976 (Humboldt University), *Philosophie und Logik* [Philosophy and Logic].

[20] R. Klausnitzer, *Wissenschaftliche Schule*, op. cit., p. 46.

3.2.2. Second Generation

Evelyn Dölling (born 1947), Reader in Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin:

- PhD 1975 (Humboldt University, Horst Wessel), *Zur Logik empirischer Zusammenhänge* [Logic of Empirical Context];
- habilitation 1985 (Humboldt University), *Logik und Sprache. Zum Gebrauch des Existenzprädikates* [Logic and Language: On the Use of the Existential Predicate].

Johannes Dölling (born 1948), Lecturer in Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin:

- PhD 1975 (Humboldt University, Horst Wessel), *Definitionen in der Philosophie* [Definitions in Philosophy].

Peter Keller (born 1948), Public Officer:

- PhD 1975 (Humboldt University, Horst Wessel), *Probleme der Zeitlogik* [Problems of the Logic of Time].

Klaus Wuttich (born 1948), Reader in Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin:

- PhD 1977 (Humboldt University, Horst Wessel), *Probleme der Epistemischen Logik* [Problems of Epistemic Logic];
- habilitation 1987 (Humboldt University), *Modale und Nichtmodale Epistemische Logik* [Modal and Non-Modal Epistemic Logic].

Karl-Heinz Krampitz (born 1951), Reader in Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin:

- PhD 1977 (Humboldt University, Horst Wessel), *Zum Begründungsproblem in der Logik* [The Problem of Justification in Logic];
- habilitation 1990 (Humboldt University), *Der Existenzbegriff in der Logik* [The Notion of Existence in Logic].

Uwe Scheffler (born 1957), Lecturer in Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin:

- PhD 1985 (Humboldt University, Horst Wessel), *Eine Theorie der Konditionalaussagen* [A Theory of Conditionals];
- habilitation 1999 (Humboldt University), *Ereignis und Zeit. Ontologische Grundlagen der Kausalrelationen* [Event and Time: Ontological Foundations of Causal Relations].

Without exception, all logicians of the second generation came to logic via Zinoviev or Wessel. Both were charismatic personalities who knew how to fascinate philosophy students not only with their conception of logic, but also with their conception of Marxist philosophy as a science. Characteristic of this is a remark Zinoviev made to the second author of this paper at the end of the first year of study (summer 1969): "Klaus, specialize in logic! Everything else makes

no sense. Perhaps, history of philosophy. Marx and Engels dreamed up all of Marxism over a glass of beer." Wessel, who at that time was still fighting for the establishment of logic at the philosophical institute, will of course have expressed himself less drastically. But by this time he had managed to enthuse a small group of gifted students with his and Zinoviev's conception of logic. Around 1970, Evelyn and Johannes Dölling and Peter Keller visited Moscow State University with a group of students and became personally acquainted with Zinoviev. All three made more or less reference to the work of Zinoviev and Wessel in their dissertations, but not to the work of one another. The topics were just too different for that. This also applies to Wuttich and Krampitz, who joined Wessel's group in 1973 and 1975 after studying at Moscow State University. The second author of this article wrote his diploma thesis under Zinoviev and continued to work in the direction advised by him. In doing so, he drew heavily on all three areas of complex logic and of course quoted many works by Zinoviev and Wessel. The quotations from Zinoviev almost caused him trouble in 1977, when he was completing his dissertation: Zinoviev had just fallen out of favour. With one exception, the name "Zinoviev" had to be replaced everywhere by "the author of the SE1 system." Krampitz had fewer problems with his dissertation on the problem of justification. He referred to the concept of complex logic by using the logical language rules in section *Approaches to a Systematic Setup of Logic*.[21] The same applies to the habilitations of Wuttich and Krampitz from 1987 and 1990 respectively. Uwe Scheffler, who had also studied in Moscow but no longer experienced Zinoviev as a teacher, in his work on causal logic and in his habilitation thesis, *Event and Time: Ontological Foundations of Causal Relations* (1999) explicitly points out that the basic idea of his work comes from Zinoviev and Wessel.[22] In the section *Termini and Statements: The Linguistic Foundations* he also relies on Wessel's work on term theory.[23] Since Scheffler was the only representative of the second generation who was able to continue working at Humboldt University until after Wessel's retirement in 2001, he was intensively involved in supervising the active group of philosophy students that had formed after the reunification, primarily through Wessel's lectures and which we refer to here as the third

[21] K.-H. Krampitz, *Zum Begründungsproblem in der Logik*, dissertation A, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1980, pp. 98ff.

[22] U. Scheffler, *Ereignis und Zeit. Ontologische Grundlagen der Kausalrelationen*, habilitation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1999, Preface, p. ii.

[23] Ibid., pp. 18ff.

generation. For a time Krampitz (from 1993 to 1995) and Wuttich (1993–1996) were involved in the work of the logic group. They were employed by Wessel in a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft project and took an active part in the meetings of the group.

3.2.3. Third Generation

The third generation includes: Fabian Neuhaus, PhD, Mireille Staschok, PhD, Sebastian Köhler, PhD, Bente Christiansen, Lars Mecklenburg, Henning Franzen, Marco Winkler, Ralf Dombrowski, PhD, Andreas Dahlke, Maik Zühlke and Sebastian Gerhard.

Marco Winkler, who later did research in linguistics, wrote to Wuttich: "At the time, I understood the Berlin group as a school and I was very happy to be part of it." Henning Franzen, who published a logic exercise book with Scheffler, replied: "I would see myself more as a member of a social group than as a member of a scientific school. I guess I came too late for that." Sebastian Köhler, who wrote his master's thesis under Wessel's supervision, also has fond memories of his time in this logic group. He later did his doctorate in another field. When asked if he felt like a member of a logic school, Fabian Neuhaus replied:

> Unfortunately I only experienced the offshoots of the Berlin logic group. I started studying in 1996 and at that point – I think – from the original Berlin logic group only Prof. Wessel and Uwe [Scheffler – M.U.] were still employed at the university. It was a great time and I was very happy to have belonged to this group in a social sense. But I was still a very young student and had corresponding worries (homework, exams, girlfriends). In this respect, of course, I wasn't ready to contribute anything scientifically. When I started to take a serious interest in science around 2000, Prof. Wessel's health was no longer as good and he was also less committed. In fact, I had more to do with Uwe. But because of the whole situation (Prof. Wessel facing retirement, Uwe's uncertain future), everything had to happen very quickly. I did my master's degree in 2001 and my doctorate in 2002. Shortly thereafter, the Berlin logic group was dissolved. In this respect, I was simply 5 years too young to become a scientific member of the Berlin logic group. My only publications on a topic in the field of complex logic were the article *Derivability and Consequence* (in "What Follows?") and my dissertation. And the latter only to a limited extent.

> Because even if I quote works from the Berlin logic group in my dissertation, so other authors played a much larger role in terms of content. After that I was out of philosophy/logic. In this respect, I did not take up the topics of complex logic again scientifically later.

The impression that everybody also felt part of a social group in the 1990s can be found in almost all reports of students who were enthusiastic about logic in those years. The commitment of Bente Christiansen in this cohesion was outstanding. Wessel's publications, especially his books, which were published by Logos Verlag[24] after the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, would hardly have been possible without their cooperation. In the forewords to their dissertations, both Fabian Neuhaus and Mireille Staschok thanked Bente Christiansen for constant help and support.

Due to Wessel's retirement in 2001 and to the fact that the logic professorship was no longer active and Scheffler, as a lone fighter, no longer had the opportunity to continue leading the group, the young "logicians" had to find a different career path outside logic (as shown in detail below). In the end, only two doctorates were finished in this field. In his doctoral thesis, *Naive Predicate Logic: A Logical Theory of Predication*, Fabian Neuhaus wrote:

> Uwe Scheffler and Horst Wessel have always encouraged and challenged me – each according to his nature. In their school you were taught to use your own mind, to formulate and deal with pointed criticism. Anyone who knows philosophy institutes knows that this is anything but a matter of course. I couldn't have wished for better teachers.

In addition to Wessel, Zinoviev and Scheffler, Neuhaus also quotes some of Krampitz's works. The second doctoral thesis, written by representatives of the third (last) generation, comes from Mireille Staschok, *Existence and the Consequences: Logical Conceptions of Quantification and Predication*.[25] In the foreword, she explicitly thanks Wessel, who was the second reviewer, and Scheffler, her first reviewer. Zinoviev and Wessel's NPT occupies a large part of her work. The whole chapter 5 is dedicated to this theory. But she also refers to other authors from the

[24] Logos was the family publishing company, where not only many books of the group were issued, but also the book series "Logical Philosophy," edited by Scheffler, Shramko, Urchs, and Wess.

[25] M. Staschok, *Existenz und die Folgen. Logische Konzeptionen von Quantifikation und Prädikation*, dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2007.

Wessel school. Krampitz, Neuhaus and Scheffler are mentioned, as well as the book *daß-Termini. Intensionalität und Ersetzbarkeit* [*daß-Termini*: Intensionality and Substitutability] by Wessel and Wuttich.[26]

3.3. What Else Happened

The rigid system of academic appointments in the German Democratic Republic, which amounted to long-term planning of university chairs, made a "natural" spread of the conception through new professorships of its members at other universities almost impossible. There was no call for open chairs at universities, that is, for professorship vacancies. Thus, the group remained concentrated in Berlin.[27]

The end of the Cold War in East Germany, which manifested itself in 1990 with the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, brought with it the largest wave of layoffs in German university history. In many cases, the dismissals became a de facto professional ban for those affected. It was above all a political decision to orient the humanities education at the universities of the unified Germany in the way that was customary in the West. But we do not think that was the only reason. A tenured professorship at a German university is the lifelong dream of countless poor devils who have to eke out a living in temporary positions after their habilitation. With a pinch of sarcasm, one could say that the newly gained chairs in the East were too precious to be left to the previous, outlandish chairholders.

A few years later, a handful of the colleagues listed above were still doing science, including only three who continued to do logic:

- Horst Wessel (1936–2019), Professor of Logic, Humboldt University of Berlin, retired 2001;
- Evelyn Dölling, Professor of Semiotics, Technical University of Berlin, retired 2015;
- Johannes Dölling, Lecturer, Institute of Linguistics, Leipzig University, retired 2014;
- Peter Keller, worked as a journalist until 2014;

[26] H. Wessel, K. Wuttich, *daß-Termini. Intensionalität und Ersetzbarkeit*, Logos Verlag, Berlin 2003.

[27] By the way: Humboldt University was the country's best university and Berlin was by far the most attractive city in East Germany. All university posts in the German Democratic Republic were open-ended anyway, so nobody was particularly interested in leaving Berlin for other appointments.

- Klaus Wuttich, management of German–US student exchange;
- Karl-Heinz Krampitz, owner of a cybercafe;
- Uwe Scheffler, Reader in Logic, Technical University of Dresden;
- Dr. Fabian Neuhaus, Lecturer at Theoretical Computer Science, University of Magdeburg;
- Dr. Mireille Staschok, hicking guide;
- Dr. Sebastian Köhler, Lecturer, HMKW, Berlin;
- Bente Christiansen, school teacher;
- Lars Mecklenburg, programmer;
- Henning Franzen, school teacher;
- Marco Winkler, projects at University of Magdeburg;
- Ralf Dombrowski, unknown;
- Andreas Dahlke, developer;
- Maik Zühlke, manager;
- Sebastian Gerhard, freelancer.

3.4. The End

Wessel himself reflects upon the situation with his peculiar sense of humour in one of his books:

> With the end of the GDR, the work of this department also ended. The strong united Germany that I had also striven for could not afford so many logicians. Nevertheless, I was justifiably proud of the fact that by leaving the professorship of the Institute of Philosophy I had made a real contribution to the inner unity of our fatherland and to the implementation of the leading culture. Now one could no longer distinguish between Ossis and Wessis among the professors of the Institute. The last relic of the defunct GDR had disappeared.[28]

Be that as it may, the Berlin research group on complex logic dissolved within a short period of time, as did many other groups in universities and research institutions in the period's disruptive environment. Change was too fast and too radical. Internal resilience was not enough to adapt to entirely new circumstances. The group had no future. And yet it had had many of the prerequisites to sustain under more favourable conditions. A charismatic leader, a strong sense

[28] H. Wessel, *Antiirrationalismus. Logisch-Philosophische Aufsätze*, Logos Verlag, Berlin 2003, p. v (own translation).

of togetherness resulting from a joint mission, a clear vision of complex logic advocated in a recognizable manner. They had a creed, a confession of logical faith: two and a half meme to spread, ready for replication. So we belief they would have had a chance to become a scientific school.

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A Brazilian Southern School in the Philosophy of Physics: Identity, Indistinguishability, and Individuality in Quantum Theories

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Abstract: This paper presents the works developed by a group of researchers mainly in the South of Brazil on the philosophy of physics, dealing mostly with the logic and metaphysics of the notions of identity, indistinguishability, and individuality of quantum entities.

Key words: South of Brazil, philosophy of physics, identity and individuality of quantum entities, non-individuality, quantum metaphysics, quasi-set theory

> The sameness of a particle is not an absolute concept. It has only a restricted significance and breaks down completely in some circumstances.
>
> Erwin Schrödinger, *What Is an Elementary Particle?*

1. Introduction

The origins of the works to be covered here go back to the motivations provided by Newton da Costa, and the works by Steven French on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. In his book *Ensaio sobre os fundamentos da lógica* [Essay on the Foundations of Logic], published in 1980,[1] da Costa argued that any logical principle can be questioned ("dialectized," as he preferred to say following Gaston Bachelard), in particular, this can be done also with respect to the basic notions of classical logic, and he specifically discusses the Principle of Identity in

[1] N.C.A. da Costa, *Ensaio sobre os fundamentos da lógica*, Hucitec, São Paulo 1980.

the first-order formulation, namely, "For all x, $x = x$." By questioning a certain principle P, he means to construct a "reasonable" logical system where P does not hold in general.[2] By "reasonable" he understands a logical system endowed with clear syntactic and well-established semantics.

Steven French, since his PhD thesis at the University of London in the 1980s, has presented important work on the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics, mainly by considering the individuality of quantum entities.[3] In the late 1980s, he was working at the State University of Campinas and I had the opportunity to contact him just before finishing my own dissertation. His works on the validity of the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles (one-half of Leibniz's Law, see below) in quantum mechanics have become key references in the field.[4]

Da Costa was occupied with logic. In order to inspire a possible departure from the Principle of Identity, he found in Erwin Schrödinger's ideas a motivation for the elaboration of a system where such a principle does not hold in full. Schrödinger said, in his book *Science and Humanism*[5] and in his essay *What Is an Elementary Particle?*,[6] that the notion of identity (sameness) does not make sense for the elementary particles in quantum physics. The reason, we can say today, is that we cannot discern among the particles of the same kind when joined in a collection, and also that when they are described by an entangled state, we cannot identify them in a "which is which" way, contradicting the standard notion of identity of classical logic, where individuals can carry names that act as rigid designators, naming the same object in all possible worlds or contexts. Schrödinger does not enter into logical discussions, and also did not mention the theory of identity of standard logic, but poses the challenge concerning the application of this notion to the fundamental entities dealt with by quantum physics. It seems clear that the notion of identity Schrödinger is looking for is linked to the physi-

2 Ibid., p. 124.

3 S. French, *Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qt-idind/ (substantive revision on 30.10.2019).

4 S. French, M. Redhead, *Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles*, "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science" 1988, Vol. 39, pp. 233–246; S. French, *Identity and Individuality in Classical and Quantum Physics*, "Australasian Journal of Philosophy" 1989, Vol. 67, pp. 432–446.

5 E. Schrödinger, *Nature and the Greeks and Science and Humanism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.

6 E. Schrödinger, *What Is an Elementary Particle?*, in: E. Schrödinger, *Science, Theory and Man*, George Allen and Unwin, London 1967, pp. 193–223.

cal notion of re-interpretation: a thing endowed with identity must be recognized as such in other circumstances, or contexts, and, clearly, this is not what happens with quantum entities.

This intuitive notion of identity can be associated with the (also informal) notion of an *individual*: an individual would be something that (1) is a *one* of a kind, or of a certain type, say a person, a chair, a pen, and (2) can be re-identified as such, that is, as being *that* individual in different contexts. This is supposed to hold with persons, chairs and pens, although we should take care with Hume's remarks that such confidence in the permanence of the object's identity is only a fiction of our imagination.[7] It seems quite clear that quantum objects seem not to be individuals in this sense, although some such as the Bohmians could contest that quantum objects obey such conditions.[8]

As said before, da Costa was occupied with logical considerations.[9] By believing that the Principle of Identity can be questioned he requested the existence of a reasonable logical system where this principle does not hold in full. Thus, in order to sustain such a thesis, he sketched a first-order two-sorted logic he called "Schrödinger Logic" with the following characteristics. Beyond the standard logical symbology of first-order systems with identity, he assumed two kinds of individual variables and also corresponding individual constants, denoted by x, x', x'', … and X, X', X'', … for the individual variables of the first and of the second species respectively. The novelty is that only expressions of the form $t = u$ are formulas if and only if both t and u are terms (individual variables or individual constants) of the second kind. So, the language does not make reference to the identity (or to the difference) of objects denoted by the terms of the first species. Consequently, the Principle of Identity in the form does not hold in full. If the terms of the first species are designating elementary particles, then Schrödinger's idea gets vindicated, since the language of the given logic (suitable postulates are provided) does not speak of their identity or of their differences.

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7 D. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford Univeristy Press, Oxford 1985, pp. 200–201.

8 In Bohmian quantum mechanics, particles have trajectories and the trajectories serve to provide particles' identities. But it should be remarked that the positions are ascribed by *hidden* variables and cannot be known. It seems to me that this is a mystery even greater than to suppose that quantum objects simply do not conform to the given definition of an individual.

9 N.C.A. da Costa, *Ensaio sobre os fundamentos da lógica*, op. cit., pp. 117ff.

From the syntactical point of view, the logic works. But problems arise with its semantic counterpart. Da Costa suggests that a semantics could be developed by taking two non-empty sets D_1 and D_2, being $D_2 \subset D_1$, so that the individual constants of the first species are in correspondence with D_1. The *n*-ary predicates of the language are associated with relations in D_1^n. To the individual constants of the second species, we associate elements of D_2. Thus he emends that "[n]aturally, to the symbol of equality one associates the equality relation over D_2."[10] So, he suggests, all the semantic results related to the logic can be obtained without difficulty, so that one can get both the soundness of this semantics and the completeness of the system relative to such a semantics.

But, da Costa reminds us, such a semantics brings philosophical difficulties. Really, according to him, D_1 should not be taken as a *set* strictly speaking, since the relation of identity would lack sense in general; only for the elements of D_2 such a relation can be stated so that they are equal or distinct. Thus, he says that "in order to surpass this difficulty, there are two open roads: 1. to try to generalize the notion of set, for instance by building a theory of *quasi-sets* containing the standard sets as special cases, and to found a semantics for the system in such a theory; 2. one will not try to build a formal semantics for the system, but an *informal semantics*, with the help of the natural language, a little bit imprecise but taking into account what quantum mechanics says."[11] This second alternative finds its reason in da Costa's belief that "in the basis of all deductive sciences there is an informal semantics."[12]

As a motivation for his PhD thesis under da Costa's supervision, this paper's author has taken the above challenges into consideration.

2. The Thesis

My thesis was titled *Não-Reflexividade, Indistinguibilidade e Agregados de Weyl* [Non-Reflexivity, Indistinguishability, and Weyl's Aggregates];[13] the logics that depart from the standard theory of identity of classical logic, in particular violat-

[10] Ibid., p. 119.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., p. 120.
[13] D. Krause, *Não-Reflexividade, Indistinguibilidade e Agregados de Weyl*, PhD dissertation, University of São Paulo, 1990.

ing the Principle of Identity, as da Costa's Schrödinger Logic, were termed *non-reflexive*, once this principle is also known as the "reflexive law of identity." In one of the chapters, da Costa's first-order system was extended to a higher-order logic of order omega (simple theory of types) and a Henkin semantics was proposed, with a weak completeness theorem proven. We remark that, as in the case delineated by da Costa for his system, such semantics was elaborated in a standard set theory (you can think of the ZFC system).

The reasons to develop such a higher-order system were, first, to get a generalization of da Costa's system but, second, and perhaps mainly, in a higher-order language, we can formulate Leibniz's Law in full, hence *defining* identity, and, in particular, we can consider the standard formulations of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, a subject that at that time was being considered in the foundations of quantum theories; philosophers were disputing its validity in such a field.[14] Leibniz's Law can be written

$$x = y := \forall F\,(Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \qquad (1)$$

where x and y are terms of type τ and F is a variable of type $\langle\tau\rangle$. The sufficient condition is the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, while the necessary one is the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals.[15] In other words, by Leibniz's Law, identity is introduced *via* indiscernibility (agreement with respect to *all* predicates). So, if we can *define* identity for all objects, how to maintain the idea that it does not hold for some of them? Thus, the relation of indiscernibility (or "indistinguishability") was used instead of identity in Leibniz's Law, meaning that entities that share all their characteristics are indiscernible, and not identical. Thus, being "$\equiv$" a binary predicate symbol, x and y terms of type τ and being F a variable of type $\langle\tau\rangle$, we put

$$\mathrm{x} \equiv \mathrm{y} := \forall F\,(Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \qquad (2)$$

to mean that and are indiscernible. But this would be just a change of terminology since the definition would be the same as standard Leibniz's Law. Anyway, the interesting fact is that using higher-order languages we are able to express things such as the "definition" of identity of elementary particles as given by J.M. Jauch,

[14] S. French, *Identity and Individuality*, op. cit.; S. French, *Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles Is Not Contingently True Either*, "Synthese" 1989, Vol. 48, pp. 141–166; S. French, M. Redhead, *Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles*, op. cit.

[15] Frequently the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals is what is called "Leibniz's Law."

namely, "two elementary particles are identical if (and only if) they agree in all their intrinsic properties."[16] Intrinsic properties are those properties that do not depend on space and time, such as electric charge, mass or spin. Thus, if P is a variable whose arguments are properties of individuals (hence we are going now to a third-order logic), we can define

$$x \equiv_P y := \forall F\,(P(F) \rightarrow (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)) \qquad (3)$$

that is, x and y are P-indiscernible if they agree with respect to every property that satisfies P, which is a variable of type $\langle\langle\tau\rangle\rangle$. If P stands for "intrinsic property," we arrive at Jauch's definition with much more precision. It should be remarked that Jauch's definition confuses the notions of identity (agreement with respect to *all* properties) with indiscernibility relative to intrinsic properties only.

But despite this more expressive language, the challenge remains: how to differentiate between identity ("="), given by Leibniz's Law (1), and indiscernibility (2)? Classical logic defines the first in terms of the second, so first of all we need to break this correlation. One of the options is to go to more than the object's properties and relations. *Haecceity* was a term coined in the Middle Ages to mean some characteristics that make the individual the individual it is so that it can be referred to as "this one." Thus, by admitting the existence of haecceities of some kind, we can go beyond the properties and qualities of things and suppose that there is something more than properties and relations to give them their identities, and so Leibniz's Law can be violated. But this seems to be a radical move: if haecceities (by definition) can be reduced to neither properties nor relations, how can we deal with them? Anyway, this is a supposition that appears in classical physics. When we say that classical particles of the same kind obey Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics, we are agreeing that they have all the same properties but that even so a permutation of them conduces to a different state; hence, *something more* is being presupposed, what Heinz Post called *transcendental individuality*.[17] But this is not so in the quantum realm. Quantum entities do not obey Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics, but either Bose–Einstein or Fermi–Dirac, and in both cases their indistinguishability is assumed (as suggested by Post), *right from the start*. Post's claim was important here; the search for a mathematics where indiscernibility was not *made by hand*, for example, when one assumes

[16] J.M. Jauch, *Foundations of Quantum Mechanics*, Addison-Wesley, Boston, MA, 1968, p. 275.
[17] H. Post, *Individuality in Physics*, "Vedanta for East and West" 1973, Vol. 132, pp. 14–22.

symmetry postulates (an analogy would be to confine the entities to deformable, not rigid structures having more automorphisms than the identity function), but where the notion of indiscernibility was primitive.

The second alternative would be to find some suitable semantics for Schrödinger Logic, and here a theory of *quasi-sets* enters the scene. In fact, if we can admit the existence of "sets" (really, *quasi-sets*) such that an indistinguishability relation can hold for all objects but identity does not, we can have indiscernible but not identical entities, thus giving life to both equations (1) and (2) without conflating identity. So, a theory of quasi-sets is in need, where a distinction between indistinguishability and identity is given *without* assuming haecceities.

The first attempt to develop such a theory was another chapter of my thesis. The result was published later[18] and improvements in the theory continue to this day, thirty years after the first steps. This trajectory shows the difficulty there is in trying to suspend the universal application of identity. Some philosophers repute this notion as a fundamental one,[19] while others contest such an assumption.[20] We can repute this notion not as a necessary one, except perhaps in standard mathematics, as I shall comment on at the end, but it is quite useful and simplifies the discourse also in the empirical sciences. Below I shall provide some hints about the theory of quasi-sets.

Weyl's aggregates (mentioned in the title of my thesis) entered the work for the following reason. In his masterpiece,[21] Hermann Weyl discussed in Appendix B the aggregation of individuals. His aim was to explain how things such as elementary particles are considered in quantum mechanics. Weyl says that "that what imports" in quantum mechanics is not the identity of the particles, but the "ordered decompositions" like (4) below, which expresses, given n particles of

[18] D. Krause, *On a Quasi-Set Theory*, "Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic" 1992, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 402–411.

[19] O. Bueno, *Why Identity Is Fundamental*, "American Philosophical Quarterly" 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 325–332.

[20] D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, *Is Identity Really So Fundamental?*, "Foundations of Science" 2019, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 51–71; D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, *Does Identity Hold A Priori in Standard Quantum Mechanics?*, in: *Probing the Meaning and Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Entanglement, Relations and Information*, eds. D. Aerts, M.L. Dalla Chiara, C. de Ronde, D. Krause, World Scientific, Hackensack, NJ–London 2019, pp. 99–120.

[21] H. Weyl, *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1949.

the same species (hence indistinguishable), how many of them there are in each particular state being considered; so, we shall have things like

$$n = n_1 + n_2 + \cdots + n_k \qquad (4)$$

which says that we have n_i particles in the state C_i. In order to express that, he takes the set S of the n particles (notice that S is assumed to be a *set*, and this will be relevant soon) and an equivalence relation "$\sim$" over this set. Then the C_i can be seen as the equivalence classes and, by considering their cardinalities, we get (4).

The challenge, not considered by Weyl, is that, as said before, S is a set, hence even if we take the C_i to represent the states of the particles, the standard theory of identity (STI) applies to them and so we cannot have *just* the ordered decomposition (4) without being committed to the identity of the elements of the equivalence classes. STI is included in standard logic and mathematics and says that given any two objects, they are different and then (due to Leibniz's Law) do present a difference. In such frameworks, *there are no indiscernible but not identical objects*. There is no escape; within a standard set theory, every represented entity becomes an individual and the most we can do is to *simulate* indiscernibility, but not consider it as it should be taken, as something holding *right from the start*, as it seems to be the case with indistinguishable quantum entities.

Another important link with the subjects of the thesis was made with M.L. Dalla Chiara and G. Toraldo di Francia's work. They were working basically on the same subject.[22] They developed a theory of *quasets* in order to cope with collections of quantum objects, also questioning the applicability of standard set theories to deal with collections of indiscernible quantum entities. A comparison between their theory of quasets and the theory of quasi-sets was done in the paper *Quasi Set Theories for Microobjects: A Comparison*,[23] and an extension of their theory relating it to *rough sets* is done in *Un acercamiento a las semánticas Nmatriciales basadas en QST*.[24] Basically, in the theory of quasets, identity holds for all objects, but the membership relation is weakened so that if we have

[22] See, e.g., M.L. Dalla Chiara, G. Toraldo di Francia, *Individuals, Kinds and Names in Physics*, in: *Bridging the Gap: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics*, eds. G. Corsi, M.L. Dalla Chiara, G.C. Ghirardi, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1993 [1978], pp. 261–284.

[23] M.L. Dalla Chiara, R. Giuntini, D. Krause, *Quasi Set Theories for Microobjects: A Comparison*, in: *Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics*, ed. E. Castellani, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998, pp. 142–152.

[24] J.P. Jorge, F. Holik, D. Krause, *Un acercamiento a las semánticas Nmatriciales basadas en QST*, forthcoming.

a quaset A and an object a, we can say that "a certainly belongs to A" by writing "$a \in A$," that "a certainly does not belong to A" by "$a \notin A$," but is not equivalent to this last formula; thus we have as a theorem that $a \notin A \rightarrow \neg(a \in A)$ but not the other way around. So, if a belongs to A, we can conclude that it is false that it certainly does not belong to A, and so we get something like a fuzzification of the situation.

3. Quasi-Sets and Applications

The idea of quasi-sets is different from that of quasets. In quasi-set theory, identity does not hold for all objects. So, we may have quasi-sets whose elements are completely indiscernible from each other; membership works as usual, but identity does not. The core of the theory is ZFA, the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with atoms. But the theory admits the existence of another kind of atoms, for which the standard notion of identity does not hold. So, we have M-atoms, which behave as the atoms in ZFA, and the m-atoms, to which identity does not apply; this is achieved by saying that expressions like "$x = y$" are not well-formed if x or y denotes an m-atom. But the primitive relation of indiscernibility, symbolized by "$\equiv$" holds for all objects; of course $x = y \rightarrow x \equiv y$, but not conversely. The axioms provide the way to construct a universe of quasi-sets, which turns to be a non-rigid (deformable) structure.

A quasi-set may have a cardinal, termed its *quasi-cardinal*, given axiomatically since quasi-cardinals are not defined by means of ordinals as usual (or relying on the notion of ordinal), despite having properties like those of standard cardinals; so, we may have certain quantities of entities that cannot be ordered, counted, labelled "significantly" (that is, so that a proper name does not act as a rigid designator). But, for the purpose of this article, the most important thing is not to speak about the details of the theory, but of its applications done by the "southern group." It is important to notice that some philosophers claim that once a collection has a cardinal greater than one, its elements are necessarily distinct. This can be assumed within a standard set theory, where a set is just a collection of *distinct* entities, but not in the theory of quasi-sets.[25]

[25] For a discussion on this topic, see D. Krause, *On Identity, Indiscernibility, and Individuality in the Quantum Domain*, forthcoming.

In the 1990s, Adonai S. Sant'Anna, from the Department of Mathematics of the Federal University of Paraná, who had obtained a master's degree in physics from the same university, started working on quasi-sets and applications to quantum mechanics. He received his PhD also with Newton da Costa at the University of São Paulo, and he wrote a series of papers, one of them with Analice G. Volkov, who was also studying with da Costa and became a member of the same department (Analice died in a bus crash in 2001 before finishing her PhD). In these papers, working in the mathematical framework provided by the theory of quasi-sets, the authors were able to assume the indiscernibility of the quantum entities as a primitive notion and not as something obtained a posteriori by making some trick with identity (as in Weyl's case). The "quantum statistics" arose naturally from the formalism, and the Indistinguishability Postulate, an essential assumption in standard quantum mechanics, was no more assumed as a postulate, for it results from the hypothesis of the indiscernibility, as is intuitive that it should be so.[26]

In 2000, I moved to the Department of Philosophy of the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), in another state of the South, whose capital is Florianópolis. There, he started working in logic with some students and a colleague, Antonio M.N. Coelho, a member of the Department of Philosophy. Antonio, who has quite a good background in logic and in mathematics, and has obtained his PhD also with da Costa in São Paulo. Together we worked on mathematical structures and wrote a paper on the subject[27] and supervised some graduate works on the subject; in *Observa*ções *sobre a neutralidade ontológica da matem*ática,[28] the authors argue that standard set theories are not "neutral" ontologically, as some suppose, since they cannot represent adequately an ontology of non-individuals. Later, a former student of that university, Jonas R.B. Arenhart, finished his PhD at UFSC working with quasi-sets and joined the group. After a period in another university, he entered the Department of Philosophy of UFSC. With Jonas, a series of papers dealing more with the philosophical aspects of indiscernibility

[26] The interested reader can consult A.S. Sant'Anna, D. Krause, *Hidden Variables and Indistinguishable Particles*, "Foundations of Physics Letters" 1997, Vol. 10, pp. 409–426; D. Krause, A.S. Sant'Anna, A.G. Volkov, *Quasi Set Theory for Bosons and Fermions*, "Foundations of Physics Letters" 1999, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 67–79.

[27] D. Krause, A.M.N. Coelho, *Identity, Indiscernibility, and Philosophical Claims*, "Axiomathes" 2005, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 191–210.

[28] G. Gelowate, D. Krause, A.M.N. Coelho, *Observações sobre a neutralidade ontológica da matemática*, "Episteme" 2005, Vol. 17, pp. 145–157.

has appeared, a work that continues today (see the references). He also has quite a good list of publications involving several aspects of the metaphysics of quantum theories. Later other students became interested in the subject and today we can mention Raoni W. Arroyo, who obtained his PhD also from UFSC and started working on the metaphysics of quantum theories.[29] These authors have pointed to important details involving the metaphysics of science, and advanced the idea that there may exist several different and alternative images of the world provided by a particular theory; these ideas are quite similar to those given in my 2019 work on perspectivism, whose motivation was provided by José Ortega y Gasset's notions of *perspectivism*.

In 2000, I created the research group Lógica e Fundamentos da Ciência (Logic and Foundations of Science) linked to the Diretório dos Grupos de Pesquisa of the CNPq, the Brazilian Council for Scientific Development; the group congregates several researchers and students and can be accessed online.[30] Another important contributor (and member of the group) is Otávio Bueno, who obtained his PhD in Leeds with S. French and is today at the University of Miami; the works of the group continued by emphasizing the *metaphysics of non-individuality*[31] and the fundamentality of the notion of identity.[32]

[29] J.R.B. Arenhart, R.W. Arroyo, *Floating Free from Physics: The Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics*, "arXiv:2012.05822," https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2012.05822; J.R.B. Arenhart, R.W. Arroyo, *Back to the Question of Ontology (and Metaphysics)*, "Manuscrito" 2021, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 1–51; J.R.B. Arenhart, R.W. Arroyo, *On Physics, Metaphysics, and Metametaphysics*, "Metaphilosophy" 2021, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 1–25; J.R.B. Arenhart, R.W. Arroyo, *The Epistemic Value of Metaphysics*, "Synthese" 2022, Vol. 200, No. 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03833-5; R.W. Arroyo, J.R.B. Arenhart, *A (meta)metafísica da ciência: o caso da mecânica quântica não relativista*, "Kriterion" 2022, Vol. 152, pp. 275–296; R.W. Arroyo, J.R.B. Arenhart, *The Powers of Quantum Mechanics: A Metametaphysical Discussion of the "Logos Approach"*, "Foundations of Science" 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-022-09837-1.

[30] *Research Group in Logic and Foundations of Science (CNPq)*, URL: https://sites.google.com/view/logicandfoundationsofscience/home?authuser=0.

[31] D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, O. Bueno, *The Non-Individuals Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Quantum Interpretations*, eds. O. Freire Jr., G. Bacciagaluppi, O. Darrigol, T. Hartz, C. Joas, A. Kojevnikov, O. Pessoa Jr., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2022, pp. 1135–1154.

[32] O. Bueno, *Why Identity Is Fundamental*, op. cit.; D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, *Is Identity Really So Fundamental?*, op. cit.; D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, *Does Identity Hold A Priori in Standard Quantum Mechanics?*, op. cit.

4. The Group of Florianópolis

Newton da Costa retired from the University of São Paulo in 2000. In 2003, he moved to Florianópolis and was incorporated into the graduate course in philosophy at UFSC, the Federal University of Santa Catarina. Our seminars gained much with his participation and other students were formed and become professors in different places. Other UFSC students should be mentioned: Kherian Gracher, a logician, who is presently in a post-doc researcher at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and Jaison Schinaider, who started working on the notions of indistinguishability in chemistry.[33]

By that epoch, close contact with Argentinian philosophers and physicists, such as Federico Holik, Graciela Domenech, Christian de Ronde, Olimpia Lombardi, Juan Pablo Jorge and other members of their groups of study, was established. They made frequent visits to Florianópolis and the Brazilian group has also visited them in Buenos Aires, participating in several conferences in both countries. Until today these groups are in contact and several meetings are being organized; we can say today there is a well-characterized South-Cone Group of philosophers of physics to which surely we can add Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Jr. from the University of São Paulo, Diana Taschetto, a PhD student under Pessoa Jr., and Patricia Kauark Leite, from the Federal University of Minas Gerais. You can read about some of the activities of these people online;[34] there you can also find out about their contacts with people from the University of Cagliari and from the Vrije Universiteit of Brussells.

Holik defended a PhD thesis in which he considered the theory of quasi-sets in the foundations of quantum mechanics under the supervision of G. Domenech; one of their papers shows that quasi-cardinals of finite quasi-sets can be defined;[35] independently, Arenhart got the same result.[36] Later we developed a way to con-

[33] J. Schinaider, D. Krause, *Indiscernibilidade e identidade em química: aspectos filosóficos e formais*, "Manuscrito" 2014, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 113–160; N.C.A. da Costa, D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, J. Schinaider, *Sobre uma fundamentação não-reflexiva da mecânica quântica*, "Scientiae Studia" 2012, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 71–104.

[34] URL: https://quantuminternationalnet.com/Groups-and-Members.

[35] G. Domenech, F. Holik, *A Discussion on Particle Number and Quantum Indistinguishability*, "Foundations of Physics" 2007, Vol. 37, pp. 855–878.

[36] J.R.B. Arenhart, *A Discussion on Finite Quasi-Cardinals in Quasi-Set Theory*, "Foundations of Physics" 2011, Vol. 41, pp. 1338–1354.

struct quantum mechanics via the Fock spaces formalism within the theory of quasi-sets.[37]

It is worth mentioning the recent works by Eliza Wajch, from the Siedlce University, Poland, who has practically reconstructed the theory by admitting quasi-classes and improving it in several aspects; she is a critic of the notion of quasi-cardinals as usually posed in the theory and has proposed alternatives. The work is in construction and will be published next year.[38] Eliza has also presented her works on the notion of quasi-cardinals in quasi-set theory in several places around Europe.

Presently, there are many works being developed on such issues with the addition of José Acacio de Barros, a Brazilian physicist and philosopher of physics who is based at the State University of San Francisco and has worked on physical and philosophical aspects of the fundamentality of the concept of indistinguishability in quantum theories.[39]

5. Non-Individuals

Let us consider the "standard formalism" of quantum mechanics, either the non-relativistic or the relativistic view. This is what physicists call the mathematical counterpart of the theory (or theories) even if it is not *formalized* in a logical sense. It is well known that we can associate such a formalism with plenty of *interpretations*, as Pessoa Jr.'s chapter in *History and Philosophy of Physics in the South Cone* shows.[40] Let us consider here a different one, which is not very well

[37] G. Domenech, F. Holik, D. Krause, *Q-Spaces and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics*, "Foundations of Physics" 2008, Vol. 38, No. 11, pp. 969–994; G. Domenech, F. Holik, L. Kniznik, D. Krause, *No Labelling Quantum Mechanics of Indiscernible Particles*, "International Journal of Theoretical Physics" 2010, Vol. 49, No. 12, pp. 3085–3091; J.A. de Barros, F. Holik, D. Krause, *Distinguishing Indistinguishabilities: Differences between Classical and Quantum Regimes*, Springer, forthcoming.

[38] E. Wajch, *Troublesome Quasi-Cardinals and the Axiom of Choice*, forthcoming; D. Krause, E. Wajch, *A Reappraisal of Quasi-Set Theory and Quasi-Cardinals*, forthcoming.

[39] J.A. de Barros, F. Holik, D. Krause, *Indistinguishability and the Origins of Contextuality in Physics*, "Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society A" 2019, Vol. 377, pp. 1–13; J.A. de Barros, F. Holik, D. Krause, *Distinguishing Indistinguishabilities*, op. cit.

[40] R.A. Martins, G. Boido, V. Rodriguez, *History and Philosophy of Physics in the South Cone*, College Publications, London 2013.

known but which brings some light to the issue: the *non-individuals* interpretation of quantum mechanics.[41] As shown in the book *Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis*,[42] the standard formalism is compatible with at least two distinct and non-equivalent accounts of quantum objects. The first see them as *individuals*, entities endowed with identity in the sense that they would obey the standard theory of identity. This is possible if one restricts the states they can be in. The second interpretation is much more interesting. It says that quantum systems, and not only "particles," lack identity in the sense that the standard theory of identity does not apply in full to them. Some words are in order to explain that.

The non-individuals interpretation establishes connections between interpreting quantum theory and the metaphysics of quantum (non-)individuality. As said in *The Non-Individuals Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*,[43] if quantum mechanics is understood as dealing with objects of a given kind, whether particles, fields or something else, it may be asked what these objects are metaphysically. This leads to questions regarding whether they are individuals or not, and if they are, which principle of individuality determines that that is the case. The non-individuals interpretation of quantum mechanics takes the relevant entities as lacking individuality, adding a further metaphysical interpretative layer over the theory's bare entities. This is known as the *received view* of quantum non-individuality.[44]

To give a short description (the details are in the mentioned references), by an *individual* we can understand something that obeys the following three conditions: (1) it is *one* of a kind; (2) it can be differentiated from any *other* individual by some condition; and (3) it can be *re-identified* as such in different contexts, that is, as being *that individual* of previous encounters. Jonathan Lowe provides examples of non-individuals, entities that fail to meet at least one of these conditions: portions of water, for instance, fail to satisfy (3).[45] The same could be

[41] For details, see D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, O. Bueno, *The Non-Individuals Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*, op. cit.

[42] S. French, D. Krause, *Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006.

[43] D. Krause, J.R.B. Arenhart, O. Bueno, *The Non-Individuals Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*, op. cit.

[44] See S. French, D. Krause, *Identity in Physics*, op. cit., chapter 3, for a historical overview.

[45] E.J. Lowe, *Non-Individuals*, in: *Individuals across the Sciences*, eds. A. Guay, T. Pradeu, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, pp. 49–60.

said of quantum entities (and Lowe acknowledges that). One of our preferred examples goes as follows. Suppose that a helium atom is in its fundamental state. Considering spin, then its two electrons are described by a vector which is the superposition of spin up and spin down for both electrons in whatever direction you chose. The vector expresses that the states of the particular electrons are entangled and the vector cannot be factorized in particular states of the electrons; so, they are indistinguishable, and *cannot* be put apart (while in the atom). But we can ionize the atom by providing it with a certain amount of energy so that one of the electrons is realized so that the atom becomes a positive ion. Later, we can proceed inversely and capture an electron again, in a way that the ion becomes a neutral atom again. Question: are the first and the second atoms *the same* atom? Is the captured electron *the same* as that which was realized? Of course, quantum theory does not answer these questions. But, if we assume that the atom and the electrons follow the standard theory of identity, we need to assume that the original atom is either identical or different from the second one (the same for the electrons). But, fundamentally, if they are two, then by STI some difference must exist, and we know that there are none. So, which case is the case we have? Impossible to say. You could relegate this situation as a typical one in quantum mechanics, where you can have $A \vee \neg A$ (namely A that the two atoms are the same and the negation says that they are different) true even if you are unable to tell which case holds.[46] But this is not all that is being considered. If $\neg A$ holds, according to the standard theory of identity, *there exists* a property holding for one of the atoms but not for the other: which one? You cannot (or should not) leave this to metaphysics, but should provide a way to (at least logically, if not physically) provide a way to discern them. But we know ever since John Dalton, that there cannot exist any differentiation between two atoms of the same substance;[47] the situation is worst for electrons, them being particles or field excitations.

[46] See D. Aerts, L. Beltran, *A Planck Radiation and Quantization Scheme for Human Cognition and Language*, "arXiv:2201.03306," https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2201.03306, who have shown that the conjunction in quantum mechanics does not act as the conjunction in classical logic. The same can be said of the other propositional connectives, quantifiers, the notion of identity and the concept of set; see D. Krause, *Non-Reflexive Logics: Logics that Derogate the Standard Theory of Identity*, forthcoming.

[47] J. Dalton, *A New System of Chemical Philosophy*, S. Russell, London 1808.

6. Extensions

In 2022, I retired from the Department of Philosophy of UFSC, but since 2019 I am a permanent member of staff of the Graduate Course in Logic and Metaphysics of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. There, I started working on some aspects of metaphysics and the logic of quantum theories, and already have two graduate students dealing with the subject, in particular by pursuing the construction of a *quantum mereology*, which faces difficult problems, such as the indistinguishability of parts and quantum holism, to mention just two; these ideas were posed in the article *Is Priscilla, the Trapped Positron, an Individual? Quantum Physics, the Use of Names, and Individuation*.[48] The possibility of expanding the activities to other universities in Brasil and abroad is great and this is the plan for the future.

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[48] D. Krause, *Is Priscilla, the Trapped Positron, an Individual? Quantum Physics, the Use of Names, and Individuation*, "Arbor" 2011, Vol. 187, pp. 61–66; D. Krause, *Essay on Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science*, "South American Journal of Logic" 2019, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 179–195.

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The Lublin Philosophical School: Its Promising Paradigm of Philosophizing and Social Relevance

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Abstract: The term "Lublin Philosophical School" refers to a mode of philosophizing (which might be called a paradigm) and a teaching programme devised in the 1950s at the Catholic University of Lublin. Against the background of the concept of "school," the paper first shows the origin of and motives for developing a specific mode of philosophizing as well as phases of the Lublin School's development. It then discusses some methodological features, indicating that realism, empiricism and accepting the truth as a goal of philosophical cognition are decisive for this mode of philosophizing. In spite of substantive debates within the School, it constitutes the *unitas in pluribus*. The paper then shows that those methodological features, also wisdom-directedness, justify the roles in individual and social life that the School ascribes to philosophy, including its role as a self-consciousness of culture and a basis for dialogue. The paper claims that this mode of philosophizing can take up issues that arise in our contemporary intellectual environment, and it constitutes a promising paradigm for solving them. Thus, even if the Lublin Philosophical School was founded seventy years ago, its methodology and theoretical approaches are of value for us today and therefore it is worthwhile to develop further its achievements.

Key words: Lublin Philosophical School, realism, empiricism, truth, wisdom, philosophy as self-consciousness of culture

1. Origin and Development

The term "Lublin Philosophical School" (other terms are also in use: the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy, the Polish School of Realist Philosophy) refers to the mode of practising philosophy devised in the 1950s by a group of philosophers (not only from the Faculty of Philosophy) from the Catholic University of Lublin (in Polish: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski – KUL). The name "Lublin School" was used by Jerzy Kalinowski in 1966.[1] It then appeared in the title of an interview

[1] J. Kalinowski, *W związku z tzw. metafizyką egzystencjalną*, "Znak" 1966, Vol. 18, No. 142, p. 452.

conducted by Władysław Stróżewski with Mieczysław A. Krąpiec in 1968: *On the Lublin "Philosophical School"*.[2] The Faculty of Philosophy was established by a resolution of the Senate on 17 June 1946 and officially opened on 10 November 1946. At that time it was called the Faculty of Christian Philosophy. From that year Stefan Swieżawski, known for his research on 15th-century philosophy, was employed at that Faculty. Rev. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec started his work in 1951, concentrating his research and teaching on metaphysics. Jerzy Kalinowski was employed at the KUL's Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, but after that Faculty had been closed by the communist authorities in 1952, Kalinowski was transferred to the Faculty of Philosophy and specialized in logic. Also Rev. Stanisław Kamiński, initially employed at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences in 1947, moved to the Faculty of Philosophy in 1950 and developed the methodology of sciences. In 1954, Rev. Karol Wojtyła, encouraged by Stefan Swieżawski, joined the Faculty of Philosophy as an ethicist. These were thinkers who formed the first generation of the Lublin Philosophical School as its founding fathers. They represented various domains of philosophy: Swieżawski – the history of philosophy, Krąpiec – general and particular theory of being (metaphysics), Kalinowski and Kamiński – logic and methodology, Wojtyła – ethics and anthropology. The second generation is usually considered to include: Antoni B. Stępień, Stanisław Majdański, Rev. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Sister Zofia J. Zdybicka, Rev. Marian Kurdziałek, Tadeusz Styczeń SDS, Andrzej Szostek MIC, and others.[3]

The mode of practising philosophy of the Lublin School was developed through scholarly cooperation and with awareness of the dangers for people and culture brought by the communist regime. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and his disciple, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, indicate three main reasons for developing the school. The first was the pressure of Marxism that was administratively imposed on all state universities. "This ideologization of the teaching of philosophy – Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk claim – threatened to shatter the foundations of humanistic culture by breaking the truth about man and the world, by enslaving free philo-

[2] M.A. Krąpiec, *O filozoficznej "szkole lubelskiej"*, "Tygodnik Powszechny" 1968, No. 42, p. 1.

[3] For the history of the School, see M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 2010; A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, eds., *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020 (e-book); S. Janeczek, *Lubelska szkoła filozofii klasycznej*, "Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych" 2006, No. 18, pp. 143–159, https://doi.org/10.15290/idea.2006.18.10.

sophical thought by ideology."[4] The second reason was the fact that other modes of philosophizing existed: phenomenology, neopositivism, and various schools of analytic philosophy. If philosophy is taken seriously, this fact is a problem to be explained but also faced by arguing for a particular philosophy. The third reason was the need "to develop an updated conception of classical realistic philosophy (which was deformed by Suarezian neoscholasticism and the essentialism of Christian Wolff and Joseph Kleutgen)."[5] The members of the school were convinced that classical thinkers have the most to say in philosophy, and, therefore, we should return to their original texts.

The mode of philosophizing was closely connected to the teaching programme with its emphasis on educating students on the one hand in the history of philosophy and general logic that embraced semiotics, formal logic, and the methodology of science, and on the other hand in basic philosophical disciplines: metaphysics with anthropology, theory of knowledge (epistemology), and ethics. More particular disciplines were added later, such as, for example, philosophy of nature and philosophy of culture. Philosophical disciplines were presented against the background of the history of various conceptions, but arguments were always provided for concrete solutions to fundamental problems of those disciplines. Thus, the school unified into one programme the way of developing philosophy and its substantive theses and the way and content of teaching philosophy. One is then justified in saying that it was a school, even if the term "school of philosophy" is difficult to define. Stanisław Janeczek claims that a school of philosophy is formed around the personality of a master (a school in a narrow sense), or it is a group of people cooperating in a particular place and time, who formulate at least a partially unified programme and/or methods (a school in a broader sense).[6] Antoni B. Stępień specifies: "In a narrower (precise) sense a philosophical school, I believe, is a basic unit (centre, factor) in the social and historical development of philosophy that crystallizes around the personality of a teacher who provides it its substantive and formal direction; at the same time there is an awareness of

[4] M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics*, "Studia Gilsoniana" 2015, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 407. Cf. M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School: Historical Development and Future Prospects*, "Studia Gilsoniana" 2015, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 423–441.

[5] M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics*, op. cit., p. 407.

[6] S. Janeczek, *Lubelska szkoła filozofii klasycznej*, op. cit., p. 143.

belonging to a particular school."[7] A.B. Stępień agrees with Janeczek that the Lublin Philosophical School is a school in the broader sense.[8] A basic agreement as to the programme and methodology did not exclude disputes within the school, as will be shown in the third section of this paper.

There are various proposals of periodizing the Lublin School's history. For example, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, using as a criterion the relationship between fields of inquiry and metaphysics, distinguishes three stages: 1) between 1950 and 1966 the school is being developed; 2) 1967–1980: the first generation of its students were active and they continued the research and teaching directions set by the founders; 3) from 1981: fields of inquiry became autonomous and the School's unity was shaken.[9] Other proposals, built with different criteria of periodization,[10] also agree that the process of the School's disintegration took place around the end of the last century. Yet, *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*), an enterprise initiated by Krąpiec and carried on by Maryniarczyk, played a re-unifying role, since in many entries it presents the intellectual heritage of the Lublin School. It has also built among younger faculty members the awareness of belonging to a strong philosophical tradition. As Rev. Andrzej Bronk, a student of Kamiński claims, "any development (progress) in culture always occurred as a result of referring to the cognitive achievements of the predecessors. […] This process, called the formation of culture, is particularly visible in the case of scientific knowledge, where subsequent generations of scientists, employing achievements of their forerunners, build upon that what has already been accomplished, that is, on an earlier scientific tradition, even if it is linked with overcoming it. Contemporary knowledge and, thanks to it, the world of today, are built upon the knowledge acquired in the past."[11] Building on

7 A.B. Stępień, *Rola ks. prof. Stanisława Kamińskiego w rozwoju środowiska filozoficznego KUL*, in: A.B. Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne,* Vol. 2, ed. A. Gut, RW KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 188. Unless otherwise stated, all Polish citations are translated by the paper's author.

8 A.B. Stępień, *Kilka uwag uzupełniających do dyskusji,* "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 1997, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 193–194.

9 M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, op. cit., pp. 45ff.

10 See J. Czerkawski, *Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 1997, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 166–190; S. Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u. Nurty – osoby – idee*, RW KUL, Lublin 2001; S. Janeczek, *Wydział Filozofii*, in: *Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. 90 lat istnienia*, eds. G. Kramarek, E. Ziemann, TN KUL, Lublin 2008, pp. 89–106.

11 A. Bronk, *Poznawcza rola tradycji,* in: *Metodologia. Tradycja i perspektywy*, ed. M. Walczak, TN KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 21.

that tradition, the Lublin Philosophical School may engage in dialogue with the contemporary world.

2. Methodological Characteristics of the Lublin Mode of Philosophizing

The Lublin Philosophical School specified very clearly its goals, objects, and methods of philosophizing. In this sense we can say that it constitutes a paradigm of philosophy, different from others, against the background of which – as indicated in the previous section – it developed. The School accepts two assumptions: the intelligibility of the world (it is a cosmos, not chaos) and the possibility of cognitive access to it. The School's philosophy is not then totally assumptionless, but it is not an objection, for the possibility of building a philosophy without any assumptions is itself a meta-philosophical assumption.

The crucial feature of the Lublin philosophy is realism: everything that exists – in the language of the School's metaphysics called being – may become an object of research. This explains why truth classically understood is the goal of philosophical cognition. In its epistemic sense, the truth is the *adequatio intellectus et rei* – when we wish to cognize a being, we must "adjust" our intellect to that being. Thus, when we formulate a proposition about a given being – we attempt to say how things are. This allows us to distinguish cognition from cognitive errors, imagination, projection, or lying. We need to remember, however, that human cognition is aspectual and, for example, metaphysical cognition investigates being only *qua* being. So formulating a proposition about a being, only an aspect of that being is captured in the proposition, not the whole truth about that being.

The second feature – empiricism – follows from the acceptance of reality as an object and arbiter of cognition. That is, the starting point of philosophizing is experience broadly understood. Stanisław Kamiński claims that "the theory of being is to be an objective and purely realistic philosophy, and therefore, in its starting point it has to get in contact with the existing, concrete reality."[12] This contact is called "experience." Human experience is of various kinds, and there

[12] S. Kamiński, *The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, in: S. Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, transl. M.B. Stępień, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, Lublin–Roma 2019, p. 290.

are no reasons to limit *a priori* the scope of that term to that what empirical sciences called "experience." The empirical starting point of philosophizing and a broad understanding of experience guarantee the openness of philosophy to the ever-changing reality. Anything existing may become an object of investigation, even if no classical thinker thought of it, a "classical" understanding of an object might be deepened or modified, and new categories might be introduced. Empiricism and openness are accompanied by a radicalized concept of cognition: the only direct cognition is captured in the existential judgement "something exists," but what it is and how it exists requires research.[13] Subjecting the philosophizing mind to reality indicates that objectivity is a governing principle.

The third feature is cognitive maximalism. According to the School, the goal of philosophy is the true and ultimate explanation of being grasped in experience. Thus, philosophy is satisfied neither with critical analysis of knowledge, nor with any reflection on the content of consciousness, nor with any interpretation of signs – it is an object-oriented type of cognition. Any explanation is an answer to the question of "why." The philosophical explanation of being should indicate the ultimate and irrefutable causes of the cognized ontic order. The technical term for this procedure is decontradification.[14] As Mieczysław A. Krąpiec indicates, such a philosophy is the "one, unified cognitive discipline, with a distinct method and purpose. If the object of philosophical cognition is the being in the aspect of its existence, then the immanent task of this cognition is to point to such factors which decontradictify the fact of the world's existence (that is, its fundamental domains), the negation of which is absurd or leads to an aporia."[15] Hence, at least some philosophical theses must have a status of general, substantial necessary truths.[16] Such philosophizing is subjected to logico-methodological rigour and criticism; its assertions must be intersubjectively communicable and justifiable. That is, philosophizing must respect the basic tenets of rationality.

[13] Not all representatives of the School agree with such an understanding of direct cognition. See A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Amicus Plato, sed Magis Amica Veritas… On Philosophical Disputes within the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy*, in: *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, eds. A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020, pp. 217–258.

[14] For details, see S. Kamiński, *Explanation in Metaphysics*, in: S. Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, transl. M.B. Stępień, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, Lublin–Roma 2018, pp. 192–195.

[15] M.A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka – ale jaka?,* "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 1969, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 60.

[16] See S. Kamiński, *Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe?*, in: M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, TN KUL, Lublin 1994, pp. 295–307.

The fourth feature is called historism.[17] The term refers to a methodological rule and the fact that in research one should take into account the history of problems, which allows one to discover – despite conceptual differentiation – within particular philosophical systems permanent aspects of problems as well as the influence which accepted assumptions, research methods, employed models of explanation and justification exert on problems' interpretation. This allows one to grasp the nature of a problem and discover ways of finding a satisfactory solution to it.

Two other features are autonomy and unity. In relation to natural and social sciences, the humanities, and theology, philosophy is autonomous, for it has its own empirical starting point and its own set of data to be explained. Its starting point cannot be data provided by any scholarly discipline, for such data are already grasped in the language of theories of a concrete discipline. Such scientific data may, of course, become an object of philosophical research as any existing being. The contact with reality allows us to develop various disciplines: general metaphysics, epistemology, anthropology, ethics, philosophy of science, etc. Each has its own empirical starting point, and in this sense they are methodologically independent of each other. If a new kind of being occurs, philosophy may develop a new discipline. The methodological autonomy of philosophy's disciplines does not preclude the unity of philosophy: each domain has the same goal, that is, to provide an ultimate explanation of the investigated kind of being, and in searching for such an explanation, one refers ultimately to the ontic structure of that being. This is the reason why metaphysics is the centre of the Lublin School's philosophy. This, in turn, brings wisdom-directedness: the search for the understanding of the foundation of reality, of the place of human beings in that reality and the meaning of human life, finding the truth about what is good, and taking the side of the good (theoretical and practical wisdom). Here one thing must be stressed: the good is objective and we may find what is good for me and other people in a particular situation, and moral good/evil should be distinguished from physical good/evil. I will not develop that point as it is not a methodological but a substantive issue. Yet, it is important, for it allows one to ascribe truth-values (true/false) not only to descriptive judgements but also to value judgements.

[17] The term used in many texts on the Lublin School is "historicism." Yet, this term is heavily burdened with philosophical history, including connections to relativism. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I use the term "historism."

3. The Role of Philosophy in Life

The acceptance of the object-directed and wisdom-directed nature of philosophy explains why the School ascribes such important roles to it, both in individual and social life and in culture. The roles of philosophy stem from human nature. Kamiński writes: "Everyone philosophizes in one way or another, regardless of whether one is aware of that or not. At any rate, it is impossible for a human being not to philosophize, for the human by his/her own nature wants to investigate the most profound reasons for everything, especially the reasons and meaning of the world, and human activity within it. Particularly in the decisive moments of one's life the human being confronts questions for which he/she does not find an answer in any science, art, or life practice."[18] Moreover, Krąpiec notices that each human being, even small children, poses questions with some significant philosophical content as soon as they start manifesting the use of intellect. The question "why" – so the search for explanation – in a way constitutes the essence of questionness.[19]

The same refers to social life. Kamiński explains: "The most profound and substantively accurate cognition of the world and the hierarchy of values, is indispensable for a proper human, culture-formative activity. Philosophy should serve as a guide in this endeavor, as it indicates and ultimately justifies in the ontic order, why one should prefer certain value-forming behaviors, uniformly solves issues outside the scope of particular domains of culture (religion, morality, science, and art). Finally, it also provides the means of understanding the transformations of culture, together with the criteria of evaluation of cultural achievements. Philosophy is therefore self-consciousness, as it were, of culture. It permeates culture, but it is not reduced to any of its domains, merging them – through theory – in ways which enable human beings to perfect themselves in a harmonious and complete manner. Human beings are creators of culture, but they themselves are also being formed by it. And for this reason, philosophy should contribute to the personalistic character of culture, that is demonstrate in which way culture can be worthy of human beings and serve their development

[18] S. Kamiński, *Wstęp*, in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofow*ać?, ed. T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1989, p. 11.

[19] Cf. M.A. Krąpiec, *What Is Classical Philosophy*, in: *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, eds. A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020, pp. 285–294.

the best."[20] This role is an argument for the return to classical thinkers and historism: "if philosophy has an enormous influence on human thinking and acting, and the human being is forced to philosophize, then he/she should do it in a responsible manner, making use of the accomplishments of the greatest thinkers."[21]

When asking such questions of ultimate importance for individual and social life, the human being searches for answers that are true, that is, they state how things really are – after all no one would like to have their life be based on falsehood or ideology. The Lublin School's philosophy with its faithfulness to the truth understood as *adequatio intellectus et rei* and therefore subjecting mind to reality can be the basis for answering those questions. Those questions have not disappeared as the development of philosophical counselling[22] testifies, and so the Lublin School's paradigm of philosophizing is relevant for the contemporary intellectual and cultural milieu.[23]

Faithfulness to the truth and faithfulness to reality also explain why dialogue is a way of developing philosophy and why philosophy developed in the Lublin School might be a basis for social dialogue. As mentioned earlier, within the Lublin School there were intensive debates on crucial issues. Among them, for example: on the status of the theory of cognition and its relation to metaphysics, that is, the issue of what domain of philosophy constitutes "the first philosophy" (basically between Krąpiec and Stępień); on the object of ethical cognition and the primary norm for morality, that is, whether the norm is *bonum est faciendum* or *persona est affirmanda* (between Krąpiec and Styczeń); on the object and purpose of metaphysics (between Krąpiec and Kalinowski). There were many others,[24] for debates were a persistent element of philosophizing in the Lublin School, and allies in one dispute were opponents in another. Kalinowski claims that carrying on debates is the imperative of the "philosophical conscience."[25] A.B. Stępień

[20] S. Kamiński, *On the Nature of Philosophy*, in: S. Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition*, transl. M.B. Stępień, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, Lublin–Roma 2020, p. 206.

[21] S. Kamiński, *Wstęp*, op. cit., p. 11.

[22] See H. Kistelska, *Doradztwo filozoficzne. Problemy – tezy – kontrowersje*, PhD dissertation, Lublin 2019.

[23] For discussions between the Lublin School and other philosophical currents, see J. Wojtysiak, Z. Wróblewski, A. Gut, eds., *Lublin School of Philosophy: A Comparative Perspective*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020.

[24] See A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Amicus Plato, sed Magis Amica Veritas…*, op. cit.

[25] J. Kalinowski, *A propos de la méta-ethique. Discussion avec Tadeusz Styczen*, "Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica" 1973, Vol. 65, pp. 794–806.

claims, in turn, that "every entry into a discussion in philosophy is, nonetheless, a form of cooperation."[26] For any real debate has as its foundation faithfulness to the truth and reality. This is why Styczeń claims that a scholar might arrive at a statement and in result "one has to have against oneself those whom one would want to have on his side, that one even has to – in order to be faithful towards 'reality' – question the views of a famous and renowned author."[27] For reality is the final arbiter in our philosophical debates, and this is why antidogmatism is a feature of the Lublin paradigm of philosophizing. Arriving at necessary truths – by research and arguments – is not a form of dogmatism but a realization of the goal of philosophy – providing the ultimate explanation. Treating that as a form of dogmatism follows – I put that forward as a hypotheses – from equating the epistemic status of philosophical theses with that of particular sciences. Andrzej Szostek, a student of Karol Wojtyła and Tadeusz Styczeń, summarizes well the creative role of debates: "A discussion between philosophers is not a boxing match and it is not supposed to result in designating as a winner the one who dealt more accurate blows. It is rather climbing together a peak desired by all of its participants. The adversaries are thus particularly valuable allies for each other, because they can 'pull' each other to their own 'positions' and bring them closer to their desired goal: the full truth."[28] Krąpiec then writes: "If anybody asks what philosophy is for, then ultimately the answer is: it is the attempt to ultimately understand reality."[29] The dispute is an efficient tool to fulfil this purpose.

This last claim explains why philosophy can be a basis for any efficient dialogue and action in other spheres of social life: it attempts to provide an understanding of how things are. In this perspective, as Szostek stresses, an opponent is an ally. Knowing how things are and correcting and deepening our knowledge through debates faithful to the truth allows us to at least try to build a better world. Of course, Bronk is right that "a philosopher does not have ready recipes to organize the world. Although instant practical rebuilding of the world is not a task for philosophy comprehended as the Greek *theoría*, a philosophical point

[26] A.B. Stępień, *O dorobku badawczym Wydziału Filozofii,* in: A.B. Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne,* Vol. 2, ed. A. Gut, RW KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 197.

[27] T. Styczeń, *Spór z eudajmonizmem czy o eudajmonizm w etyce?,* "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 1983, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 72.

[28] A. Szostek, *Wokół afirmacji osoby: Próby uściśleń inspirowane dyskusją nad koncepcją etyki ks. Tadeusza Stycznia,* "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 1984, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 149.

[29] M.A. Krąpiec, *O rozumienie filozofii*, RW KUL, Lublin 1991, p. 308.

of view can turn out to be important and helpful. The impact of philosophy is long-term and in the field of the consciousness rather than in outright practice."[30] Yet, without the consciousness of how things are, our efforts would eventually be doomed to fail.

4. Conclusions

The paper discussed the paradigm of philosophizing developed at the KUL and known as the Lublin Philosophical School or the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy. In spite of hot inner debates, the School constitutes the *unitas in pluribus*, as Katarzyna Stępień observes.[31] Its methodological characteristic includes, first of all, realism, empiricism, cognitive maximalism, autonomy with regard to all kinds of particular sciences, also theology, and the unity of philosophical disciplines in spite of the fact that each has its own starting point in experience. Realism and empiricism guarantee openness to any new experience and any new being; and understanding reality leads to theoretical – and finally also practical – wisdom. Such philosophy plays the role of, as it were, self-consciousness of human culture, allowing us to analyze and evaluate its developmental trends and particular solutions through the lenses of personhood. This is possible, for one of the substantive theses of the Lublin philosophy is that the human being – a creator and consumer of culture – is a free and rational person with their dignity and potentialities to be developed to their fullness. Of course, this thesis is also formulated on the basis of experience – experience of self ("I") and of other human beings as other "Is" – and ultimately explained by the reference to one's ontic structure. Since this philosophy must be faithful to reality, it is self-correcting in response to experience, and it aims at assertions that are adequate to the investigated aspect of the world. As such, it may provide answers to fundamental human questions. As argued elsewhere, this philosophy may provide a promising framework for other scholarly and practical disciplines. There is a general agreement that science makes philosophical presuppositions including value judgements (in the language of the School: philosophy constitutes an external basis for science).

[30] A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć świat współczesny,* TN KUL, Lublin 1998, p. 113.

[31] K. Stępień, *Unitas in Pluribus: On the History of the Lublin Philosophical School*, in: *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, eds. A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020, pp. 23–50.

The Lublin paradigm of philosophizing shares with science realism and empiricism, and so its theses are not, in terms of their origin, methodologically different from scientific theses.[32] This also suggests the unity of human knowledge, but this topic deserves separate considerations. It may also provide a useful paradigm for research ethics, as it offers a conception of the human person and norm *persona est affirmanda* which subjects methodological principles of doing science to that norm.[33] It provides a promising framework for developing so-called technology assessment, as it explains the value-ladenness of technology, objectivity of value-judgements, and the ontological primacy of the human person. For technology is not a value-neutral enterprise, and introducing a new technology brings consequences that can be evaluated in terms of human good.[34] The Lublin philosophy's understanding of human mind and its orientation towards truth as *adequatio* allows one to consider – and respond to – contemporary post-truth conditions. I have named but a few issues for which the Lublin philosophy provides a promising framework for considerations. There are many other such contemporary theoretically and practically important questions that the School is able to take up and propose solutions to. Thus, the Lublin Philosophical School was founded seventy years ago but its methodology and content are of value for us today. Thus, it is worthwhile to develop further its achievements.

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[32] See, for example, A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Discovering the Axiological Dimension of Science*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, ch. 4.

[33] A. Lekka-Kowalik, *On the Need of Developing Research Ethics as a Domain of Classical Philosophy*, in: *Studies in Logic and Theory of Knowledge*, eds. S. Kiczuk, J. Herbut, A.B. Stępień, TN KUL, Lublin 2006, pp. 235–255, https://doi.org/10.2478/mape-2021-0038.

[34] R.A. Lizut, *Technika a wartości. Spór o aksjologiczną neutralność artefaktów*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Academicon, Lublin 2014; A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Technology Analysis and the Need of a Value Framework*, in: *Multidisciplinary Aspects of Production Engineering: Monograph Part 2. Social Sciences*, ed. P. Hąbek, Sciendo (de Gruyter Poland), Warszawa 2021, pp. 421–430.

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The Lvov-Warsaw School after 1950*

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Abstract: Although most historians of philosophy agree about the date of the Lvov-Warsaw School's beginning (the year 1895, when Kazimierz Twardowski was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy in Lvov), the question of the end of the School's activities is an object of controversies. A few decades ago, the prevailing view was that the School ceased to exist between 1939 and 1950 as a result of World War II and its aftermath. Today, it is more and more common to say that the School also existed in the second half of the 20th century, although in a slightly different form than before. After presenting this controversy over the Lvov-Warsaw School's existence in the first part of the paper, in the second and third parts I sketch the history and main features of the School and the reasons why World War II and its consequences caused its collapse. In the fourth part, I first list the criteria of the existence of philosophical schools and then analyze to what degree the Lvov-Warsaw School fulfilled these criteria after 1950. I end with some remarks on the recent developments of the Lvov-Warsaw philosophical tradition.

Key words: philosophical schools, Lvov-Warsaw School, Polish analytic philosophy

1. The Controversy about the Frames of the Lvov-Warsaw School's Existence

Most historians of philosophy agree on the date of the beginning of the Lvov-Warsaw School (hereinafter: the School or the LWS): it is the year 1895, when Kazimierz Twardowski was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy in Lvov.[1] However, the question of the end of the School's existence is the object of controversy. A few

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1 According to well-established tradition, I use the term "Lvov-Warsaw School" as the English equivalent of the Polish "Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska" and the term "Lvov" in reference to the city which was the cradle of the School in the years 1895–1939. In reference to the contemporary city I use the term "Lviv."

decades ago, the prevailing view was that the School ceased to exist between 1939 and 1953 as a result of World War II and its aftermath. Władysław Tatarkiewicz described the consequences of the war for Polish philosophy as follows:

> The second great war found […] [Polish philosophy] in a blooming state […]. It was destroyed by occupants between 1939 and 1944. A great part of the young generation perished in fights or was murdered in German camps.[2] And the great part of scientific workshops, libraries, and institutes, was devastated, robbed, razed to the ground. For Poland, much more than for other countries, these years closed an important and rampant, but short and unfinished, epoch.[3]

In 1967, Henryk Skolimowski also diagnosed the collapse of the analytic movement in Central Europe:

> The continuous development of the analytical movement [in Poland] led to its finest results in the late 1920s and in the 1930s. The war shattered this continuity. After the war, analytical philosophy never regained its previous strength; the 1950s saw its definitive decline. […] [In the early 1960s], the analytical movement become emasculated. […] Analytical philosophy is no longer a dominant trend in Poland; its strength has been diluted; its output drastically limited.[4]

In his monograph on the School published in the 1980s, Jan Woleński stated that the war stopped the development of the School as a whole. He, however, stressed that "if that School continued to exist after World War II, it did so only in the individual achievements of its surviving members, and not as a collective undertaking."[5]

Today, it is more and more common to state that the School continued its existence in the second half of the 20th century. Jacek Jadacki considered the decades from 1960 to 1980 to be the phase of restoration of the School and the 1980s – the phase of its expansion.[6] In 2006, a book edited by Jadacki and Jacek Paśniczek

[2] The text was originally published in 1950, in the Stalinist period. Today we would add: „or by Bolshevik Russians."

[3] W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii* [History of Philosophy], Vol. 3, PWN, Warszawa 1968, p. 387. Unless stated otherwise, all translations from Polish are my own.

[4] H. Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy: A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytic Philosophy*, Humanity Press, New York 1967, p. 260.

[5] J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1989, p. 24.

[6] J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2009.

was published, entitled *The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation*, the title of which somehow suggests that the School is still an active phenomenon. We may surely say that, since 2000, interest in the School's history and tradition has been rising both in Poland and abroad.[7]

Nevertheless, the question of the continuity of the LWS after 1950 is intriguing for historians. This controversy over the time frames of the School is accompanied by a controversy over geography. In 1945, Lviv was incorporated into the Soviet Union. For philosophy in Lvov, which flourished in previous decades, it meant no perspective of further existence. For many decades, Lviv was a part of the world under extremely strong ideological pressure with no conditions for the development of scientific philosophy. Besides, almost all representatives of the School left the city forever. That is why another question arises: could the LWS continue to exist without its first and most important centre? I will come to this question later.

The aims of the paper are the following. Firstly, to give the criteria of the existence of the LWS in particular and of any philosophical school in general. Secondly, to examine whether the LWS fulfilled these criteria of existence after 1950 and thus to juxtapose the arguments for and against the continuity of the LWS in the second half of the 20th century. Thirdly, to sketch the changes in the structure and functioning of the LWS after 1950.

Before presenting these issues, I will provide the Reader with some basic information about the LWS and the ways it existed before 1939. Then, I will focus on the period 1939–1950 – namely, the time of the School's collapse. Only against this general presentation of the history of the School before 1950, the picture of its further existence may be full.

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[7] Among recent monographs on the LWS published in last twenty years there are: A. Brożek, M. Będkowski, A. Chybińska, S. Ivanyk, S. Traczykowski, *Anti-Irrationalism: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Semper, Warszawa 2021; A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, J.J. Jadacki, eds., *Tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Ideas and Continuation*, Brill/Rodopi, Leiden 2018; A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, eds., *At the Sources of the Twentieth-Century Analytical Movement: Kazimierz Twardowski and His Position in European Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden 2022; A. Brożek, F. Stadler, J. Woleński, eds., *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture*, Springer, Berlin 2017; A. Chrudzimski, D. Łukasiewicz, eds., *Actions, Products and Things: Brentano and Polish Philosophy*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2006; A. Drabarek, J. Woleński, M. Radzki, eds., *Interdisciplinary Investigations into the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2018; Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, Birkhäuser, Cham 2018; J. Hintikka, T. Czarnecki, K. Kijania-Placek, T. Placek, A. Rojszczak, eds., *Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2003; J.J. Jadacki, E.M. Świderski, eds., *The Concept of Causality in the Lvov-Warsaw School: The Legacy of Jan Łukasiewicz*, Brill, Leiden 2022.

2. The LWS before 1939: Basic Facts

2.1. Kazimierz Twardowski as the Beginning of the LWS

The LWS is a Central European branch of analytic philosophy. Founded in Lvov by Twardowski at the turn of the 19th century, it was appreciated for its results in logic and its applications in philosophy. The School flourished between 1920 and 1939 when Poland regained independence after over 100 years of political non-existence. The School became famous thanks to a few of its flagship results, such as Twardowski's content/object and action/product distinctions, Jan Łukasiewicz's discovery of three-valued logic, Stanisław Leśniewski's systems, Tadeusz Kotarbiński's reism, Alfred Tarski's semantics, etc. However, the School output consists, first of all, of "small" results – namely, analyses of small problems, and conceptual specifications, providing a careful examination of philosophical argumentations.

Twardowski, a Pole born and educated in Vienna (where he studied under Franz Brentano) was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy in Lvov in 1895. There, he could realize his dream of initiating a school of scientific philosophy and teaching philosophy in Polish.[8] Thanks to his didactic and organizational skills, he soon managed to establish a philosophical seminar (which was in fact an institute of philosophy) which became a real forge of talents. Twardowski was lucky to have really gifted students, only to mention Władysław Witwicki, Jan Łukasiewicz, Bronisław Bandrowski, Zygmunt Zawirski, Helena Słoniewska, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Maria Kokoszyńska, Izydora Dąmbska, and many others. Only up to 1914, Twardowski supervised about twenty-five doctors of philosophy; and in the interwar period, twenty further young scholars prepared their PhDs under his guidance.

Twardowski not only had a project of founding a philosophical school but also realized this project with steadfast consistency. His university activities were comprehensive, since Twardowski took the process of teaching philosophers extremely seriously. He introduced several "stages of initiation" in this

[8] In 1895, there were only two universities in the world where Polish was allowed as the language of instruction: the University in Lvov and Jagiellonian University in Cracow; both were located in Galicia, the Polish province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The University of Warsaw, founded in 1818, was completely Russified after the fall of the January Uprising, staged by Poles against the Russians in 1863.

process – namely, attending lectures, proseminars, and seminar meetings. He delivered lectures in all basic philosophical disciplines: descriptive psychology and logic (which he considered philosophical organon), epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and the history of philosophy. At the proseminar meetings, students regularly prepared summaries of classical philosophical texts. At seminar meetings, a smaller group of students under Twardowski's guidance studied classical philosophical texts and then prepared their independent works. He provided his students with perfect conditions for work (full access to the seminar room and library) but, at the same time, Twardowski expected from his students not only intellectual abilities and hard work but also firm will and a good heart.

The work of Twardowski was continued by his students in Lvov and other philosophical centres and thus the School of Twardowski became the Lvov-Warsaw School.

2.2. Development and Branches of the School

In the second decade of the 20th century, a Polish university was reopened in Warsaw and Twardowski's students Łukasiewicz and Kotarbiński, joined later by Leśniewski and Witwicki, were appointed to chairs in Warsaw. The capital of resurrected Poland became the second, after Lvov, centre of Polish analytic philosophy. Thus, the period 1918–1939 is usually considered the phase of the greatest prosperity and "full existence" of the LWS.

Warsaw soon turned into an active centre of philosophy and logic. In Lvov, Twardowski, joined later by Ajdukiewicz and Roman Ingarden, continued his work of educating new generations of scholars. Besides Lvov and Warsaw, new centres appeared: in Poznań (Stefan Błachowski, shortly also Zygmunt Zawirski), then also in Wilno (Tadeusz Czeżowski) and finally Cracow (Zawirski).

The LWS was mainly a school of philosophy; however, it had various branches, first of all, psychological and logical.

When Twardowski was starting his career, psychology was considered a part of philosophy, and in Brentanian tradition even the basic philosophical discipline. However, Twardowski was equally interested in experimental psychology and founded a psychological laboratory in Lvov. Together with his students Witwicki, Błachowski, Mieczysław Kreutz, and Słoniewska, he formed the Lvov School of Psychology. Among its peculiarities, there are descriptive attitude, emphasis on terminological precision, humanistic traits, and distrust of testing methods.

The logical branch of the School was initiated by Łukasiewicz in Lvov and developed into the Warsaw School of Logic, whose main representatives, besides Łukasiewicz, were Leśniewski and Tarski. Representatives of this branch of the LWS provided many results in mathematical logic, which I mentioned above. However, they also used logic as a tool of philosophical investigations (see Łukasiewicz's programme of the logicization of philosophy).

Continuously with this bidirectional specialization of the LWS, two tendencies in philosophical investigations crystallized: a psychological-descriptive tendency, which evolved into the semiotic direction, and a logical-mathematical tendency. There were also such scholars as Kotarbiński, Czeżowski, or Ajdukiewicz, who balanced these two tendencies. One of the consequences of this coexistence of various trends was that formal and informal logic developed continuously within the School.

In the sphere of the School, and in particular in its "logicoidal" branch, there existed the Cracow Circle – a group of philosophers aiming at the modernization of Catholic thought. It existed very shortly (it was established in 1936 during the Third Polish Philosophical Congress in Cracow), under the patronage of Łukasiewicz; among its members were Jan F. Drewnowski, Józef M. Bocheński, Jan Salamucha (Łukasiewicz's student), and Bolesław Sobociński.

2.3. Methodological Bond of the LWS and Its Worldview Neutrality

Collectives of philosophers are referred to in various ways: there are "circles," "groups," "trends," and of course "schools." It is worth stressing that the LWS was a school in a strict sense. It means that the most essential relation in this community was the teacher–students relation. Twardowski played the main role of a philosophy teacher in Lvov.[9] His students continued this didactic activity in other centres. That is why, usually, Twardowski, his students, the students of his students (and possibly also further generations of them) are included in the LWS.

In the majority of philosophical schools, the members share some common views which are transferred from one "generation" to another. In the case of the LWS, this "transferred" element was not typical. Both members of the LWS and

[9] However, he was accompanied by other professors, first of all Mścisław Wartenberg. Later, some of Twardowski's students lectured in Lvov, for example Łukasiewicz and later Ajdukiewicz, but also Ingarden, who, admittedly, was first of all Husserl's student, but was also under Twardowski's scientific influence to some degree.

historians of its tradition stress that the element bounding the members of School was *methodological*. It consists in preserving the postulates of clarity of speech and reliable justification of judgments, application of logical tools (broadly understood), and respecting the results of other ("detailed") sciences. In philosophical investigations, the members of the School used some methods typical for analytic tradition, first of all analysis of concepts and paraphrasing of statements. In the logical branch of the School, axiomatization was considered the final step in tooling and presenting philosophical conceptions.

Besides methodological attitudes, there are some additional elements that formed the School. Twardowski was a student of Brentano, whose scientific vision of philosophy and spirit of teaching Twardowski wanted to install in Poland. Together with some elements of Brentano's programme, Twardowski brought also Aristotle and Bolzano. However, as a not-orthodox Brentanist, anti-dogmatist, and an opponent of any "isms" (which he stresses already in his introductory lecture in Lvov), he did not force any particular "objective" views on his students and encouraged them to do their own independent research.

Therefore, no set of strictly ("substantially") philosophical views was common to all members of the LWS, except for some general attitudes, summed up by one of its outstanding representatives, Ajdukiewicz, in the term "anti-irrationalism." An anti-irrationalist rejects obscure philosophical language and unjustified speculations but accepts all scientific methods (of both formal and empirical sciences) in philosophical investigations. In this critical attitude, the golden mean is found between the Scylla of scepticism and the Charybdis of dogmatism.

2.4. The LWS as an Integrating Enterprise

The programme for philosophy which Twardowski proposed in Lvov was interdisciplinary and involved psychology (first of all descriptive), logic (both formal and informal), linguistics, and humanities. Of course, 100 years ago, the borders between disciplines looked different than today, and some disciplines were still not separated from philosophy. The interdisciplinary character was one of the reasons for the diversity of directions in which the School was developing and had an impact on many areas of Polish science.

LWS members were of Polish, Ukrainian, as well as Jewish origin. On one hand, it was natural because of the multinational character of Lvov. On the other

hand, in turbulent times and in a society full of tensions, the School was a positive example of fruitful cooperation of people of different nationalities.

The School is also famous for a relatively big number of female scholars that were its active and creative members. About one-third of doctors supervised by Twardowski were female, which is a big number given that women were permitted to study at Austrian universities in 1897. Twardowski supported the presence of women at universities and fulfilled an official role of a kind of women's rights ombudsman at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Lvov.[10] Female students appreciated Twardowski especially for his just estimation of their work, and for treating everyone equally regardless of gender.

Among female students of Twardowski who made academic careers were Helena Słoniewska, Daniela Gromska, Maria Kokoszyńska, Helena Łuszczewska, and Izydora Dąmbska. In Warsaw, Maria Ossowska and Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum belonged to the second generation of the School.

2.5. Institutional Basis

Let us stress once again that philosophical discussion was considered in the LWS the most important impulse for philosophical investigations. That is why the existence of the School was possible in the frames of institutions which guaranteed, first of all, the basis for the free exchange of ideas. The most important elements of this institutional basis were universities, where seminar meetings guaranteed the possibility of not only transferring knowledge and skills but also of discussing philosophical matters.

However, the institutions outside the university were of equal importance. Shortly after coming to Lvov, Twardowski started to attend, and soon also to lead, the meetings of the Student Philosophical Circle. At the meetings of the Circle, Twardowski appeared to be a real head-hunter. A telling testimony of this is that he encouraged Łukasiewicz to move from the Faculty of Law to philosophy. A student philosophical circle existed also in Warsaw (one of its presidents was Ossowska).

In 1904, thanks to Twardowski's initiative, the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov was founded. The Society became a forum for meetings of philosophers

[10] Strictly speaking, Twardowski regularly presented issues connected with women at the meetings of the faculty members.

of all currents, and it was stressed by Twardowski that its only dogma is the lack of (other) dogmas. However, he set the tone for the Society, being its president to his death, and involved his students in its activities. The institution was very active and already in 1910 Twardowski received a glorious tableau as a token of appreciation on the occasion of the Society's 100th meeting.

Philosophical journals were another important institutional element of the School's activity. From 1897, Twardowski cooperated with Władysław Weryho, the editor-in-chief of the quarterly "Przegląd Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Review]. In 1911, a new philosophical journal was initiated by Twardowski himself in Lvov, entitled "Ruch Filozoficzny" [Philosophical Movement] – initially a monthly journal, later appearing irregularly due to financial difficulties. It included, besides original papers, reports from lectures, discussions, bibliographic information, etc. "Ruch Filozoficzny" was edited by Twardowski and his younger co-workers.

"Przegląd Filozoficzny" and "Ruch Filozoficzny" were published exclusively in Polish as one of their aims was to support the development of Polish philosophy and culture before and shortly after regaining independence by Poles. In the 1930s, the journal "Studia Philosophica" was initiated in Lvov, intended for publishing in "international" languages (German, French, and English). Unfortunately, only a few issues were published before World War II.

The most important philosophical events in Poland between 1918 and 1939 were three congresses of philosophy, which took place in Lvov (1923), Warsaw (1927), and Cracow (1936). Twardowski and Łukasiewicz were members of the organizing committees of all three events. It is significant that the inaugural lectures of the congresses were entrusted to Twardowski's pupils: Witwicki (the first), Łukasiewicz (the second), and Tatarkiewicz (the third).

Let us add that in the 1930s, members of the LWS entered into an active exchange of ideas with other centres of early analytic philosophy. Interactions with the Vienna Circle are perhaps of special importance. Moreover, those who visited Poland in this period (e.g., Karl Menger, Rudolf Carnap, Ernest Nagel, or Willard Van Orman Quine) were really impressed by the results of Polish logicians and philosophers and by the intensity of scientific life in Warsaw and Lvov.

3. The Decline of the LWS

3.1. Direct Effects of World War II

In September 1939, Poland was attacked from the west by Nazi Germany, from the east by Soviet Russia, and from the south by Slovakia, an ally of the Third Reich. For the LWS, the outbreak of World War II, its course, and its results were really tragic. The whole of Poland was occupied by aggressors, and all Polish scientific institutions were closed. During the war, over 6 million Polish citizens were murdered by the occupants, often in a cruel way.

Many representatives of the LWS were killed in this war. Let us mention some examples. In 1939, Father Salamucha, a student of Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski, a leading member of Cracow Circle, was among the professors of Jagiellonian University arrested by German occupiers (the so-called Sonderaktion Krakau) and imprisoned for over a year in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen, then in Dachau. In 1941, Father Salamucha was released thanks to the intervention of, among others, the German logician Heinrich Scholtz. He went to Warsaw, where, as a priest, he became the chaplain of the secret National Armed Forces. He was murdered during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, when he was taking care of the wounded.

Jan Mosdorf, a talented doctoral student of Tatarkiewicz, dealing with historiosophical issues, was murdered by Germans in the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp in 1943.

Hosiasson-Lindenbaum described her dramatic war years in a letter to George E. Moore in which she asked him for help. The help, however, did not come in time. She escaped from Warsaw to Wilno, but after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union she was arrested and killed in Ponary near Wilno.

Zygmunt Schmierer, a young assistant of Ajdukiewicz and a promising logician, was killed in a concentration camp.

These are only some examples of many.

The war also changed seriously the course of life of those who survived it. For instance, because of her Jewish origin, in 1940, Dina Sztejnbarg (later Janina Kotarbińska), a pupil of Kotarbiński, was placed by the occupants in the Warsaw Ghetto, from where she escaped thanks to the help of her "Aryan" friends. Later, she used the nickname "Kamińska." However, in 1942, she was arrested and sent to the concentration camp Ravensbrück, then to Auschwitz. She survived thanks to the fact that she agreed to be the object of medical experiments. Seweryna

Łuszczewska-Romahnowa was also sent to a Nazi-German concentration camp; she survived; however, her husband was killed there.

Many members of the LWS were forced to emigrate. Tarski went to the USA just before the war to take part in a philosophical congress, which – paradoxically –probably saved his life. Łukasiewicz, wanting to protect himself from the Russian invasion, tried to reach Switzerland in 1944, but after many turbulent events, he finally went to Ireland, where he died nine years later "far from dear Lwów and Poland" – as is written on his grave.[11] Henryk Mehlberg, Sobociński, and Henryk Hiż also found themselves in the USA.

It is worth emphasizing that the war did not kill the spirit of the Poles. In the Polish territories functioned the greatest resistance movement in Europe. Some members of the LWS took part in it. Izydora Dąmbska was a soldier of the Home Army, the biggest underground army in Europe. The Ossowskis belonged to "Żegota," the organization that helped the Polish Jews to survive the war. Czeżowski spent the war in Wilno, where he was twice arrested for his underground activities. He and his family also helped the Jews to survive the war; for this activity, he was awarded the title of Righteous Among the Nations. Secret teaching in Polish was organized on all levels. Many members of the LWS, including Ajdukiewicz, Czeżowski, Dąmbska, Kotarbiński, Łukasiewicz, the Ossowskis, and others, co-created underground universities and lectured the youth.

3.2. Post-War Marxists' Attacks on the LWS's Members

Unfortunately, the war was not the end of dramatic events in Poland. In 1945, the territorial changes established in Yalta meant that Lvov could no longer be the centre of the LWS; a similar fate befell Wilno. Poland under the new borders dictated by Stalin was placed behind the Iron Curtain. Moreover, the communist regime installed in Poland seriously limited the LWS intellectual influence, since Marxism-Leninism became the only official accepted philosophy, also, and above all, at universities. In the process of creating the *homo sovieticus*, criticism and independent thinking, the hallmarks of the LWS, were revealed to be the most serious enemies of the communist propaganda.

That is why the LWS and its members became the objects of ideological attacks. Twardowski, as well as his students, were openly criticized in the press,

[11] On 22 November 2022, his remains were brought to Warsaw and laid to rest at the Powązkowski Cemetery.

officially for "idealistic" elements in their philosophy. Twardowski was attacked by Henryk Holland, who intentionally changed the legend *of* Twardowski into "the legend *about* Twardowski" in order to discredit his output and significance, trying to present him as… an obscure and clerical canvasser of bourgeois philosophy. Also Kotarbiński, Tatarkiewicz, Ajdukiewicz, and Ossowska became the objects of unjustified ideological criticism.

The members of the LWS who survived the war and stayed in Poland faced a choice: to resign from the public practice of philosophy and its didactics or to limit themselves to teaching "ideologically neutral" logic. Others (like, e.g., Tatarkiewicz, Ossowska, Dąmbska) were temporarily removed from universities by the communist authorities (based on the accusation of "demoralizing" students).

For all those reasons the condition of the LWS around 1950 was unenviable.

4. The Existence of the LWS after 1950

4.1. The School: Criteria of Existence

Given the described serious collapse of the LWS, the historical question of whether the School existed after 1950 is reasonable. In order to address this question properly, a certain ontological problem should be resolved: what does it mean for a school to exist or continue to exist?

My proposal for answering this last question is a formula that uses Tatarkiewicz's idea of idealization (or typological) definition.[12] It is often difficult to indicate both necessary and sufficient conditions of schools' existence; however, it is possible, I believe, to indicate the criteria that should be fulfilled if the school exists "fully." In reality, there are schools that do not meet some of these criteria or meet them only to some degree. Still, such an idealization indicates some determinants for estimating the symptoms of schools' existence.

The proposal of definitions is as follows (the verb "exist" can be replaced by "continue to exist" if necessary).

Philosophical school *S* exists at time *t*, iff:

(i) members of *S* exist as philosophers at time *t*;

(ii) (personal and academic) relations between members of *S* hold;

[12] It was used, for instance, in Tatarkiewicz's definition of happiness.

(iii) (previous) geographical centres of *S* exist at time *t*;
(iv) institutional framework of *S* exists at time *t*;
(v) members of *S* are convinced that *S* exists;
(vi) people from outside *S* (in particular, historians of philosophy) are convinced that *S* exists.

Let us notice that conditions (i)–(iv) are "objective" while (v) and (vi) are "subjective" (as they refer to someone's convictions). We may examine (i)–(iv) by establishing historical facts. Determining whether criteria (v) and (vi) are met is more difficult – and in the case of (v), sometimes even impossible. It is obvious that objective conditions may be fulfilled while subjective ones may not and vice versa.

Let us supplement the definition of a school's existence with the following definition of the membership of a (philosophical) school, of a typological-inductive character. Let us assume the following one:

A is a member of *S*, iff:
(a′) *A* is the founder of *S* or (a″) *A* is a student of a member of *S*;
and
(b) *A* realizes the programme of *S*;[13]
(c) *A* considers *A* to be a member of *S*;
(d) *A* is considered (by others) to be a member of *S*.

Also here, both objective and subjective criteria can be taken into consideration and thus there are more and less typical representatives of a philosophical school.

Let us now examine all the criteria mentioned above in the case of the LWS after 1950.

4.2. People

Although many outstanding representatives died during World War II, the majority of them lived and continued to work after 1950. Even some of the coryphaei of the School, like Kotarbiński, Tatarkiewicz, Czeżowski, or Ajdukiewicz, were still active in philosophy for a few more decades.

Paradoxically, the careers of women of the LWS could develop only after World War II (it was one of the very few positive changes in these political circumstances).

[13] In the case of the LWS, point (b) consists in the realization of the methodological postulates of the LWS.

None of them were appointed to academic chairs before the war (only Ossowska habilitated), while in the 1940s and 1950s Ossowska was appointed to the Chair of the Theory of Morals in Łódź and then in Warsaw; Kotarbińska – in Łódź and then in Warsaw (logic); Kokoszyńska – in Wrocław (logic); Łuszczewska-Rohmanowa – in Poznań (logic); Dąmbska – (for a short period, admittedly) in Cracow (philosophy); Słoniewska – in Wrocław (psychology).

Regardless, in a slightly different political situation, the members of the School continued their scientific and didactic work, bringing up a new generation of scholars.

In Warsaw, this new generation of the LWS was composed of, among others, Roman Suszko (PhD student of Ajdukiewicz when he was still in Poznań), Marian Przełęcki (PhD student of Kotarbińska), Henryk Stonert (PhD student of Kotarbiński), and Klemens Szaniawski (PhD student of Ossowska); soon, their own students joined them, including Barbara Stanosz (PhD student of Suszko) and Adam Nowaczyk (PhD student of Przełęcki). In Toruń, they were Czeżowski's PhD students: Leon Gumański and Bogusław Wolniewicz (who eventually moved to Warsaw). In Opole, Jerzy Słupecki's PhD student was, among others, Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska, and in Wrocław, Kokoszyńska's PhD student was, among others, Ryszard Wójcicki. In Cracow, as already mentioned, the authorities did not allow Dąmbska to have official doctoral students, but, among others, Jerzy Perzanowski attended her philosophical *privatissimum*.

It is interesting that the main historians and chroniclers of the School, as well as prolific continuators of its intellectual achievements, that is, Jerzy Pelc, Jan Woleński, Jacek Jadacki, and Ryszard Jadczak, were not PhD students of the LWS representatives. All of them, however, were under the personal influence of the School's members, attended their lectures, or cooperated with them. Among Pelc's mentors, there were Kotarbiński and Tatarkiewicz; Woleński attended Dąmbska's seminars and wrote his master's thesis under her supervision; Jadacki was a participant in classes of Przełęcki, Szaniawski, and Pelc; Jadczak was influenced by Czeżowski. *Nota bene*: probably all or almost all contemporary Polish formal logicians are "genetically connected" to the School.

4.3. Relations

Schools are more than mereological sums of people. The second important factor of schools' existence are the intellectual relations between their members. As said

before, the relations essential for the LWS were teacher–students relations and the relation of cooperation between the members.

After 1950, some of the LWS representatives became great teachers, and so new instantiations of the teacher–student relation appeared. These new generations were educated in the spirit of anti-irrationalism. Unfortunately, because of the political situation, the conditions of didactic work were essentially different than in the truly independent Poland of the interwar period. There was also ubiquitous censorship and drastic limitations on the freedom of publishing.

Interpersonal contacts became perhaps more complicated because the LWS members were treated differently by the newly established authorities. As mentioned earlier, some members of the LWS were officially attacked or temporarily lost their academic positions. Others were supported or at least tolerated by the communists. It is understandable if we remember that the LWS was a group of people with different political and worldview orientations. In any case, some controversies had to appear over how to behave in these political circumstances. Dąmbska was an example of the strongest resistance against the restriction of university freedom. She paid a big prize for it, since she was removed from university twice. Others decided to compromise, at least in some respects.

4.4. Centres

Let us now consider the centres of the LWS after 1950.

After the change of borders brought on by the Yalta Conference, the LWS lost Lvov and Wilno as academic centres but new centres appeared in which the members of the LWS played an essential role.

Although Warsaw was completely destroyed during the war and lost the majority of its inhabitants, it never lost its position as the main LWS centre. Twardowski's followers played an essential role at the Faculty of Philosophy (and Sociology) after 1950. This was evidenced by the fact that more and more lecture rooms in the building of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Warsaw (located at Krakowskie Przedmieście 3) were named after the LWS representatives. First, there was the room of Ossowski (Chair of Sociology in 1947–1952 and 1956–1962), then the room of Ajdukiewicz (Chair of Philosophy in 1925–1928 and Chair of Logic in 1955–1961), the room of Kotarbiński (Chair of Philosophy in 1918–1939 and Chair of Logic in 1951–1961), the room of Tatarkiewicz (Chair of Philosophy in 1915–1919, 1923–1939, 1945–1949 and 1957–1960) and

Tarski (who lectured in Warsaw as a docent between 1925 and 1939). Finally, the assembly hall of the faculty was named after Ossowska (Chair of Ethics in 1948–1952 and 1956–1966). Another great tribute to LWS members in Warsaw is the colonnade of philosophers and logicians (Twardowski, Leśniewski, Łukasiewicz, Tarski) in the building of the University of Warsaw Library, as well as restoring the rector's portrait of Łukasiewicz in the Kazimierzowski Palace, the seat of the rectors of the University of Warsaw.

Shortly after World War II, Kotarbiński was elected the president of the newly established University of Łódź. He was joined by Kotarbińska, as well as the Ossowskis. Although they moved back to Warsaw after a few years, it was enough to educate a new generation of scholars and to establish there a new centre of analytic philosophy. Ajdukiewicz became a lecturer and the rector in Poznań and, together with Łuszczewska-Rohmanowa, played an essential role in organizing philosophy and logic studies and research in the reconstructed university in this city. Dąmbska cooperated successfully with Ingarden (earlier: antagonist of the logical branch of the LWS) – to the extent that Perzanowski identified the phenomenon of Lvov-Cracow School. Czeżowski co-created the Toruń philosophical centre. A Polish university was also organized in Wrocław, where Kokoszyńska lectured logic, while Słoniewska created the new centre of psychological research. In Lublin, Stefan Swieżawski (Lvovian assistant of Ajdukiewicz) played an important role in shaping the local centre of the history of philosophy.

Generally, one may state that despite some losses (among which Lvov, the cradle of the school, was particularly painful), the number of LWS centres increased around 1950. However, in these centres, the School was not as influential as it was in the interwar period in Lvov and Warsaw. The ideas of the LWS became perhaps more "widespread" but also more "diffused."

One may also identify some new phenomena as "satellites" of the LWS: the Warsaw School of Praxeology (Tadeusz Pszczołowski, Wojciech Gasparski), inspired by Kotarbiński, and the Poznań School of Methodology (Jerzy Kmita and Leszek Nowak), inspired partly by Ajdukiewicz. The latter school is an extremely interesting phenomenon inasmuch as it is a testimony to the victory of the "power of reason" demonstrated by the LWS over the "power of ideology" (or rather the "power of politicians") that was attempted to be implanted in Poland. Kmita, a student of Jerzy Giedymin (a close associate of Ajdukiewicz), and Nowak, a graduate student of Kotarbińska, initiated the analytical metamorphosis

of a certain part of communist ideology into an original concept of the philosophy of the humanities, corresponding to the standards of the LWS.

Let us mention, last but not least, that because of the emigration of some LWS representatives, the LWS had more impact abroad than before the war. In the USA, Tarski supervised twenty-two doctorates in logic, by which the LWS spirit has been present in the USA up to now. Łukasiewicz worked for a few years in Dublin, influencing Irish logicians (such as Carew A. Meredith). Czesław Lejewski, a pupil of Łukasiewicz, worked in Manchester (where he taught, among others, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, and Kevin Mulligan).

4.5. Institutional Framework

The institutions created by Twardowski appeared to be extremely durable and survived both World War II and the post-war ideological pressure.

The Polish Philosophical Society has existed continuously since 1904, although it was "concealed" during World War II and "dormant" during the Stalinist period. Presently, there are sections of the Society in all Polish academic centres. The journal "Ruch Filozoficzny" was closed in the early 1950s but later reopened by Czeżowski in Toruń. The journal is still issued today. On the front cover, it is recalled that it was founded by Twardowski. Until the death of Gumański, a student of Czeżowski, and the editor-in-chief after him, "Ruch Filozoficzny" kept the content structure given to it by Twardowski.

Moreover, some new philosophical institutions, promoting the scientific ethos of the LWS, appeared. Firstly, Ajdukiewicz realized Łukasiewicz's idea and started to publish "Studia Logica" in 1953. In 1970, the journal "Studia Semiotyczne" [Semiotic Studies] began to be issued, referring through its founder and editor, that is, Pelc, to the ideals of the LWS; in 1993, Jadacki, founded the general philosophical journal "Filozofia Nauki" [Philosophy of Science], which serves the same aim.

What is more, in 1968, Pelc initiated the Polish Semiotic Society, which continued the tradition of the LWS. In 1994, the Polish Association for Logic and Philosophy of Science was established, declaring that it is a continuation of the Polish Logical Association, founded by Łukasiewicz and his pupils, active in the years 1936–1939. Polish Philosophical Congresses were renewed in 1977. Earlier, Ajdukiewicz initiated a series of conferences on logic (organized in Osieczna and Jabłonna).

4.6. Self-Identification and the View from Outside

The memory of Twardowski and of the spirit of the LWS was strong among the school members also after 1950. However, could the members of the LWS have a feeling of the continuity of the School shortly after 1950? It was hardly possible. Most members of the LWS were strongly emotionally bound to Lvov and the loss of this center was painful. Also, the political situation, and lack of academic freedom made it difficult to "feel" the spirit of the School.

Woleński recollects that when he asked about the continuity of the LWS in the 1980s, even such a "natural" member of the LWS as Przełęcki did not admit to belonging to the School, although, from an objective point of view, he was a member of the LWS in a strict sense: he was a student of Twardowski's students and applied the LWS ideals to the greatest degree. He simply considered the School as a closed chapter of the history of Polish philosophy.

However, this situation gradually changed. In the recent decades, more and more scholars have admitted to being in the sphere of the School's influence. A decisive role in this process is played by historians of philosophy who identified, explored, and described the phenomenon of the LWS and the scale of its impact on Polish (and not only Polish) philosophy. After the intensification of the research about the history and tradition of the LWS, and together with recognition of the international prestige of the School, also the process of self-identification reappeared. It is, incidentally, an example of the influence of the research on the researched object.

5. Final Diagnosis and Closing Remarks

As mentioned at the beginning, various historians of philosophy have different opinions about the School's existence after 1950. These differences are probably caused by the fact that they consider different criteria crucial for the School's continuity.

I would like to end with two comments.

Firstly, we naturally compare the period after 1950 to the period before World War II. However, it is not the case that the School was ideally "integral" before the war and fulfilled all the mentioned criteria completely and to the highest degree. Remember that, until 1920, only the Lvov centre existed (called the "Lvov

School," "Twardowski's School"). The mathematical-logical direction appeared also only after 1920. The term "Lvov-Warsaw School" was coined in the 1930s. There were deep differences inside the School, and many controversies among its members. Let us mention, for instance, Witwicki's criticism of the "Triumvirate" of Warsaw logicians (Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, and Tarski), Twardowski's reservations towards the "symbolomania" of some of his students, Twardowski's students' reservations towards some points of their teacher's programme, etc. From the perspective of 100 years, we see more similarities and integrity than they saw themselves.

Secondly, some recent developments in the LWS tradition should be mentioned. Above all, numerous thorough monographs on the School have been edited and published, and translations of classic works of the LWS representatives have appeared. Two additional dates should be mentioned in this context. In 2016, the Kazimierz Twardowski Philosophical Society in Lviv was established thanks to the effort of Stepan Ivanyk and his Ukrainian colleagues. Thus the School symbolically came back to its cradle. In 2020, at the University of Warsaw the Lvov-Warsaw School Research Center was established, which closely cooperates with the Lviv Society and aims to integrate those who follow the tradition of the School. It seems that this presence of Twardowski's spirit in contemporary Lviv removes the last barrier in thinking about the School's continuity.

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On the Polish "Via Modalization" Approach to Paraconsistency

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Abstract: In this paper, I survey the history of the Polish tradition of paraconsistency and its chronological development. I outline the features of this tradition to provide some insights into the more general notion of philosophical schools. The main features of the Polish tradition of paraconsistency are the continuation of research on a previous philosophical tradition and international collaboration.

Key words: Polish tradition, discussive logic, paraconsistent, modal logic, inconsistency

1. Introduction

This paper is devoted to revisiting the Polish approach to paraconsistent logic developed by the Polish logician Professor Stanisław Jaśkowski. In 1948 –seventy-five years ago – Jaśkowski published his revolutionary paper *A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems*,[1] dealing with the problem of:

1) providing a calculus for inconsistent systems that do not entail its triviality (or *overfilling*),
2) which would be rich enough to allow for practical inferences, and
3) which would have intuitive justification.

Having critically assessed several options to solve this problem, Jaśkowski proposed a logical system which was named $\mathbf{D}_2$ after two-valued discussive sentential calculus. Part of its motivation was to allow for models of a discussion where participants contradict one another.

[1] S. Jaśkowski, *Rachunek zdań dla systemów dedukcyjnych sprzecznych*, "Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis" 1948, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 55–77; S. Jaśkowski, *A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems*, "Logic and Logical Philosophy" 2004, Vol. 7, pp. 35–56.

Some scholars found further applications of discussive logic for the following tasks:[2]

- modelling views that accept true contradictions,
- representing systems of hypotheses that contradict established laws of science,
- handling vague terms and imprecise concepts.

In this paper, I investigate the essential features of the Polish approach to paraconsistency, and the morals that one can obtain from it to outline a conception of a "philosophical school." More specifically, I seek to determine the model of the Polish tradition of paraconsistency, which was initiated by Jaśkowski, reinstated in Toruń by Jerzy Perzanowski, and which has been kept alive since then by Andrzej Pietruszczak, Marek Nasieniewski, and Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska.

There is a vast well-known survey on the history of discussive logic.[3] In most cases, however, not much attention has been paid to the chronology of works developed after Jaśkowski's paper and the evolution of his conceptual insights. The aim of this study is thus to contribute to both aspects. I would like to distinguish the historical stages of the Polish tradition of paraconsistency and reflect on its evolution. In the paper, I do not look at the full formal details of discussive logic but emphasize the historical and intuitive aspects instead.

The paper is divided into three sections. In the first part, I describe the life and work of Stanisław Jaśkowski and focus particularly on his research of the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$. In this section, while describing his life and work, I follow standard literature as well as some facts not found elsewhere (to the best of the author's knowledge). In the second section, I describe the development of discussive logic

[2] N.C.A. da Costa, L. Dubikajtis, *On Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic*, in: *Non-Classical Logics, Model Theory and Computability : Proceedings of the Third Latin-American Symposium on Mathematical Logic, Campinas, Brazil, July 11–17, 1976*, eds. A. Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa, R. Chuaqui, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam–New York–Oxford 1977, pp. 37–56; J. Kotas, *Discussive Sentential Calculus of Jaśkowski*, "Studia Logica" 1975, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 149–168; J. Kotas, N.C.A. da Costa, *A New Formulation of Discussive Logic*, "Studia Logica" 1979, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 429–445.

[3] For notable examples, see L. Dubikajtis, *The Life and Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, "Studia Logica" 1975, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 109–116; J. Kotas, A. Pieczkowski, *Scientific Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, "Studia Logica" 1967, Vol. 21, pp. 7–15; A.I. Arruda, *Aspects of the Historical Development of Paraconsistent Logic*, in: *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, eds. G. Priest, R. Routley, J. Norman, Philosophia Verlag, München–Hamden–Wien 1989, pp. 99–130; J. Ciuciura, *History and Development of the Discursive Logic*, "Logica Trianguli" 1999, Vol. 3, pp. 3–31.

after Jaśkowski. In the third section, I sketch some general criteria to determine the notion of the philosophical "school" by analyzing the features of the Polish tradition of paraconsistency, and discuss the prospect of its future.

2. Life and Work of Stanisław Jaśkowski

Stanisław Jaśkowski (1906–1965) was a Polish mathematician working under the supervision of the logician and philosopher Jan Łukasiewicz.[4] Jaśkowski studied mathematics at the University of Warsaw, where he later obtained a PhD in philosophy.

Jaśkowski's scientific research was mainly concerned with mathematical logic, geometry, and arithmetic.[5] In the field of mathematical logic, he made important contributions to paraconsistent logic, natural deduction,[6] intuitionistic logic, free logic, and decidability. In geometry and arithmetic, he contributed to the geometry of solids, foundations of geometry, the notion of symmetry and ornaments, and the notion of number. According to Kotas and Pieczkowski, the research of Jaśkowski on mathematical logic was characterized by two main topics:[7]

1) (un)decidability of various systems, and
2) foundations of geometry.

As a former student of Łukasiewicz, Jaśkowski was influenced by Łukasiewicz's research on the principle of non-contradiction.[8] Such an influence is also present in his PhD dissertation,[9] where he undertook the effort of answering a problem

[4] Jan Woleński in *Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2022 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lvov-warsaw/ (susbstantive revision on 30.09.2019), observed that Jan Łukasiewicz and Stanisław Leśniewski were philosophers with modest mathematical backgrounds invited to the Faculty of Mathematical and Natural Sciences of the University of Warsaw to teach mathematical logic. It was not strange that a philosopher was a mentor of a mathematician. Jaśkowski was also a student of Leśniewski and of Alfred Tarski (see L. Dubikajtis, *The Life and Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, op. cit., p. 109).

[5] J. Kotas, A. Pieczkowski, *Scientific Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, op. cit.

[6] A. Indrzejczak, *Powstanie i ewolucja dedukcji naturalnej*, "Filozofia Nauki" 2014, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 5–19.

[7] J. Kotas, A. Pieczkowski, *Scientific Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, op. cit.

[8] J. Łukasiewicz, *O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa*, Akademia Umiejętności, Fundusz Wydawniczy im. W. Osławskiego, Kraków 1910.

[9] S. Jaśkowski, *On the Rules of Suppositions in Formal Logic*, Seminarjum Filozoficzne Wydziału Matematyczno-Przyrodniczego Uniwersystetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1934.

raised by Łukasiewicz in 1925,[10] to wit: expressing formally the way that mathematicians actually reason and carry out their proofs. As Łukasiewicz noted, mathematicians reason without appealing to the theses of the theory of deduction, and instead they proceed by making suppositions.[11]

The outbreak of the Second World War caused Jaśkowski to not obtain his habilitation. He instead volunteered to defend Warsaw. At the time, most of his scientific works were destroyed, and he had to rewrite them from memory. After the Second World War, he lectured at the University of Łódz, and later moved to Toruń in 1945.[12] Then, he obtained his habilitation in Kraków under the supervision of Zygmunt Zawirski with a dissertation on real numbers.[13] He organized the Faculty of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry, and later became its dean. Then, he became vice-rector, and rector of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. It is important to remark that as a consequence of the war, the Nicolaus Copernicus University was lacking scientific staff. Jaśkowski had to then take charge of several courses and seminars in mathematical logic, probability, and set theory.[14]

Jaśkowski also worked as a collaborator of the "Journal of Symbolic Logic," and as joint editor of "Studia Logica" and "Zeitschrift für Matematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik." After the Second World War, his publications summed up to forty-seven contributions, including scientific works, reviews, reports, and lectures.[15]

His social activity was marked by modernizing the programmes of mathematics in secondary schools. For this reason, he was concerned with the way

[10] See S. Jaśkowski, *Elementy logiki matematycznej i metodologii nauk ścisłych*, ed. A. Indrzejczak, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódz 2018, p. x.

[11] As it has been emphasized in J. Kotas, A. Pieczkowski, *Scientific Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, op. cit., pp. 7–15; S. Jaśkowski, *Elementy logiki matematycznej i metodologii nauk ścisłych*, op. cit., Gerhard Gentzen is mostly recognized as the forerunner of natural deduction systems, even though Jaśkowski investigated the topic eight years earlier at a seminar imparted by Łukasiewicz (see G. Gentzen, *Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen. I & II*, "Mathematische Zeitschrift" 1934, Vol. 39, pp. 176–210, for more information on Gentzen's work). The reason for this situation was the delay of the publication of his doctoral dissertation for eight years, due to health problems (see S. Jaśkowski, *Elementy logiki matematycznej i metodologii nauk ścisłych*, op. cit., p. x).

[12] At the time, Tadeusz Czeżowski, also a student of Łukasiewicz and an important member of the Lvov-Warsaw School, also moved to Toruń. However, Czeżowski went to the department of philosophy at Nicolaus Copernicus University. Czeżowski, however, did not collaborate with Jaśkowski there.

[13] S. Jaśkowski, *Elementy logiki matematycznej i metodologii nauk ścisłych*, op. cit., p. xiv.

[14] Ibid., p. xii.

[15] L. Dubikajtis, *The Life and Works of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, op. cit., p. 110.

that mathematics is taught, and devoted much of his time to improving the programmes at secondary schools.

The legacy of Jaśkowski spread through his four students, who continued to develop the scientific interest of their mentor. These students were Lech Dubikajtis, Jerzy Kotas, August Pieczkowski, and Aleksander Ciopa-Śniatycki.[16] Jaśkowski planned to work with each of them, separately, on the topics of discussive logic, decision procedures, natural deduction, and causal functions. However, his students were interested in all of the different topics, and sometimes contributed to more than one of them.

In the rest of the paper, I will focus on describing Jaśkowski's "discussive logic," a paraconsistent logic inspired by an analysis of discussions, by far the most recognized contribution of Jaśkowski in the global logical community. It is significant to note, however, that Jaśkowski did not find himself primarily interested in this topic, but in the research on causal functions. It was the case that paraconsistent logic became studied in several places in the world, and, as a consequence, Jaśkowski's research on discussive logic received more attention than his investigation on causal functions. As a matter of fact, Jaśkowski's research led in some way to the big development of logic made sometime later in Brazil with Professor Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa.

3. The Discussive Logic D_2

Consider a formal language, *L*, and a formula, *A* of *L*. A paraconsistent logic is a logic where a contradiction does not imply an arbitrary formula. More specifically, a logic, **L**, is paraconsistent if and only if the principle *ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet*, that from a contradiction any conclusion follows, that is, for any *A and B*:

$$A, \sim A \vDash B,$$

is not valid.[17] Discussive logic is a paraconsistent logic in which one can represent opposing opinions from a discussion. Jaśkowski considered the possibil-

[16] I am grateful to Bogumiła Maria Klemp-Dyczek for providing me the reference of Aleksander Ciopa-Śniatycki.

[17] See I.M.L. D'Ottaviano, E.L. Gomes, *Gerland's Dialectica and Paraconsistency*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2021, Vol. 70, pp. 143–170, for a detailed discussion of the conception of paraconsistent logic.

ity of adding a diamond connective, $\Diamond$, in front of a formula, A, to show how an impartial arbiter should evaluate the assertions made in a discussion. Thus, when someone in the discussion says A, an impartial arbiter must consider this assertion as "only possible." To model such discussions, Jaśkowski used the modal logic **S5**, as it permits to represent the external observer as aware of all the assertions made in the discussion by every participant. In discussive logic, all participants are aware of all the assertions of all other participants. According to this point of view, a participant in a discussion can assert a particular formula A, say $\Diamond A$–, another participant can assert its negation $\sim A$, say $\Diamond \sim A$, but neither of the two, nor the observer themself, needs to assert any unrelated formula B, say $\Diamond B$. But this is nothing more than invalidating the principle of explosion, thus making $\mathbf{D}_2$ a paraconsistent logic, due to the fact that $\Diamond A, \Diamond \sim A \nvdash \Diamond B$ on the basis of **S5**. Furthermore, following the previous intuition, a participant in a discussion can assert A ($\Diamond A$) another participant can assert B ($\Diamond B$) but neither of the two needs to assert its conjunction $A \wedge B$ ($\Diamond(A \wedge B)$) where $\wedge$ is classical. Thus, one arrives at invalidating the principle of adjunction:

$$A, B \nvdash (A \wedge B).$$

After considering adding the possibility connective in front of assertions, Jaśkowski introduced the logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ using some "discussive" language with a discussive implication, $\rightarrow_d$, and a (right) discussive conjunction, $\wedge^r_d$ as a way to express the idea conveyed by the use of the possibility.[18] In intuitive terms, a formula with the form $A \rightarrow_d B$ is interpreted as "if some participant asserts A in the discussion, then B." Correspondingly, a formula with the form $A \wedge^r_d B$ is interpreted as "A, and some participant asserts B in the discussion." As it has been noted after Jaśkowski,[19] another theoretical possibility is to interpret the discussive conjunction as saying: "some participant asserts A, and also B," where the first conjunct is "modalized" instead of the second one. For this second conjunction, one can use the (left) discussive conjunction $\wedge^l_d$ to build formulas with the form $A \wedge^l_d B$, with the previous intended interpretation.

To be sure, the assertions made in a discussion can be used to draw inferences. As such, the assertions are merely considered possibly true from the point of view

[18] In fact, in his original paper Jaśkowski used Polish notation.

[19] N.C.A. da Costa, L. Dubikajtis, *On Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic*, op. cit.

of some external observer of the discussion,[20] where the observer has access to the assertions made by each participant of the discussion. Thus, if some participant d_1 asserts A, and another participant d_2 asserts B, then the external observer has among his records both $\Diamond A$ and $\Diamond B$, from which he can, for instance, conclude either $\Diamond A$ or $\Diamond B$. This example shows that the premises and conclusions made in a prototypical discussion are taken by its participants under proviso, that is – in a metaphoric way – that they are always preceded by the symbol $\Diamond$.

One can consider the inference $A \models_d B$ to be valid in the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ just in case for all A and B, $\Diamond \mathrm{tr}(A) \models \Diamond \mathrm{tr}(B)$ is valid in the modal logic **S5**. Here tr(x) is the respective translation of discussive formulas into the modal language according to their above-sketched meanings.

4. The Development of Discussive Logic

After the introduction of the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$, logicians began to explore all its potential. This was done thanks to the efforts of Jaśkowski's students Lech Dubikajtis and Jerzy Kotas.

In 1967, Dubikajtis met Newton da Costa in Paris and the two started to work together. Just one year later, Dubikajtis and da Costa published the paper *Sur la logique discursive de Jaśkowski*,[21] where they discussed the first axiomatization of $\mathbf{D}_2$, that is, providing a set of formulas from which all the formulas that are valid in discussive logic can be derived. In that work, Dubikajtis and da Costa also distinguished between two kinds of languages for the axiomatization of $\mathbf{D}_2$: a propositional language with the discussive connectives $\rightarrow_d$, and $\wedge^r_d$, and a modal language with the connectives $\Diamond$ and $\Box$ but without the discussive connectives. Later, Dubikajtis and his students Grażyna Achtelik, Elżbieta Dudek, and Jan Konior investigated in two articles another axiomatization (this axiomatization was introduced by da Costa and Dubikajtis, as I will explain below).[22] Dubikajtis and

[20] See K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *A Modal Extension of Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic D_2*, "Logic Journal of the IGPL" 2019, Vol. 27, p. 451.

[21] N.C.A. da Costa, L. Dubikajtis, *Sur la logique discursive de Jaśkowski*, "Bulletin de L'Académie Polonaise des Sciences" 1968, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 551–557.

[22] G. Achtelik, L. Dubikajtis, E. Dudek, J. Konior, *On Independence of Axioms in Jaśkowski Discussive Propositional Calculus*, "Reports on Mathematical Logic" 1981, Vol. 11, pp. 3–11; L. Dubikajtis, E. Dudek, J. Konior, *On Axiomatics of Jaśkowski's Discussive Propositional Calculus*, in:

Kotas also were invited teachers, and spent some periods in Brazil, working with da Costa at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP, State of São Paulo).[23] The research on discussive logic in Poland was continued also by Kotas and his students Tomasz Furmanowski, Wiesław Dziobiak, Jerzy Błaszczuk, and Max Urchs.

I propose to divide the kind of research on discussive logic made after the meeting of Dubikajtis and da Costa into the following topics:

- axiomatization of the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ and different proof-theoretic presentations of $\mathbf{D}_2$,
- algebraization of $\mathbf{D}_2$ and mathematical theories relying on $\mathbf{D}_2$,
- modal logic counterparts that can define $\mathbf{D}_2$ and other discussive systems,
- generalization of discussive logics: discussive consequence and discussive negation, and
- philosophical view on discussive logics, and relation with other paraconsistent logics.

In 1968, Kotas investigated which algebra underlies the system $\mathbf{D}_2$ as a mathematical theory that corresponds to a given logical system.[24] The research on the mathematical dimension of discussive logic was then transported to Brazil. In 1970, Lafayette de Moraes wrote, under the supervision of da Costa, the first thesis on discussive logic.[25] This thesis was devoted to presenting a first-order discussive logic different from the one introduced by da Costa and Dubikajtis in 1968. In the thesis, de Moraes also discussed the prospects of a discussive set theory based on this system of logic. The same year, da Costa and Itala M. Loffredo D'Ottaviano introduced the system **J3**,[26] a modal three-valued paraconsistent logic, as a solution to the problem proposed by Jaśkowski. In 1973, de Moraes wrote his PhD dissertation, *Lógica discursive e modelos de Kripke* [Discussive Logic and Kripke Models], also under the supervision of da Costa, where de Moraes introduced

Proceedings of the Third Brazilian Conference on Mathematical Logic, eds. A.I. Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa, A.M. Sette, Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica, São Paulo 1980, pp. 109–117.

[23] I thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.

[24] N.C.A. da Costa, L. Dubikajtis, *Sur la logique discursive de Jaśkowski*, op. cit., pp. 551–557.

[25] L. de Moraes, *Sobre a lógica discursiva de Jaśkowski*, master's thesis, University of São Paulo, 1970.

[26] I.M.L. D'Ottaviano, N.C.A. da Costa, *Sur un problème de Jaśkowski*, "Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences" 1970, Vol. 270, pp. 1349–1353.

an axiomatic system for discussive logic in the modal language, and a Kripke semantics for it.[27]

In 1974, Kotas showed that the discussive system is finitely axiomatizable. To put it roughly, the idea is that one can provide a finite set of formulas from which all the formulas that are valid in $\mathbf{D}_2$ can be derived.[28] In the same year, Kotas showed that the discussive logic is characterized by an infinite quantity of values.[29] One year later, in 1975, Furmanowski showed that one can use any modal system **M** intermediate between the modal systems **S4** and **S5** for the translation, tr(x), of the discussive formulas.[30] This became a significant discovery, as one could consider other modal systems aside from **S5** as a basis for the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$. To put it differently, the full modal system **S5** is not necessary to obtain the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$.

The $\Diamond^n$-counterpart of a modal system **M** is the set of formulas that are valid after preceding them with the symbol $\Diamond$ *n* times: $\mathbf{M} \vDash \Diamond \ldots \Diamond B$; the $\Box^n$-counterpart of a modal system **M** is the set of formulas that are valid after preceding them with the symbol $\Box$ *n* times: $\mathbf{M} \vDash \Box \ldots \Box B$. The $\Diamond^n$-counterpart of the modal system **S5** can be used to characterize the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ via the translation function tr(x). In 1975, Perzanowski discussed the $\Box^n$-counterparts and $\Diamond^n$-counterparts of different modal systems other than **S5**, and considered various modal systems inspired by the way of obtaining discussive logic.[31] In 1976 Błaszczuk and Dziobiak investigated the problem of the axiomatization of $\Diamond^n$-counterparts of various modal systems.[32]

In 1977, da Costa and Dubikajtis replaced Jaśkowki's discussive conjunction with one where the translation of the discussive conjunction "possibilitates" the

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[27] See E.H. Alves, A.E. Consalvo, *Contribuições do Professor Lafayette de Moraes para o Desenvolvimiento da Lógica Matemática no Brasil (Contributions by Professor Lafayette de Moraes to the Development of Mathematical Logic in Brazil)*, "Cognitio" 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 185–190.

[28] J. Kotas, *The Axiomatization of Stanisław Jaśkowski's Discussive System*, "Studia Logica" 1974, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 195–200.

[29] J. Kotas, *On Quantity of Logical Values in the Discussive D_2 System and in Modular Logic*, "Studia Logica" 1974, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 273–275.

[30] T. Furmanowski, *Remarks on Discussive Propositional Calculus*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 1975, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 33–36.

[31] J. Perzanowski, *On M-Fragments and L-Fragments of Normal Modal Propositional Logics*, "Reports on Mathematical Logic" 1975, Vol. 5, pp. 63–72.

[32] J.J. Błaszczuk, W. Dziobiak, *An Axiomatization of M^n-Counterparts for Some Modal Logics*, "Reports on Mathematical Logic" 1976, Vol. 6, pp. 3–6.

first conjunct, namely, $f(A \wedge^{1}_{d} B) = \Diamond f(A) \wedge f(B)$.[33] Furthermore, they extended this new system and axiomatized it. In the same year, Błaszczuk and Dziobiak[34] studied the ◊-counterparts of modal systems, including Sobociński's ones, as some of them can be used to define the logic $\mathbf{D}_2$. Also in this year, Kotas and da Costa investigated ◊-counterparts of various families of modal systems, including minimal ones that could be used to characterize the discussive logic.[35]

In 1979, Kotas and da Costa introduced a natural deduction system for the discussive logic with the (left) discussive conjunction $A \wedge^{1}_{d} B$.[36] The next year, Dubikajtis, Dudek and Konior investigated da Costa and Dubikajtis's work of 1977.[37] They showed the dependence of the axioms that do not use negation and then reduced them. In 1978, Kotas and da Costa offered a solution to Jaśkowski's problem of providing a calculus for inconsistent systems that do not entail its triviality by using Łukasiewicz's many-valued logics.[38] In 1981, Achtelik, Dubikajtis, Dudek and Konior showed the dependence of the axioms that use negation in da Costa and Dubikajtis's work of 1977 and also reduced them.[39]

An M-counterpart of a modal system can be also treated more generally as the set of formulas that are valid after preceding them with arbitrary successions of ◊, □ or ~: $\vDash \sim\Diamond\ldots\Box(B)$. In 1984, Błaszczuk investigated the M-counterparts (or "M-extensions") of various modal systems, where the notion of M-counterparts was meant in a more general way.[40] By taking the M-counterparts of a given modal system – instead of its ◊-counterparts – one could obtain various logical systems, some of which can be considered discussive.

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33 N.C.A. da Costa, L. Dubikajtis, *On Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic*, op. cit.

34 J.J. Błaszczuk, W. Dziobiak, *Modal Logics Connected with Systems $S4_n$ of Sobociński*, "Studia Logica" 1977, Vol. 36, pp. 151–164.

35 J. Kotas, N.C.A. da Costa, *On Some Modal Logical Systems Defined in Connexion with Jaśkowski's Problem*, in: *Non-Classical Logics, Model Theory and Computability: Proceedings of the Third Latin-American Symposium on Mathematical Logic, Campinas, Brazil, July 11–17, 1976*, eds. A. Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa, R. Chuaqui, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam–New York–Oxford 1977, pp. 57–73.

36 J. Kotas, N.C.A. da Costa, *A New Formulation of Discussive Logic*, op. cit.

37 L. Dubikajtis, E. Dudek, J. Konior, *On Axiomatics of Jaśkowski's Discussive Propositional Calculus*, op. cit., pp. 109–117.

38 J. Kotas, N.C.A. da Costa, *On the Problem of Jaśkowski and the Logics of Łukasiewicz*, in: *Proceedings of the First Brazilian Conference*, eds. A.I. Arruda et al., Marcel Dekker, New York 1978, pp. 127–139.

39 G. Achtelik, L. Dubikajtis, E. Dudek, J. Konior, *On Independence of Axioms in Jaśkowski Discussive Propositional Calculus*, op. cit., pp. 3–11.

40 J.J. Błaszczuk, *Some Paraconsistent Sentential Calculi*, "Studia Logica" 1984, Vol. 43, pp. 51–61.

In 1985, de Moraes introduced a "discussive" set theory based on a first-order logic with equality using the modal system **S5**.[41] One year later, 1986 Urchs defined a system for a discussive logic that can also be used to represent causal relations.[42] It thus combines Jaśkowski's two central interests in mathematical logic.

In 1989, Kotas and da Costa presented some open problems on the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$: whether certain discussive systems based on various modal logics are axiomatizable or not, the algebraization of various modal systems, and modal logics based on different non-classical logics.[43] This constitutes an important summary on discussive logic done so far. In 1995, da Costa and Francisco Doria discussed the idea of pragmatic truth and perspectives on the foundation of physics in the context of discussive logic.[44]

In 1998, in Toruń, the Memorial Symposium "Paraconsistent Logic, Logical Philosophy, Informatics and Mathematics" was organized on the occasion of the anniversary of Jaśkowski's seminal paper. During this event, the Medal of Merit "Nicolaus Copernicus" was awarded to Newton da Costa; the University of Toruń awarded him this Medal due to his important contributions. In the international journal "Logic and Logical Philosophy," a new translation of Jaśkowski's seminal paper with notes by Jerzy Perzanowski was published.

In a 2001 article, de Moraes and Jair Minoro Abe presented a discussive logic of zeroth order.[45] They axiomatized this logic, and showed that the resulting logic was different from the logic introduced by da Costa and Dubikajtis in 1977.

In 2002, Urchs challenged the conception of paraconsistent logic.[46] A paraconsistent logic had been characterized as a logic where it is not true that from an inconsistency anything follows. Urchs held that this definition is derivative from

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41 L. de Moraes, *On Discussive Set Theory*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 1985, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 144–148.

42 M. Urchs, *On Two Systems of Stanisław Jaśkowski*, "The Journal of Non-Classical Logic" 1986, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 25–32.

43 J. Kotas, N.C.A. da Costa, *Problems of Modal and Discussive Logics*, in: *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, eds. G. Priest, R. Routley, J. Norman, Philosophia Verlag, München–Hamden–Wien 1989, pp. 227–244.

44 N.C.A. da Costa, F. Doria, *On Jaśkowski's Discussive Logics*, "Studia Logica" 1995, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 33–60.

45 L. de Moraes, J.M. Abe, *Some Results on Jaśkowski's Discursive Logic*, "Logic and Logical Philosophy" 2001, Vol. 9, pp. 25–33.

46 M. Urchs, *On the Role of Adjunction in Para(In)Consistent Logic*, in: *Paraconsistency: The Logical Way to the Inconsistent*, eds. W.A. Carnielli, M.E. Coniglio, I.M.L. D'Ottaviano, Marcel Dekker, New York–Basel 2002, pp. 487–499.

a conception of a paraconsistent logic as a logic where it is not true that from an inconsistency follows its conjunction.

In turn, in 2005 Janusz Ciuciura observed that da Costa and Dubikajtis's axiomatization from 1977 resulted in a different system from the original discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$.[47] Ciuciura introduced another axiomatization for da Costa and Dubikajtis's system – thus dealing with a discussive language with the conjunction $\wedge_d^l$ – using fewer axioms. In the next year, Ciuciura considered a variant of the discussive logic in which a discussive negation $\sim_d$ is introduced.[48] The intuitive meaning of a formula $\sim_d A$ is to be read as "some participant rejects *A*." Three years later, in 2008, Ciuciura proposed an axiomatization for $\mathbf{D}_2$ in a language with discussive connectives using $\wedge_d^r$.[49]

In 2005, Jean-Yves Béziau introduced the logic **Z** as a way to solve Jaśkowski's problem of providing a paraconsistent logic with intuitive justification, and where negation had enough properties to be consider a negation.[50] The logic is actually again motivated by discussive logic, where one "modalizes" the negation "$\Diamond\sim A$," which is accordingly understood as "it is possible that not *A*" in the modal logic **S5**.

In 2006, Joke Meheus combined a (paraconsistent) adaptive logic with discussive logic.[51] A new result came from formulating discussive logic without the discussive connectives. In another paper published in 2006, Meheus also considered an adaptive-discussive logic that permits representing discussions in which participants contradict themselves.[52]

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47 J. Ciuciura, *On the da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas' System of Discursive Logic*, "Logic and Logical Philosophy" 2005, Vol. 14, pp. 235–252. This seems clear given the fact that da Costa and Dubikajtis axiomatized the system with a different conjunction.

48 J. Ciuciura, *A Quasi-Discursive System*, "Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic" 2006, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 371–384.

49 J. Ciuciura, *Frontiers of the Discursive Logic*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2008, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 81–92.

50 J.-Y. Béziau, *The Paraconsistent Logic Z: A Possible Solution to Jaśkowski's Problem*, "Logic and Logical Philosophy" 2006, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 99–111.

51 J. Meheus, *An Adaptive Logic Based on Jaśkowski's Approach to Paraconsistency*, "Journal of Philosophical Logic" 2006, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 539–567.

52 J. Meheus, *Discussive Adaptive Logics: Handling Internal and External Inconsistencies*, in: *Essays in Logic and Ontology*, eds. J. Malinowski, A. Pietruszczak, Rodopi, Amsterdam–New York 2007, pp. 211–223.

In 2007, D'Ottaviano and Carlos Hifume proposed a paraconsistent modal logic.[53] This logic can be seen as a kind of Jaśkowski's discussive logic that could be used, in general, as a deductive logic of science. In 2015, Ciuciura contributed to the study of the algebra of the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$,[54] basing his study on the work of Jerzy Kotas.

Besides the previous works, the contemporary investigation on discussive logic has been mainly carried out in Toruń by Andrzej Pietruszczak, Marek Nasieniewski, and Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska. Below, I present a succinct annotated bibliography of their work on discussive logic:

2001 Nasieniewski, *A Comparison of Two Approaches to Paraconsistency: Flemish and Polish*. In this work, Marek Nasieniewski compared the approaches to paraconsistent logic of discussive logic and of adaptive logics.[55]

2005 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *Syntactical and Semantical Characterization of a Class of Paraconsistent Logics*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski built upon Béziau's 2005 article to present different paraconsistent logics using normal modal logics other than **S5**.[56] In the same year, similar observations were made by João Marcos.[57]

2008 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *Paraconsistent Logics Obtained by J.-Y. Béziau's Method by Means of Some Non-Normal Modal Logics*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski generalized their work from 2005 to present more paraconsistent logics using regular modal logics.[58]

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53 I.M.L. D'Ottaviano, C. Hifume, *Peircean Pragmatic Truth and da Costa's Quasi-Truth*, "Studies in Computational Intelligence (SCI)" 2007, Vol. 64, pp. 383–398.

54 J. Ciuciura, *Algebraization of Jaśkowski's Paraconsistent Logic D2*, "Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric" 2015, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 173–193.

55 M. Nasieniewski, *A Comparison of Two Approaches to Paraconsistency: Flemish and Polish*, "Logic and Logical Philosophy" 2001, Vol. 9, pp. 47–74.

56 K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *Syntactical and Semantical Characterization of a Class of Paraconsistent Logics*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2005, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 229–248.

57 J. Marcos, *Nearly Every Normal Modal Logic Is Paranormal*, "Logique & Analyse" 2005, Vol. 48, No. 189/192, pp. 279–300.

58 K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *Paraconsistent Logics Obtained by J.-Y. Béziau's Method by Means of Some Non-Normal Modal Logics*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2008, Vol. 37, pp. 185–196.

2008 Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak, *The Weakest Regular Modal Logic Defining Jaśkowski's Logic D_2*. In this work, Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak considered the smallest regular modal logic which enables defining the discussive logic $\mathbf{D_2}$.[59]

2009 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *Béziau's Logics Obtained by Means of Quasi-Regular Logics*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski generalized their work from 2005 and 2008 to present more paraconsistent logics using quasi-regular modal logics.[60]

2011 Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak, *A Method of Generating Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic D_2*. In this paper, Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak provided a method of obtaining various modal logics that can be used to define the discussive logic $\mathbf{D_2}$ via the translation tr(x).[61]

2012 Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak, *On the Weakest Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's Logic D_2 and the D_2-Consequence*. In this work, Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak indicated the weakest modal logic that can be used to define the discussive logic $\mathbf{D_2}$.[62] They specified that the discussive logic $\mathbf{D_2}$ can be presented either as a set of discussive formulas or as a consequence relation, and they provided the weakest modal logic for any of the two presentations of the discussive logic.

2013 Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak, *On Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's D_2-Consequence*. In this work, Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak studied normal and regular modal logics that can be used to define the discussive logic $\mathbf{D_2}$-consequence.[63]

2014 Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak, *Axiomatization of Minimal Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's-Like Discussive Logics*. In this work, Nasieniewski

[59] M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *The Weakest Regular Modal Logic Defining Jaśkowski's Logic D_2*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2008, Vol. 37, pp. 197–210.

[60] K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *Béziau's Logics Obtained by Means of Quasi-Regular Logics*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2009, Vol. 38, pp. 189–203.

[61] M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *A Method of Generating Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic D_2*, "Studia Logica" 2011, Vol. 97, pp. 161–182.

[62] M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *On the Weakest Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's Logic D_2 and the D_2-Consequence*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2012, Vol. 41, pp. 215–232.

[63] M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *On Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's D_2-Consequence*, in: *Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications*, eds. K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. Mares, F. Paoli, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, pp. 141–160.

and Pietruszczak presented axiomatizations of the minimal modal logic that can be used to define some variants of discussive logics.[64]

2017 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *Logics with Impossibility as the Negation and Regular Extensions of the Deontic Logic D_2*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski built upon Béziau's work from 2005 and considered negation to be defined as impossibility, instead of unnecessity. This helped obtain expressibility of analogous logics to logic **Z** using regular logics being extension of the smallest regular deontic logic.[65]

2018 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *A Characterization of Some Z-Like Logics*. The logic **Z** was characterized similarly as the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ by using the modal logic **S5**.[66] By considering other modal systems than **S5** one can define different **Z**-like logics. In Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski's work, different **Z**-like logics are studied by considering other modal logics. The authors took two negations to be understood as unnecessity and as impossibility, respectively.

2019 Mruczek-Nasieniewska, Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak, *A Modal Extension of Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic D_2*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska, Nasieniewski and Pietruszczak considered a version of discussive logic where participants can express the modal status of their assertions.[67] In the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$, an assertion preceded by the symbol ◊ can only express that a given statement is possible from the point of view of an observer of the discussion. The idea is thus to allow participants of the discussion to use ◊*A* to express statements of the kind "it is possible that *A*."

2019 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *A Kotas-Style Characterization of Minimal Discussive Logic*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska

[64] M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *Axiomatization of Minimal Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski's-Like Discussive Logics*, in: *Trends in Logic XIII: Gentzen's and Jaśkowski's Heritage. 80 Years of Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculi*, eds. A. Indrzejczak, J. Kaczmarek, M. Zawidzki, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódz 2014, pp. 149–163.

[65] K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *Logics with Impossibility as the Negation and Regular Extensions of the Deontic Logic D_2*, "Bulletin of the Section of Logic" 2017, Vol. 46, pp. 261–280.

[66] K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *A Characterization of Some Z-Like Logics*, "Logica Universalis" 2018, Vol. 12, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-018-0184-9.

[67] K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, A. Pietruszczak, *A Modal Extension of Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic D_2*, op. cit., pp. 451–477.

and Nasieniewski considered syntactical characterization of a minimal variant of the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$.[68] Instead of considering that each participant has access to the assertions of all other participants of the discussion, they explored the idea that a participant must have access to the assertions of at least one participant in the discussion.

2020 Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski, *On Correspondence of Standard Modalities and Negative Ones on the Basis of Regular and Quasi-Regular Logics*. In this work, Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski investigated different **Z**-like logics considering negation to be defined as unnecessity.[69]

Finally, it is worth mentioning that recently, in 2018, Hitoshi Omori and Jesse Alama showed that Ciuciura's axiomatization from 2006 and 2008 of the discussive logic and its variant required some corrections, and presented the final axiomatization for it.[70] Omori is also trying to find connections between different paraconsistent logics, particularly the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ and Florencio González-Asenjo's/Graham Priest's logic **LP**.[71] Edelcio G. de Souza, Alexandre Costa-Leite and Diogo H.B. Dias, in turn, in a new approach to paraconsistency called "paraconsistentization" – aimed at studying how a given logic can be transformed into a paraconsistent logic – observed that the discussive logic $\mathbf{D}_2$ can be considered a paraconsistent logic that results from adding discussive operators.

5. The Discussive Tradition

In this section, I offer some reflections on the tradition started by Jaśkowski and his collaborators, and continued by many scholars.

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[68] K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *A Kotas-Style Characterization of Minimal Discussive Logic*, "Axioms" 2019, Vol. 8, No. 4, https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms8040108.

[69] K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski, *On Correspondence of Standard Modalities and Negative Ones on the Basis of Regular and Quasi-Regular Logics*, "Studia Logica" 2020, Vol. 108, pp. 1087–1123.

[70] H. Omori, J. Alama, *Axiomatizing Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic* $\boldsymbol{D_2}$, "Studia Logica" 2018, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp. 1163–1180.

[71] See H. Omori, *Observations on Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic*, in: *Proceedings of XI Conference "Smirnov Readings in Logic"*, ROIFN, Moscow 2019, pp. 77–79.

As can be seen from the history of discussive logic, the unity and identity of the Polish approach to paraconsistency is to a great extent determined by the previous tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School and international collaboration. The creation of discussive logic constituted an effort to express a contradiction in a way that does not trivialize a system. Given a consistent system (that is, classically, a non-trivial system), a given contradiction would not overfill it with any sentence, since some contradictions are being translated into consistent expressions of this consistent system. Moreover, Jaśkowski's interest in inconsistency was linked to Łukasiewicz's investigation on the principle of contradiction. By a critical survey on defences of the principle of non-contradiction, Łukasiewicz arrived at the conclusion that that principle had not been well motivated from a philosophical point of view. As a mathematician, Jaśkowski knew how to take advantage of modal logic to represent a possibility where a contradiction could be consistently true.

Furthermore, the discussive tradition was expanded by a common interest by da Costa and his collaborators. Had it not been for the joint work of da Costa and Jaśkowski's students, Jerzy Kotas and Lech Dubikajtis, the tradition probably would not have the fame that it enjoys today.

By sketching the development of discussive logic, I tried to present a model for the Polish approach to paraconsistency initiated by Jaśkowski in the late 1940s. This was continued by Kotas and Dubikajtis from the 1960s to the 1980s – with input from da Costa, Achtelik, Dudek, Konior, Furmanowski, Dziobiak, Błaszczuk, Urchs, Doria, and Pieczkowski – and reinstated by Perzanowski in the 1990s. Since then, the contributions on discussive logic have been led by Pietruszczak, Nasieniewski, and Mruczek-Nasieniewska in Toruń.

The investigation on discussive logic also brought new investigations on philosophical logic. As I have tried to remark in the text, the international collaboration of Polish and Brazilian logicians, and the subsequent effort to join different systems of logic, including paraconsistent ones, led to expansions of discussive logic to set theory, new systems that take into account the representation of causal relations, and the idea that several connectives can be taken to be modal.

If there is a moral to be drawn from this historical tradition, one can consider the following: it is a *sine qua* condition for the development of the humanities and science to work on the ideas of a given school's master, and to try to participate actively in international collaborations by taking interest in the current research

of our colleagues. By following this formulation, one can secure the future development of any intellectual tradition, and the survival of long-term schools of thought.

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The Polish School of Praxiology: Historical Background, Essential Features, the Founder and Main Representatives

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Abstract: The text is dedicated to the Polish School of Praxiology, founded primarily by Tadeusz Kotarbiński. The aim of the article is to present an outline of the history of the School, to review the scientific contribution of its main representatives, and to indicate its essential features. The School connects praxiology *sensu scricto* (theory of action), ethics, together with felicitolology, within the framework of practical philosophy. Kotarbiński's concept of praxiology can be described as "small philosophy" in contradistinction to many 19th-century all-encompassing syntheses, which were often substitutes of worldviews; in the interpretation of Wojciech W. Gasparski this concept is also called "philosophy of practicality." In the article, the Polish School of Praxiology is compared in some aspects with the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Austrian School of Economics (more precisely, with the philosophical foundations of the latter school).

Key words: Polish School of Praxiology, praxiology, praxeology, *philosophia practica*, philosophy of practicality, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Ludwig von Mises, Jan Zieleniewski, theory of organization

1. Introductory Remarks

Leopolis,[1] the city belonging to Poland for many centuries – and at present, since the end the World War II, belonging to Ukraine – is a place with which the found-

* In the last year of his life, Professor Wojciech W. Gasparski did me the honour of inviting me to become the co-author of this paper on the Polish School of Praxiology. The article shows an outline of its history and its crucial features in a comparative perspective, but without aiming for a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of Polish praxiology. The Professor specifically requested we do not list his name first, albeit his contribution in this field of research is undeniably greater. The final version of the text was prepared for publication when prof. Gasparski was no longer with us. My sincere thanks are due to prof. Anna Lewicka-Strzałecka and prof. Alojzy Czech for reviewing the latest versions of the article and for their comments (Marcin W. Bukała's note).

[1] Lwów in Polish, and Львів in Ucrainian, Lvov in English.

ers of the two main schools of praxiological thinking were connected. Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981) obtained his doctorate there in 1912, and Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) was born in this city in 1881.[2] Universitas Leopoliensis was also the cradle of one of the main schools of analytic philosophy, the Lvov-Warsaw School, to which Kotarbiński belonged in the early phases of his scientific path.[3]

The Polish School of Praxiology – a branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School – was founded by Kotarbiński in the middle of the 20th century. Independently, in accordance with the theses of von Mises, "praxeology" became the philosophical foundation of the Austrian School of Economics.

The aim of the article is to present a brief outline of the historical background of modern praxiology and the development of the Polish school. The text is also about the founder of the school:[4] the paper's goal is to discuss those of Kotarbiński's concepts that form the basis for further praxiological thought (however, the concept of reism, although in a way related to praxiology, does not necessarily belong to its premises,[5] and is not discussed here[6]). Therefore, the

[2] The figures of T. Kotarbiński and L. von Mises – the founders of two schools, called "praxiological" and "praxeological" – are juxtaposed in the work of W.W. Gasparski, *Between Logic and Ethics: The Origin of Praxiology*, "Axiomathes" 2006, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 385–394.

[3] See U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, *Introduction. The School: Its Genesis, Development and Significance*, in: *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, eds. Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Birkhäuser, Cham 2016, pp. 3–14; Cz. Porębski, *Lectures on Polish Value Theory*, Brill, Leiden–Boston, MA, 2019; cf. B. Smith, *Why Polish Philosophy Does Not Exist*, in: *The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation*, eds. J.J. Jadacki, J. Paśniczek, Brill, Poznań 2006, pp. 19–39; Kotarbiński continued the analytic focus of the Lvov-Warsaw School, as a disciple of its outstanding representative Kazimierz Twardowski; see A. Betti, *Kazimierz Twardowski*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2021 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/twardowski/; on K. Twardowski, see also F. Coniglione, *Nel segno della scienza: la filosofia polacca del Novecento*, Franco Angeli, Milano 1996 (Epistemologia, Vol. 52), p. 79f.

[4] In the praxiological and analytic perspective, the scientific contribution of T. Kotarbiński is presented in the encyclopedic entry written by W.W. Gasparski, *Kotarbiński, Tadeusz*, in: *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, Vol. 5, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 2004, pp. 902–907; see also W.W. Gasparski, *Agency in a Praxiological Approach*, in: *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, eds. Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Birkhäuser, Cham 2016, pp. 175–187; Cz. Porębski, *Lectures on Polish Value Theory*, op. cit., pp. 30–40 ("Lecture 3: Kotarbiński. Knowing and Doing").

[5] P.T. Makowski, *Jak myśleć o praktyczności* [How to Think about Practicality], "Prakseologia" 2022, Vol. 163–164, in press (on the book by W.W. Gasparski, *Filozofia praktyczności. Traktat o filozofii Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego oraz similaria*, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2021).

[6] For reism, see the entry by J. Woleński, *Reism*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2022 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/reism/ (substantive revision on 10.04.2020); the papers by B. Smith, B. Wolniewicz and others in the

article focuses on the following problems: who were the chronologically first representatives of modern praxiological thought (in the late 19th century)? Where to look for their earlier precursors? What was the concept of "small philosophy" proposed by Kotarbiński, and why can it be called "the philosophy of practicality"? Who were the most important representatives of the Polish School of Praxiology? What were the main features of this school, especially in comparison to the "praxeological" concept developed within the Austrian School of Economics?

2. Latin *Praxilogia* – French *Praxilogie* – Polish *Prakseologia*, and Austrian-American Praxeology

The historical roots of praxiological thinking can be associated with a reflection on the virtue of *phronesis* (Aristotelian φρόνησις, and scholastic *prudentia*).[7] As Danilo Facca notes, *praxilogia* appeared at the beginning of the 17th century in the texts of the German philosopher Clemens Timpler (1563–1624). However, the idea was forgotten for more than two centuries.[8]

Praxiological concepts were introduced into the contemporary scientific circulation in the late 19th century by Spaniard Melitón Martín Arranz (1820–1886) and French Louis Bourdeau (1824–1900) and Alfred Espinas (1844–1922).[9] In

following volume: J. Woleński, ed., *Kotarbiński: Logic, Semantics and Ontology*, Springer, Dordrecht 1990; F. Coniglione, *Nel segno della scienza…*, op. cit., p. 129f.

7 In the praxiological context, the role of virtue of *phronesis* is also underscored in recent research, e.g., in the works of Bent Flyvbjerg.

8 Cf. D. Facca, *On the Early Modern Origin of the Term "Praxiology": Historical Reconstruction and General Considerations*, "Prakseologia," Vol. 165, in press; see also J. Ostrowski, *An Outline of the Prehistory of Praxiology*, in: *Praxiological Studies: Polish Contributions to the Science of Efficient Action*, eds. W.W. Gasparski, T. Pszczołowski, Springer, Dordrecht 1983, pp. 31–45.

9 L. Bourdeau, *Theorie des sciences. Plan de science integrale*, Germer Bailliere et C., Paris 1882; cf. V. Alexandre, ed., *The Roots of Praxiology: French Action Theory from Bourdeau and Espinas to Present Days*, in cooperation with W.W. Gasparski, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2002. The book is Volume 7 of the series "Praxiology: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology" (later quoted briefly as: Praxiology). The series consists of twenty-five volumes edited or coedited by W.W. Gasparski. The essential issues of praxiological thought were discussed especially in the following volumes: 1 (praxiologies and philosophy of economics), 7 (historical French origins), 10 (pragmatism, including *The ABC of Practicality* – the translation of Kotarbiński's text), 12 (praxiological contributions of French and other nations), 22 (designology, particularly developed by W.W. Gasparski), 23 (Kotarbiński's role and legacy), 25 (praxiology in the different outlooks); see Bibliography. In the 20th century the knowledge of concept of praxi-

the 20th century, praxiological thought became the basis for the two mentioned schools, due to the crucial contributions of Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Ludwig von Mises. Thus, albeit in the late 19th century praxiology came to being in Spain and developed in France, in the 20th century it became the conceptual foundation of two scientific schools in other countries: the Polish School of Praxiology and the Austrian (actually Austrian-American) School of Economics. The English term **praxiology** is used in the Polish School whereas **praxeology** – in the Austrian one.

Praxiology is first of all an "action theory" which is focused on **effectiveness** and **efficiency**. In recent studies by Piotr T. Makowski, Kotarbiński's praxiological ideas are discussed as a philosophical action theory.[10] Various approaches to the general study of human action have been developed: the ergologic and managerial (Melitón Martín, Jan Zieleniewski,[11] Roland Caude[12]), the functional (Louis Bourdeau), the technological (Alfred Espinas), the psychological (Charles A. Mercier), the methodological (Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Georges Hostelet), the economic (Ludwig von Mises), the ethical (Mario Bunge), the epistemological (Donald A. Schön) and the decisional (Eugeniusz Słucki,[13] Arnold Kaufmann[14]) and

ology was disseminated thanks to Alfred Espinas and his article *Les origines de la technologies*, "Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger" 1890, Vol. 30, pp. 295–314. In the quoted book *The Roots of Praxiology: French Action Theory*, the *Theorie des sciences* is partly translated into English (L. Bourdeau, *Praxiology as the Science of Functions*, pp. 21–43); and the excerpts of *Les origines de la technologies* too (A. Espinas, *The Origins of Technology*, pp. 45–91); see Bibliography. Ludwig von Mises indicated Espinas as the first predecessor of his praxiological way of thinking, and he omitted the contribution of Melitón Martín and Bourdeau. For this reason, Espinas is mistakenly indicated in many works as the chronologically first representative of praxiological thought; cf. J. Zieleniewski, *Remarks of a Polish Praxiologist on the Subject of a Paper by C. Gutiérrez*, "Theory and Decision" 1971, Vol. 1, pp. 359–368, see pp. 362–363.

[10] Cf. P.T. Makowski, M. Bonecki, K. Nowak-Posadzy, eds., *Praxiology and the Reasons for Action*, Routledge, New York 2015 (Praxiology, Vol. 23); P.T. Makowski, *Tadeusz Kotarbiński's Action Theory: Reinterpretive Studies*, Springer, Cham 2017.

[11] J. Zieleniewski, *The Theory of Organization and Management*, in: *Praxiological Studies: Polish Contributions to the Science of Efficient Action*, eds. W.W. Gasparski, T. Pszczołowski, Springer, Dordrecht 1983, pp. 347–360.

[12] R. Caude, *Scientific Organisation of Work and Management*, in: *The Roots of Praxiology: French Action Theory from Bourdeau and Espinas to Present Days*, ed. V. Alexandre, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2000 (Praxiology, Vol. 7), pp. 163–182.

[13] E. Słucki (Евгений Слуцкий) was a scholar of Polish origin, active in Russia and later in the Soviet Union; on his contribution, see F. Coniglione, *Nel segno della scienza*, op. cit., p. 142.

[14] A. Kaufmann, *The Science of Decision-Making*, in: *The Roots of Praxiology: French Action Theory from Bourdeau and Espinas to Present Days*, ed. V. Alexandre, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2000, pp. 183–198.

of the systems (Wojciech W. Gasparski). Nevertheless, only Kotarbiński and von Mises were founders of the schools. The other mentioned authors of the 19th century and the first seven decades of the 20th century – such as Martín, Bourdeau, Espinas, Mercier and Hostelet – did not create them. As Zieleniewski observed:[15]

> It seems amazing that in spite of the evident social usefulness of a general theory of efficient action, in spite of the thought-provoking contents of the majority of publications mentioned here, almost none of the authors found continuators of their ideas, almost none created a "school"; for the continuity of thought usually ended very soon.

The proposal of the Polish school is distinguished by the fact that in addition to effectiveness and efficiency of action, also **ethicality** (the third **E**) is required in the praxiological terms.[16] Moreover, in Kotarbiński's approach praxiology received the status of a general methodology of sciences.

Von Mises's approach is quite different, as it assumes the complete axiological neutrality of praxiological rules and their grounding in the structure of the human mind.[17] The crucial features of von Mises's theory of practical action were discussed and juxtaposed with the Polish School of Praxiology by W.W. Gasparski in Volume 17 of the series "Praxiology," dedicated to entrepreneurship.[18] In Volume 162 of the journal "Prakseologia" (founded by Kotarbiński and Zieleniewski), von Mises's view was also compared to the philosophy of business en-

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[15] J. Zieleniewski, *Remarks of a Polish Praxiologist*, op. cit., pp. 360–361.

[16] This point was not formulated explicitly by Kotarbiński. Nevertheless W.W. Gasparski demonstrated the correctness of this interpretation in many works, including: W.W. Gasparski, *Between Logic and Ethics*, op. cit.

[17] On the *a priori* categories of the Austrian school, cf. L. von Mises, *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*, Ludwig von Mises Institute Auburn, Auburn, AL, 1998, pp. 38–41 (Chapter II, subchapter 3: "The A Priori and Reality") and pp. 199–200 (Chapter X, subchapter 3: "Calculative Action"); see also p. 199: "All the praxeological categories are eternal and unchangeable as they are uniquely determined by the logical structure of the human mind and by the natural conditions of man's existence. Both in acting and in theorizing about acting, man can neither free himself from these categories nor go beyond them. A kind of acting categorially different from that determined by these categories is neither possible nor conceivable for man."

[18] W.W. Gasparski, *Entrepreneurship from the Praxiology Point of View*, in: *Entrepreneurship: Values and Responsibility*, eds. W.W. Gasparski, L.V. Ryan, S. Kwiatkowski, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2010 (Praxiology, Vol. 17), pp. 23–36; on Ludwig von Mises, see also W.W. Gasparski, ed., *Praxiologies and the Philosophy of Economics*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1992 (Praxiology, Vol. 1).

terprise of Józef Innocenty M. Bocheński, whose ideas are close to praxiological concepts.[19]

3. Kotarbiński's "Small Philosophy" or Philosophy of Practicality[20]

On 25 April 1918, in a lecture hall of the University of Warsaw, a thirty-two-year-old philosopher gave the famous lecture "On Philosophy Great and Small." Tadeusz Kotarbiński – for he was the author of the lecture in question – did not present any impressive prospects for his audience. As the students wrote about the lecture,[21] the young professor rather outlined a minimalist programme.

His recommendation was to abandon the construction of great syntheses and to practice "small philosophy": the kind of philosophy that will serve as a plan for **reforming intellectual work**.[22] The students looked at one another; the glances of those who had been drawn to philosophy by the need for a broad view of the world, the need for a great system, reflected their disappointment… How can you feel fascinated with the prospect of a bee's or ant's work when your imagination shows you an eagle's wings stretched out in flight? Those among the audience who remembered Icarus' downfall began – maybe not immediately, but certainly

[19] J.I.M. Bocheński, *Towards the Philosophy of the Industrial Enterprise*, transl. M.W. Bukała, "Prakseologia" 2020, Vol. 162, pp. 19–41; J. Gniadek, *The Philosophy of Industrial Enterprise from a Praxeological and Personalistic Perspective*, "Prakseologia" 2020, Vol. 162, pp. 83–101; cf. W.W. Gasparski, *Entrepreneurship from the Praxiology Point of View*, op. cit., pp. 24–25. On Bocheński's model, see also in the quoted Vol. 162 of "Prakseologia": T. Airaksinen, *The Development of Immanent Ends in Professor Bocheński's "Towards the Philosophy of the Industrial Enterprise"*, pp. 61–81; W.W. Gasparski, *The Philosophy of the Business Enterprise by Józef Maria Bocheński*, pp. 43–59; M.W. Bukała, *The Main Topic of the Issue: Józef Maria Bocheński on the Business Enterprise*, pp. 14–18; M.W. Bukała, *Business Enterprise in the Logic and Ontological Analysis of Józef I. M. Bocheński*, pp. 103–114.

[20] The content of this section relates largely to the remarks on "small philosophy" presented in a previously published text: W.W. Gasparski, *Tadeusz Kotarbiński and His Philosophical Transitions*, in: *Transition Redesigned: A Practical Philosophy Perspective*, eds. W.W. Gasparski, B. Rok, Routledge, New York 2013 (Praxiology, Vol. 20), pp. 3–13.

[21] In the first series of *Fragmenty filozoficzne* [Philosophical Fragments], *Seria pierwsza: ku uczczeniu piętnastolecia pracy nauczycielskiej prof. T. Kotarbińskiego w Uniwersytecie Warszawskim* [Series One: Celebrating Fifteen years of Prof. Tadeusz Kotarbiński's Work as a Teacher at the University of Warsaw], Warszawa 1934 (published by students).

[22] Ibid.

with time – to realize something that Francis Bacon had written several centuries before: "Nec manus nuda, nec intellectus sibi permissus multum valet; Instrumentis & auxilliis res perficitur; quibus opus est, non minus ad intellectum, quam ad manum"[23] (Kotarbiński was the subsequent translator of *Novum organum*, the Baconist *par excellence*[24]).

And thus, the practising of "small" (or "minor") philosophy started (as the students reminisced!): the hard labour of tackling conceptual subtleties, long hours of pondering the meanings of the terms they used, hours of tedious effort aimed at formulating their thoughts precisely and extracting important issues from among verbal misunderstandings. As the participants of this project added: one could feel the burden of this unspectacular analytical work. Even so, they admit – just like those who hammer the last piton into the rock wall and climb the last overhang to relish the view stretching from the conquered peak – that Professor Kotarbiński created an atmosphere of perhaps the greatest philosophical intensity, an atmosphere in which (despite the methodological emphasis on "small philosophy"), one feels the ozone of "great philosophy"!

Kotarbiński, referring to his praxiological works, asked his followers to read them all, and he underlined that they constituted a coherent system. Writing about this system, Kotarbiński addressed the readers: "Read my works better," – and he meant more carefully, more deeply, with greater understanding – "read them all." "This is a whole, not a conglomeration! It is a system […]," "Call it preposterous, unnatural, badly built, what have you"; "[…] I can add more than one rude word myself"; "Just don't call me an eclectic, I beg of you."[25]

Thus, Kotarbiński's works should be considered as a philosophical system, which is the foundation of the Polish School of Praxiology.

This system focuses first of all on the universe of actions of a subject actively changing the reality, where a subject is defined as a conscious human, aware of

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[23] Francisci Baconis de Verulamio *Novum Organum Scientiarum*, Pars II. *Novum Organum sive Iudicia de Interpretatione Naturae*, Summa Digesta in Aphorismos, Aphorismus 2 (ed. Typis Gasparis Girardi, Venetiis 1762, p. 26).

[24] While naming Kotarbiński "The Baconist par excellence," W.W. Gasparski must have been based on a deeper knowledge of his Master's approach; cf. T. Kotarbiński, *The Development of the Main Problem in the Methodology of Francis Bacon*, offprint from: "Commentariorum Societatis philosophicae Polonorum – Studia philosophica" 1935.

[25] T. Kotarbiński, *Odpowiedź* [The Answer], in: *Dzieła wszystkie* [Opera omnia], Vol. 2: *Ontologia, teoria poznania i metodologia nauk* [Ontology, Theory of Cognition and Methodology of Sciences], Wrocław 1993, pp. 170–182 (citation transl. by Wojciech W. Gasparski).

their surroundings.[26] This universe is the world of practical human activity, the world of acting humans. Therefore, Kotarbiński's system is in fact a **philosophy of practicality**.[27] It was presented as such especially in his main work, *Traktat o dobrej robocie* (titled *Praxiology* in the English translation).[28] Practicality is not understood here in the everyday sense, that is, resourcefulness. It is a philosophy of practicality, when "practicality" means efficacy in a broader sense, that is, the basic technical value of human actions. Kotarbiński was interested in the issues of practicality from the very start of his philosophical path; in fact, they were his direct and primary interest also in the course of exploring other areas of philosophy. These issues affected: his concern over the teaching of philosophy as the foundation of teacher training;[29] his concern over the importance of logic; his concern over words properly describing reality; his concern over avoiding practical mistakes – hence his effort in the field of errors' typology.[30]

All these concerns resulted in a kind of *organon* of practicality, that is, a set of cognitively well-founded instruments essential to any acting man, that is, doing something intentionally to achieve a chosen goal, whether the actions involve research practice (sciences and their methodology) and/or they involve functional practice (technologies and their methodological foundations).

According to Kotarbiński *philosophia practica* is understood as life wisdom. The main founder of the Polish Praxiological School underscored its essential importance: life wisdom is worth working for with no less commitment than physical safety, food and wages.[31] Such an idea implied the rejection of both Marxist

[26] Ibid., pp. 175–176.

[27] Cf. W.W. Gasparski, *A Philosophy of Practicality: A Treatise on the Philosophy of Tadeusz Kotarbiński*, Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki 1993 (partly republished as *On the Concept of Practicality* and *On the Methodology of Practical Disciplines (Sciences)*; see Bibliography).

[28] T. Kotarbiński, *Traktat o dobrej robocie*, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1955; published in English as: *Praxiology: An Introduction to the Science of Efficient Action*, transl. O. Wojtasiewicz, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1965.

[29] T. Kotarbiński, *Odrębność i rodzaj użyteczności nauk humanistycznych* [The Distinctiveness and the Particularity of Usefulness of the Humanities], in: *Dzieła wszyskie* [Opera omnia], Vol. 2: *Ontologia, teoria poznania i metodologia ogólna*, op. cit., p. 90; see A. Lewicka-Strzałecka, *Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego wzorzec wychowania i cnót nauczycielskich* [Tadeusz Kotarbiński's Model of Education and Teaching Virtues], in: *Myśl Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego i jej współczesna recepcja* [The Thought of Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Its Contemporary Reception], eds. B. Banajski, W.W. Gasparski, A. Lewicka-Strzałecka, Polska Akademia Nauk, Towarzystwo Naukowe Prakseologii, Warszawa 2006, pp. 85–91.

[30] T. Kotarbinski, *Practical Error*, "Danish Yearbook of Philosophy" 1964, Vol. 1, pp. 65–71.

[31] T. Kotarbiński, *Myśli o ludziach i ludzkich sprawach* [Thoughts on Humans and Human Problems], Ossolineum, Wrocław 1986, p. 23.

economicism[32] and or ethical skepticism. In the described system, *philosophia practica* is divided into:

- felicitology (hedonistics, eudaimonology), or the study of a happy life,
- praxiology (general methodology, general theory of action), or the study of the practicality of actions,
- ethics *sensu stricto* (ethics proper, moral deontology), or the study of "how one should live to deserve to be called a decent person."

4. Representatives of the Schools

The Polish School of Praxiology came to being first of all thanks to Tadeusz Kotarbiński. In his praxiological concepts, he was followed by his younger collaborators – Jan Zieleniewski (1901–1973), Marian Mazur (1909–1983) and Tadeusz Pszczołowski (1922–1999) – and later by his disciples mentioned below. Zieleniewski made a very significant contribution to praxiological research, especially in the ergologic and managerial aspects. His scientific path was initially independent from Kotarbiński.[33] In the application of praxiology in the field of management and work organization, two figures – of fundamental importance for the school – complemented each other: the great philosopher and theorist Kotarbiński,[34] and Zieleniewski. The latter initially – before World War II – com-

[32] Karol Wojtyła noted the fact of Kotarbiński's criticism of Marxism: "Certain eminent thinkers who maintained a critical attitude towards dialectical materialism were also regarded with suspicion. Of these I particularly remember Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Maria Ossowska and Tadeusz Czeżowski" (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity: Personal Reflections*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 2005, p. 10). On "economicism," see J.I.M. Bocheński, *Sto zabobonów. Krótki filozoficzny słownik zabobonów* [One Hundred Superstitions: A Brief Philosophical Dictionary of Superstitions], Philed, Kraków 1994, entry "Ekonomizm"; cf. A. Brożek, *Logical Analysis against Superstitions: Józef M. Bocheński on the Social Role of Philosophy*, "Edukacja Filozoficzna" 2020, Vol. 70, pp. 39–57. The term **economicism** is used here in a broad philosophical sense (described by Bocheński). It must not be confused with its narrower meaning describing a type of political strategy of workers' movements, used in the Soviet thought (especially by Vladimir Lenin in his criticism of trade unions).

[33] Zieleniewski wrote his PhD on the philosophy of fiction in Hans Vaihinger and David Hume, under the supervision of Cracovian historian of philosophy Witold Rubczyński (who was first of all an outstanding medievalist and the scientific editor of the works of Matthew of Cracow).

[34] In this point, Kotarbiński reffered also to the achievements of the most oustanding Polish theorist and practician of management – Karol Adamiecki; cf. T. Kotarbiński, *Główne myśli Karola*

bined scientific research with management practice, and, moreover, he came from a well-known family of entrepreneurs.[35]

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the scientific and organization development of Polish praxiology was coordinated mostly by Pszczołowski, and for more than two last decades by Wojciech W. Gasparski (1936–2022), one of Kotarbiński's students.

Apart from the mentioned researchers, the following ones had or have an especially significant role in the development of the school: Jarosław Rudniański (1921–2008), Maria Nowakowska (†1989), Witold Kieżun (1922–2021), Henryk Stonert (1923–1992); and (still active): Anna Lewicka-Strzałecka (born 1949), Piotr T. Makowski (born 1982).

The Polish School of Praxiology has also attracted some foreign researchers. In particular, Finnish philosopher Timo Airaksinen (born 1947),[36] and other scholars, like Victor Alexandre (born 1939) from France.[37]

In the framework of the school, works and concepts representing various aspects of praxiological reflection have been developed. Their list would mainly include:[38]

- fundamental terms of praxiology and the formal (or quasi-formal[39]) status of this discipline (T. Pszczołowski, H. Stonert, Edward Leniewicz, Mirosław Sułek),
- formal theory of action (M. Nowakowska, P.T. Makowski),
- praxiosemiontics (Tadeusz Wójcik),
- issues of motivation, theory of work (J. Zieleniewski, Xymena Gliszczyńska, T. Pszczołowski),
- theory of creativity (Andrzej Strzałecki),
- praxiology and theory of decision (Tadeusz Tyszka),

Adamieckiego (18 III 1866 – 16 V 1933) [The Main Thoughts of Karol Adamiecki], "Prakseologia" 1971, Vol. 39–40, pp. 7–15.

35 A. Czech, *Jan Zieleniewski (1901–1973) – Cracow Period, Early Works*, in: *Reflections about Contemporary Management*, eds. B. Kożuch, Ł. Sułkowski, Peter Lang, Berlin 2017, passim; see also other texts in the volume dedicated to his contribution: "Prakseologia" 1971, Vol. 39–40 and the paper: J. Zieleniewski, *The Theory of Organization and Management*, op. cit.

36 T. Airaksinen, ed., *Praxiology and the Philosophy of Technology*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2007 (Praxiology, Vol. 15).

37 See V. Alexandre, ed., *The Roots of Praxiology*, op. cit.

38 For selected works of the mentioned scholars, see Bibliography.

39 The concept of praxiology as a quasi-formal discipline was developed by Henryk Stonert.

- praxiology of discussion (T. Pszczołowski),
- linking praxiology with technology and cybernetics (M. Mazur, T. Airaksinen),
- praxiological theory of management (J. Zieleniewski, W. Kieżun, P.T. Makowski, Mateusz Lewandowski),
- praxiology of fighting and negative cooperation concepts (J. Rudniański)
- praxiology of religion (J. Rudniański),
- praxiological concepts of creation and studying (J. Rudniański),
- applying praxiology in the theory of law (Adam Podgórecki),
- theory of social engineering (A. Podgórecki),
- praxiology and the methodology of designing (Danuta Miller, W.W. Gasparski, A. Strzałecki),
- praxometries (W.W. Gasparski),
- praxiological system theory (W.W. Gasparski, A. Lewicka-Strzałecka),
- applying praxiology in business ethics (D. Miller, W.W. Gasparski, A. Lewicka-Strzałecka).

The school brings together scholars with different worldviews, including both Christians and atheists. Kotarbiński himself presented an atheistic worldview (at least in the period of his scholarly activity), although he admitted that he drew inspiration from evangelical values and a chivalrous ethos. Many of his students identified themselves with Christianity, for example Rudniański, Stonert, Podgórecki, Kieżun and Gasparski.[40]

5. Essential Features of the School

The **philosophy of practicality** shaped the essential features of the Polish School of Praxiology. They can be described in the following points:

1. Praxiological concepts clearly diverge from the traditional Aristotelian idea of *philosophia practica* (considered as moral philosophy). Nevertheless, the concept of practical action – as it is viewed in the Polish School – takes also into account the ethicality of action as one of its essential features

[40] Moreover, the organizational concepts of Karol Adamiecki, which for Kotarbiński were an important point of reference in the thought concerning organizational practice (see above, in n. 34), were inspired by Catholic solidarism.

required in praxiological terms (apart from effectiveness and efficiency). In this aspect, the concepts of the school differ from von Mises's approach, in which "praxeology" is axiologically neutral, and the ethicality of action depends on the choice of goals (in the Austrian perspective, such choice is considered as extrinsic to the praxiological problem).

2. The Polish School of Praxiology does not assume the existence of praxiological categories inscribed in the structure of the human mind.[41] As Jan Zieleniewski notes, in this aspect the Polish praxiologists are close to other representatives of this discipline, such as Alfred Espinas, Eugeniusz Słucki[42] or Georges Hostelet. A decisively different position was presented by von Mises. However, in Murray Rothbard's concept (who was a continuator of von Mises's thought), the emphasis on the *a priori* character of "praxeological categories" was partially limited.[43]
3. Due to its historical origin, the Polish School of Praxiology is linked to the Lvov-Warsaw School, and, in consequence, one of the goals of praxiology is to create the analytic philosophy of action.[44] It is also worth noting that praxiological thought (in its Polish or Austrian version) was developed in countries where analytic philosophy flourished (that is, in the USA and Poland). At the same time, praxiology is essentially distant from "continental philosophy" (whose particularly characteristic representatives were, among others, Martin Heidegger or Jacques Derrida).[45]
4. The Polish school brings together scholars with different worldviews – another common point with the Lvov-Warsaw School.
5. The conceptual foundation of the Polish School of Praxiology is the **philosophical system** created by T. Kotarbiński (which could be called "philosophy of practicality"!). This focus on creating a system differentiates the Polish School of Praxiology from the Lvov-Warsaw School.
6. Praxiology is considered by Kotarbiński as the general methodology, because praxiology includes the theory of intellectual actions through which

[41] See above, in n. 17.
[42] See above, n. 13.
[43] J. Zieleniewski, *Remarks of a Polish Praxiologist*, op. cit., pp. 364–365.
[44] This aspect is underscored in the recent studies by P.T. Makowski.
[45] Cf. the remarks on the Polish analytic philosophy in the article by B. Smith, *Why Polish Philosophy Does Not Exist*, op. cit.

other scientific disciplines/arts[46] are developed.[47] Analogically, in von Mises's view "praxeology" is the philosophical foundation of economics.

7. The term "small philosophy" indicates that, within the framework of the Polish **philosophy of practicality**, praxiological concepts can give humans essential support (tools) in their action. This term also indicates the auxiliary role of practical tools: in no way does "small philosophy" propose the idea of the primacy of practice over ethics or over the pursuit of truth.[48]
8. Ontological **reism** does not belong to the essential element of the Polish School of Praxiology, though it was proposed and presented by Kotarbiński himself (in his later works in a more moderate version of **concretism**). At present, this concept of Kotarbiński is mainly developed outside the praxiological school, mostly by the philosophers linked to the School of Brentano.[49]
9. The Polish praxiological concepts are applied to different detailed disciplines and different areas of human activity (see above in the list of school representatives), but **theory of organization** and **business ethics** have a special significance here. The first path was initiated by Polish praxiologists already in the 1960s, especially by Jan Zieleniewski.[50] Later, after the collapse of so-called real socialism, applying praxiology in the area of business ethics became a crucial accomplishment of the Polish School of Praxiology. In the praxiological perspective, business ethics acquires its proper philosophical dimension and is not reduced to the position of an auxiliary discipline of management theory.[51]

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[46] The term "scientific" is understood broadly (not limited to the French term *la science*), whereas Kotarbiński's understanding of the term "arts" is close to the word "skills" (in the Polish original: *umiejętności*, which could be associated with the word *umiejętnia*, proposed in the 19th century by Bronisław Trentowski to replace the word "university").

[47] The concept of praxiology as the general methodology can be compared to the concept of L. Bourdeau, who considered praxiology as the "Science of Functions" (cf. L. Bourdeau, *Praxiology as the Science of Functions*, op. cit.)

[48] For this reason, the interpretations ascribing to Kotarbiński a special kind of absolutization of the value of action in a neo-Marxist perspective (such as the interpretation of Brazilian theologian Hugo Assman) definitely seem wrong.

[49] See above, in n. 6; cf. F. Coniglione, *Nel segno della scienza*, op. cit., p. 129f (subchapter 2.2.5: *Reismo e prasseologia in Tadeusz Kotarbiński*).

[50] Moreover, praxiology is applied to economics as well; cf. T. Kotarbiński, *Praxiology and Economics*, offprint from: *On Political Economy and Econometrics: Essays in Honour of Oskar Lange*, Pergamon Press, Warszawa 1965, pp. 303–312.

[51] Cf. W.W. Gasparski et al., eds., *Entrepreneurship: Values and Responsibility*, op. cit. In this volume, in addition to the strictly praxiological perspective, the interconnection between entrepre-

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Scientific disciplines supporting practicality with theoretical tools are being developed in diverse directions. Tadeusz Kotarbiński did envisage some of them, but some others were not foreseen by him. The latter would never bother him but instead would make him happy, because (as he used to say): "Being outdistanced by one's own followers is the true reward for a brave master." The students were, are, and will be those for whom Kotarbiński fulfilled his mission as a teacher and **trustworthy guardian**.

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The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science: Profiting from Two Traditions

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Abstract: We set several aims for this paper: first, we wanted to attempt to show that from the perspective of historical and philosophical research, it is legitimate to accept the thesis for the existence of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science, which was rooted in the activities of Michał Heller and Józef Życiński. We also wanted to make a comparative analysis of the basic specific determinants of the Lvov-Warsaw School (as a model for a philosophical school) and their correspondence in the Kraków School. Further, we wished to show how the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science is actually an adaptation of Kazimierz Twardowski's model, of course taking into account the differences between them. Finally, we wanted to illustrate the nature of the philosophy in the Kraków School and discuss the current efforts to develop it further.

Key words: Kraków School of Philosophy in Science, Lvov-Warsaw School, philosophy of science, philosophy in science, Polish philosophy, Michał Heller, Józef Życiński, Kazimierz Twardowski

1. Introduction

The development of a philosophy with close ties to the sciences has a long local tradition in Kraków,[1] one that culminated in Michał (Michael) Heller's *philosophy in science*.[2] This term describes a specific approach to the philosophy of science, one that assumes an interdisciplinary perspective, where the sciences play

[1] P. Polak, *Tradycja krakowskiej filozofii w nauce: między XIX a XXI wiekiem*, in: *40 lat filozofii w uczelni papieskiej w Krakowie*, ed. J. Jagiełło, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UPJPII, Kraków 2018, pp. 491–514.

[2] M. Heller, *Jak możliwa jest "filozofia w nauce"?*, "Studia Philosophiae Christianae" 1986, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 7–19; English version: M. Heller, *How Is Philosophy in Science Possible?*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2019, Vol. 66, pp. 231–249; M. Heller et al., *Jak filozofuje się w OBI?*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 1999, Vol. 25, pp. 20–29.

a philosophically significant role, namely, by using philosophical assumptions to create explanations of reality and thereby contributing to the discussion around relevant philosophical problems.[3]

This philosophy had been practised in various forms for more than a century and a half in scientific-philosophical circles, but it was not until the late 1970s that a school of philosophy began to form on this basis. Its founder was Michał Heller, who together with Józef Życiński not only renewed this local tradition but also added a strong impetus for development. The peculiarities of these developed traditions have meant that it has not been referred to as a "philosophical school" yet,[4] but a historical examination of the development of philosophy in Kraków reveals that we should start talking about the past, present, and future of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science. Indeed, this sentiment manifests in the most recent studies of Kraków philosophy,[5] and so a need has arisen to analyze the phenomenon that we call the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science. This article therefore represents an initial attempt to characterize this school,[6] as well as to understand the specific nature of this phenomenon and explain why reflecting on this issue appears to be long overdue. We believe that explaining the peculiarities of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science will become possible through a comparison with another specific philosophical school, namely the Lvov-Warsaw School.

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[3] The term "philosophy of science" has a wide scope of meaning in English, so "philosophy in science" is a specific research programme within the philosophy of science. For more about "philosophy in science," see P. Polak, *Philosophy in Science: A Name with a Long Intellectual Tradition*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2019, Vol. 66, pp. 251–270.

[4] Michał Heller and Bartosz Brożek have referred once to the "Kraków school," but this term seems to be very imprecise, because it refers to "a group of philosophers, scientists, and theologians who belong to the milieu of the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies." B. Brożek, M. Heller, *Science and Religion in the Kraków School*, "Zygon" 2015, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 194.

[5] K. Trombik, *Koncepcje filozofii przyrody w Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie w latach 1978–1993: studium historyczno-filozoficzne*, Wydawnictwo "scriptum," Kraków 2021.

[6] In general, when analyzing the phenomenon of the Kraków school, we account for the factors identified by Zbysław Muszyński in *Siedem cech głównych szkoły naukowej*, "Filozofia Nauki" 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1–2 (9–10), pp. 64–65. He distinguished a set of seven factors for describing the phenomenon of the school (without giving a hierarchy for their relative importance): "(I) genealogy, (II) time, (III) place, (IV) self-consciousness, (V) ideological core, (VI) methodological core, and (VII) journals, styles and worldviews." Unless stated otherwise, all translations from Polish are our own.

2. Historical Background

Kraków is Poland's oldest centre of philosophy due to its university, which was established in 1364. However, the sources of the science-related tradition are much younger and can be attributed to the birth of the interdisciplinary circle called the Kraków Scientific Society (Towarzystwo Naukowe Krakowskie, est. 1815). Following some significant transformations, this society ultimately became the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (Polska Akademia Umiejętności), which exists to this day in Kraków.

The philosophical reflection carried out at the society's interdisciplinary meetings gradually developed throughout the 19th century.[7] Up until the outbreak of World War II, this tradition significantly shaped the Kraków milieu, and according to the opinions of historians of philosophy, a separate school of philosophy did not form in Kraków in that period.[8] Instead, there existed groups or circles of philosophizing naturalists.

The World War II period brought great loss to the entirety of Polish philosophy, and to make matters worse, Poland fell within the Soviet sphere of influence after the war and lost many aspects of its sovereignty.[9] This also took its toll on philosophy, which had to contend with the forcibly imposed Marxist ideologization of science. This affected all areas of non-Marxist thought, although the persecution of philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School is the best-known exam-

[7] The strong position of this local tradition can be associated with the enduring interdisciplinary scientific community, so even during the period of the widespread dominance of idealist philosophy, its influence in Kraków proved to be very short-lived. For more on this topic, see P. Polak, *Między koniecznością a utopią. Józefa Kremera koncepcja filozofii przyrody w kontekście szybko rozwijającej się nauki*, in: *Genus vitae. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Panu Profesorowi Marianowi Józefowi Wnukowi*, eds. S. Janeczek, Z. Wróblewski, A. Starościc, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2019, pp. 257–269.

[8] M. Heller, J. Mączka, *Krakowska filozofia przyrody w okresie międzywojennym*, in: *Krakowska filozofia przyrody w okresie międzywojennym*, Vol. 1, ed. M. Heller, J. Mączka, P. Polak, M. Szczerbińska-Polak, OBI-Biblos, Kraków–Tarnów 2007, pp. 5–40.

[9] P. Madajczyk, *The Policy of the USSR and the III Reich towards the Polish Elites during the Second World War*, "Studia nad Totalitaryzmami i Wiekiem XX – Totalitarian and 20th Century Studies" 2017, Vol. 1, pp. 202–217; D. Schenk, *The Genocidal Extermination of the Polish Intelligentsia*, "Studia nad Totalitaryzmami i Wiekiem XX – Totalitarian and 20th Century Studies" 2017, Vol. 1, pp. 240–253; J. Kojkoł, *Polskie spory filozoficzne w latach 1945–1949*, "Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej" 2009, Vol. 4 (179), pp. 101–144.

ple today.[10] Under these circumstances, any clear meaning for the local tradition in Kraków was lost, although it secretly persisted in scientific circles, cultivating a specific "intellectual climate."

Bishop Karol Wojtyła, who initiated meetings of scientists and philosophers in the 1970s, contributed greatly to reviving the importance of interdisciplinary discussion and this tradition.[11] These meetings turned into regular interdisciplinary seminars chaired by Michał Heller together with the slightly younger Józef Życiński.

Heller and Życiński built upon the local tradition, which was called an "intellectual climate,"[12] and coined the modern conception of the philosophy of science, which was aimed at transcending the limitations of both the then-declining positivist philosophies and the still-active neo-Thomist philosophy of nature.[13] In this historical context, the concept of "philosophy in science" was formulated by Heller.[14] The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science was also born in the same

[10] R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Ł. Ratajczak, *Filozofia po ciemnej stronie mocy: krucjaty marksistów i komunistów polskich przeciwko Lwowskiej Szkole Filozoficznej Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Cz. 1: Lata 1945–1951*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2018; R. Kuliniak, M. Pandura, Ł. Ratajczak, *Filozofia po ciemnej stronie mocy: krucjaty marksistów i komunistów polskich przeciwko Lwowskiej Szkole Filozoficznej Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Cz. 2: Problem reformy szkolnictwa wyższego w świetle partyjnej ofensywy ideologicznej*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2019; see also critical remarks: J. Woleński, *Uwagi o książce o krucjatach marksistów przeciwko Lwowskiej Szkole Filozoficznej*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria" 2022, Vol. 131, No. 1 (121), pp. 107–125; for a general overview of this period in Polish philosophy, see J. Woleński, *Philosophy inside Communism: The Case of Poland*, "Studies in Soviet Thought" 1992, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 93–100.

[11] K. Trombik, *The Origin and Development of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies: A Historical Outline by 1993*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2019, Vol. 66, pp. 271–295.

[12] M. Heller, J. Mączka, *Początki filozofii przyrody w Ośrodku Badań Interdyscyplinarnych w Krakowie*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 2006, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 49–62.

[13] Anna Lemańska, in her review of Heller's book, gives interesting objections to Heller's attitude towards scholasticism and neo-scholasticism and concerning the omission of neo-scholastic philosophers. See A. Lemańska, *Michał Heller,* Nowa fizyka i nowa teologia*, Tarnów 1992, ss. 151*, "Studia Philosophiae Christianae" 1993, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 198–200.

[14] Życiński's philosophy, like Heller's, was part of the trend towards a Christian-inspired renewal of philosophy. He shared many areas of interest with Heller, such as science–religion relations, interdisciplinary research, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, and methodology of sciences. The peculiarity of Życiński's philosophy was due to a broader approach than Heller's and to the inspiration of 20th-century British and American philosophy. See J. Życiński, *Język i metoda*, Znak, Kraków 1983; J. Życiński, *Teizm i filozofia analityczna*, Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy „ZNAK," Kraków 1985; J. Życiński, *Bóg Abrahama i Whiteheada*, Biblos, Tarnów 1992. Many of Życiński's views testify to this philosopher's openness to metaphysics; on the

context. The birth of this new school was not quickly recognized, however, not least because of Heller's own distance to the neo-Thomist conception of a philosophy and the Lublin conception of a philosophical school[15] but also because the nascent school was unique in many respects. The problematic nature of this school and its ties with the existing interdisciplinary milieu meant that its members rarely referred directly to the concept of a school. Nevertheless, many characteristics of a philosophical school were evident in it, such as various metaphilosophical concepts and claims that were rather unique in Polish philosophy. We will attempt to elaborate on these peculiarities in the following sections.

3. Kazimierz Twardowski's Model of a Philosophical School

The unique character of the philosophical school that formed around Michał Heller and Józef Życiński suggests that it is worth comparing it with another more widely known modern philosophical school, namely, the Lvov-Warsaw School. Such a comparison would not be arbitrary, because Heller has repeatedly mentioned that in his scientific and organizational activities he was inspired by the model of Kazimierz Twardowski. (These remarks were shared by Heller

other hand, Życiński's distance from thinking in neo-Thomist categories is evident (see, e.g., the concept of the field of rationality, evolutionary emergentism, panentheism). It is worth noting that from the 1990s onward, Życiński's influence on the school became weaker and weaker due to his pastoral duties as a bishop. Despite this, the concepts undertaken by Życiński are still being developed in the Kraków milieu, especially by his former students, such as Zbigniew Liana and Jacek Rodzeń (see, e.g., Z. Liana, *Nauka jako racjonalna doxa. Józefa Życińskiego koncepcja nauki i filozofii nauki – poza internalizmem i eksternalizmem*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2019, Vol. 66, pp. 147–199; Z. Liana, *Józefa Życińskiego koncepcja racjonalizmu umiarkowanego: epistemologiczna i doxalogiczna funkcja podmiotowego commitment*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2020, Vol. 68, pp. 117–184).

[15] "At the end of [my studies at] the Catholic University of Lublin, I was definitely a non-Thomist, and […] probably even more radical than today." M. Heller et al., *Wierzę, żeby rozumieć: w osobistej rozmowie o życiowych wyborach*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2016, p. 162. Such a negative attitude towards neo-Thomism (described by Heller as a "rebellion," ibid., p. 74) stemmed from the following diagnosis: "[H]ere is the essence of the matter: not only does Thomism not fit into the sciences, but no one will be convinced by Thomism. It is just the opposite" (ibid., pp. 126–127).

during a seminar attended by one of this paper's author's, Paweł Polak).[16] We posit that such a comparison represents the most convenient way to analyze the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science.

The Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS), as well as its philosophy, has been the subject of many studies since the mid-1980s,[17] and so its concepts have been ana-

[16] For interesting remarks by M. Heller and J. Mączka on the relationship of Kraków philosophy to the LWS, see M. Heller, J. Mączka, *Początki filozofii przyrody w Ośrodku Badań Interdyscyplinarnych w Krakowie*, op. cit. It is worth noting that in this article they do not use the term "school," but speak instead of the "Kraków centre," while noting the key role of internal influences within this "centre." In particular, they emphasize the role of friendship as a cohesive factor in this group: "friendships, although they do not leave traces in any archive, are the most durable element of all initiatives"; on the interests of the Kraków Circle (a branch of the LWS) and the philosophical parallels, see M. Heller et al., *Jak filozofuje się w OBI?*, op. cit.

[17] Z. Jordan, *The Development of Mathematical Logic and of Logical Positivism in Poland between the Two Wars*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1945; H. Skolimowski, *Polish Analytical Philosophy: A Survey and Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, The Humanities Press, London–New York 1967; J. Woleński, *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1985; J. Woleński, *Filozofia szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Wrocław 1986; J.J. Jadacki, *Semiotyka szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej: główne pojęcia*, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1987; J. Woleński, *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989; K. Szaniawski, *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989; R. Poli, F. Coniglione, J. Woleński, eds., *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, Atlanta, GA, 1993; J.J. Jadacki, *The Conceptual System of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, "Axiomathes" 1996, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 325–333; J.J. Jadacki, *Warsaw: The Rise and Decline of Modern Scientific Philosophy in the Capital City of Poland*, in: *In itinere: European Cities and the Birth of Modern Scientific Philosophy*, ed. R. Poli, Rodopi, Amsterdam–Atlanta, GA, 1997, pp. 145–160; J. Woleński, *Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska w polemikach*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 1997; K. Kijania-Placek, J. Woleński, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1998; J.J. Jadacki, *From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Rodopi, Amsterdam–New York 2003; J.J. Jadacki, J. Paśniczek, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation*, Rodopi, Amsterdam–New York 2006; J.J. Jadacki, *Polish Analytical Philosophy: Studies on Its Heritage: With the Appendix Containing the Bibliography of Polish Logic from the Second Half of the 14th Century to the First Half of the 20th Century*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2009; R. Murawski, *Philosophy of Mathematics in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy*, eds. S. Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Marion, W. Miskiewicz, Springer, Dordrecht 2009, pp. 121–130, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2401-5_9; S.B. Ìvanik, *Filozofowie ukraińscy w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2014; A. Chybińska et al., eds., *Tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Ideas and Continuations*, Brill-Rodopi, Leiden–Boston, MA, 2016; A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, eds., *Fenomen szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin 2016; A. Brożek, F. Stadler, J. Woleński, eds., *The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture*, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2017, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52869-4; Á. Garrido, U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, eds., *The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past and Present*, Springer International Publishing AG, Cham

lyzed many times. In the context of this work, we will therefore only recall the most important issues. The best guide for this is the precursor monograph by Jan Woleński,[18] in which he analyzed the LWS in terms of the various criteria used in the historiography of philosophical schools.

Woleński stressed that the LWS was distinguished by the fact that it did not require members to share the same metaphilosophical and philosophical assumptions, nor did it require them to focus on any selected philosophical theme. All this indicates that the LWS philosophy was very diverse, and it is difficult to find common elements. It could be said that LWS members were united more by methodological issues, such as a common aspiration for clarity and precision in philosophy. The second most important factor determining this school was the question of its intellectual genealogy. It originated from the circle of Twardowski's direct disciples, or the circles of his disciples' disciples, and this provided the basis of self-identification, which was one of the most important elements of the school's identity. Twardowski's school was also distinguished by its philosophers' high level of professionalism, and the requirement to train philosophers in both philosophy and one additional discipline is particularly noteworthy.[19]

Typically, when we attempt to analyze the phenomenon of a certain philosophical school, we first pay attention to the existing relationships among its members. When analyzing the structural relations, the LWS appears to be a typical school, because its internal relations are based mainly on the master–disciple relationship and centralized, with them converging on the personality

2018; A. Drabarek, J. Woleński, M.M. Radzki, *Interdisciplinary Investigations into the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2019; A. Brożek, *Analiza i konstrukcja: o metodach badania pojęć w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2020; A. Brożek et al., *Antyirracjonalizm. Metody filozoficzne w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2020; A. Brożek et al., *Anti-Irrationalism: Philosophical Methods in the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2020; J.J. Jadacki, ed., *Rozum i wola: Kazimierz Twardowski i jego wpływ na kształt kultury polskiej XX wieku*, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin 2021, https://doi.org/10.52097/acapress.9788395354977; A. Brożek, J.J. Jadacki, eds., *At the Sources of the Twentieth-Century Analytical Movement: Kazimierz Twardowski and His Position in European Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden–Boston, MA, 2022; J. Woleński, *Lvov-Warsaw School*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2022), ed. E.N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/lvov-warsaw/ (substantive revision published on 30.09.2019).

[18] J. Woleński, *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*, op. cit.

[19] K. Twardowski, *On Scientific Preparation for Philosophy*, in: *On Prejudices, Judgments, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, eds. A. Brożek, J.J. Jadacki, transl. A. Chybińska, Rodopi, Amsterdam–New York 2014, pp. 57–59.

of Twardowski. Of course, such a picture of the LWS is an oversimplification, because, over time, fellow-to-fellow relationships, as is rather typical in a philosophical circle,[20] began to manifest, mostly between Twardowski's students. As we have already mentioned, the basis for identity was being aware of belonging to a group, so the typical activities of a philosophical circle were treated as secondary. However, on closer inspection of the LWS model, the boundaries between school-typical and circle-typical activities are sometimes blurred, and identity issues are decisive and determine any interpretation. Now, let us immediately highlight that this identity issue would become the main source of distinction for the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science.

We posit that when analyzing a philosophical school, attention should be paid *not just to internal relations* but also the intentional shaping of the *environment with which the school interacts*. This claim is based on the biological metaphor of a living organism. If a philosophical school has certain aspects that are analogous to a living organism – and after all, we use biological terms like "birth," "development," and "dying" when referring to them – then it may be beneficial to consider them as being akin to a living organism in these respects. Thus, while we need to analyze the internal relations, it is equally important to consider the relations the school had with the surrounding environment in which it existed. In this context, the environment refers to all the informational relationships and influences the school was engaged with. For the sake of clarity, we will call this environment the *extended circle of influences*.[21] We coined this name based on the metaphor of a "circle" to illustrate how the influences of a philosophical school's ideas can be thought of as three concentric circles. At the centre of all these circles is the master, the next circle comprises his or her students (i.e., the school itself is the primary circle of influence), while the outermost circle represents the school's environment (see Fig. 1). We refer to the outer circle as "extended" to indicate that while most influences will be internal to the school, the school also needs to disseminate its ideas and engage with other thinkers and groups, and so it will remain open to discussion and avoid turning into a closed sect. Thus, the existence of an extended circle of influence is crucial to establishing a philosophical school rather than a cult.

[20] This model of fellow-to-fellow relationships is perhaps most clearly seen in the example of the Vienna Circle. We are grateful to Anna Brożek for this distinction between the school (master–disciple relations) and the philosophy circle (fellow-to-fellow).

[21] The school itself is the primary circle of influence.



Figure 1. Concentric circles representing the influences of a philosophical school

A question now arises: what was the extended circle of influence for the LWS? Originally, the Polish Philosophical Society that was established by Twardowski was intended to function as an extended circle of influence. Over time, the circle expanded to include many other groups, becoming strongly international in the 1930s, including with connections to the well-known Vienna Circle.

Equipped with these tools for analysis, we can now take a closer look at the similarities and differences between the LWS and the Kraków school.

4. The Kraków Adaptation of Twardowski's School Model: Similarities and Differences

The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science resembles in some respects the LWS model of a philosophical school. Of course, the circumstances of its foundation and the conditions of its operation, as well as the people involved, are completely different, so we certainly cannot speak directly about the model's application here. We therefore believe it is better to use the word "adaptation" to describe

the Kraków school's relationship to the LWS. Indeed, Heller himself admitted in private conversations that while he was inspired by Twardowski's school, it was impossible to translate old solutions to a completely different situation.[22]

Now, let us first examine the similarities linking these two schools of interest. For ease of reference, the basic determining factors for the philosophical schools are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. A comparison of the basic features of the LWS and the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science

FACTORS	Kraków School of Philosophy in Science	LWS
"GENETICAL" (masters)	M. Heller, J. Życiński	K. Twardowski
GEOGRAPHICAL	Kraków	At first Lvov, then Lvov and Warsaw
PERIOD	Exists since the late 1970s (still active)	Existed since the end of the 19th century/beginning of 20th century (there is some controversy over times when the school was active)
SUBSTANTIVE	Various interests but a common set of metaphilosophical and methodological views (i.e., how philosophy should be practised); philosophy focuses on science and its philosophical significance	Various interests but a common set of metaphilosophical and methodological views (i.e., how philosophy should be practised); a broad concept of philosophy that is potentially open to all problems
SENSE OF BELONGING TO A SCHOOL	Rather strong, but it originally did not form an identity due to strong ties with the extended circle of influence	Very strong, and it formed an identity

On analyzing the way philosophy was practised in the two schools more closely, we can discern a number of important similarities, although these are

[22] M. Heller, J. Mączka, *Początki filozofii przyrody w Ośrodku Badań Interdyscyplinarnych w Krakowie*, op. cit.

obviously not exactly identical. Firstly, we need to stress that in both cases the absence of a common core of shared philosophical ideas is distinctive. Indeed, pluralism and inclusiveness are not typical characteristics of classical philosophical schools, but here they play an important role. Of course, we should stress that pluralism was limited in both cases, but every kind of philosophy was accepted. Surprisingly, we discover that the LWS and the Kraków school shared a negative attitude towards the neo-scholastic model of philosophy and its model for a philosophical school (the reasons for this attitude, however, were different). This issue – as well as the pursuit of strict philosophy, which in Heller's case was even based on an "exegesis" of the mathematical structures of scientific theories[23] – naturally brought these schools closer together. This was especially evident during the 1970s when the Kraków school was founded. At that time, Polish philosophy could not freely develop due to the limitations of the communist regime and the narrow range of potential "allies." The methodical similarities between the LWS and the Kraków school should also be considered carefully. On the one hand, the proponents of both schools accept the need for clarity and transparency, but Heller in fact redefined this aspect. For Heller, the clarity of philosophical considerations in philosophy in science was based on the clarity of the mathematical structure of scientific theories.[24] Clarity and precision in the philosophy of physics are possible because a philosopher can describe the properties of the extremely precise mathematical structures used in physical theories. Of course, such descriptions will necessarily be poorer and less precise than the mathematical structures themselves.[25] However, Heller did not dare to abandon natural language as the vehicle and "fabric" of philosophy. After all, in physics a similar strategy is in use – natural language is employed to explain mathemati-

[23] Exegesis of the mathematical structure of a given physical theory, according to Heller, is a kind of philosophical comment or interpretation of a physical theory. "A comment could so closely follow the mathematical structure of a physical theory that any its 'perturbation' would result into inconsistencies or contradictions with the theory's formalism" (M. Heller, *What Does It Mean "To Exist" in Physics?*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2018, Vol. 65, p. 14). With this approach, it is possible to achieve maximum accuracy and clarity in the philosophy of physics, although it is important to be aware that not all philosophers agree with this extreme approach.

[24] See, e.g., M. Heller, *Science as Philosophy*, in: M. Heller, *Philosophy in Science*, Springer, Berlin–Heidelberg 2011, pp. 129–151, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17705-7_12.

[25] We know that the language of mathematics can efficiently describe properties that cannot be exhaustively and strictly described in natural language – a perfect example is quantum mechanics.

cal structures, and statements can always be made more precise by referring them to the mathematical structures of the theory. This clarification is possible because nature is mathematical and our explanatory structures can be "in resonance" with the real, infinitely complex natural structures despite being evidently simpler than them.[26]

When looking at the scientific ethos and set of values in both cases, we see strong inspirations and intentional similarities.[27] It is worth noting, though, that sharing such ethos and the abovementioned metaphilosophical assumptions were the reason why the problem of "proper interpretation of the Master" did not emerge in either school. This is interesting because both philosophical schools profited from the inspiring influence of their masters (i.e., Twardowski or Heller).

It is worth noting that Heller, having modelled himself on Twardowski's activities, also organized a *privatissimum* (a private seminar) in the 2000s.[28] As a rule, invitations were supposed to be limited to selected doctoral students and young philosophers, but some other philosophers and scholars were also invited. Interestingly, this way of working was continued by the next generation of the school.

When evaluating the differences between the LWS and the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science, we need to highlight the incomparable historical contexts in which the schools developed, as well as the markedly different aims of these schools. First, Twardowski built his school from scratch because no strong local traditions existed in Lvov in the 1890s. Conversely, Heller drew strongly on local tradition while also being somehow, even unconsciously, bound by it (the most obvious evidence of the influence of local traditions is the role played by the concept of interdisciplinary research).

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[26] M. Heller, *Czy* świat *jest matematyczny?*, in: *Filozofia i wszechświat: wybór pism*, TAiWPN Universitas, Kraków 2006, pp. 48–57; M. Heller, *The Field of Rationality and Category Theory*, in: *Mathematical Structures of the Universe*, eds. M. Eckstein, M. Heller, S.J. Szybka, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, pp. 441–457; for a deeper analysis of this topic, see W.P. Grygiel, *A Critical Analysis of the Philosophical Motivations and Development of the Concept of the Field of Rationality as a Representation of the Fundamental Ontology of the Physical Reality*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2022, Vol. 72, pp. 87–108.

[27] Interesting remarks about these issues in the Kraków school can be found in M. Heller, *Jak być uczonym*, ed. M. Szczerbińska-Polak, Znak, Kraków 2009.

[28] The name *privatissimum* was taken from the Austrian educational model, which was a basis for the Polish model of universities in the early 20th century and still belongs to the intellectual traditions of the Kraków centre.

The biggest difference between Twardowski's and Heller's metaphilosophical concepts concerns the object and role of philosophy. Heller's concept of philosophy is very limited compared to Twardowski's concept of open philosophy. Given Heller's exclusive focus on philosophy in the context of the sciences, his philosophy is strongly related to the sciences. For Twardowski, meanwhile, his adopted solution emphasized the autonomy of philosophy in relation to the sciences, which would be unacceptable for Heller, because for him, the boundaries between philosophy and science were blurred, and science itself played a philosophically important role. After all, the very name "philosophy in science" indicates there are close ties between science and philosophical reflection. We also need to mention that Heller's, and similarly Życiński's, philosophy served a double purpose: to analyze the problems of science while also building a dialogue between science and theology.[29]

5. The Special Role of the Extended Circle of Influence in the Kraków School

In order to understand the phenomenon of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science, we need to take a closer look at the significant role played by its extended circle of influence. This was originally represented by the Interdisciplinary Seminars, which were chaired by Michał Heller from the 1970s, and later by a separate institution that became the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (Ośrodek Badań Interdyscyplinarnych) at the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Kraków.[30] This Centre was formally established by Michał Heller and Józef Życiński at the academy's Faculty of Philosophy, but it had some autonomy from the very be-

[29] P. Polak, J. Rodzeń, *The Science-Religion Relationship in the Academic Debate in Poland, 1945–1998*, "European Journal of Science and Theology" 2021, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 11–14; for the case of Heller's reception of relativity theory, see P. Polak, J. Rodzeń, *The Theory of Relativity and Theology: The Neo-Thomist Science–Theology Separation vs. Michael Heller's Path to Dialogue*, "Theology and Science", https://doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2022.2155917; see also W.M. Macek, *Teologia nauki*, in: *Oblicza racjonalności: wokół myśli Michała Hellera*, eds. B. Brożek et al., Copernicus Center Press, Konsorcjum Akademickie Wydawnictwo, Kraków 2011, pp. 204–206.

[30] R. Janusz, *The Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Cracow*, "Forum Philosophicum" 2006, Vol. 11, pp. 269–274; K.Trombik, *The Origin and Development of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies*, op. cit.

ginning.[31] The role that the centre played is particularly important, because the centre's activities were strongly linked to the school's formation process. Michał Heller and his close collaborator Janusz Mączka described it as follows:

> From the very beginning of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies (OBI) in Kraków […], those associated with it had two goals: (1) to develop a contemporary philosophy of nature, that is, by referring to the dynamically developing natural sciences, and provide modern man with a useful tool for understanding the world and himself in this world; and (2) to give students and those within the circle of influence of the OBI a philosophical and natural science education that meets modern needs, that is, being on the one hand rooted in the great philosophical tradition of the West and on the other hand open to the challenges brought by scientific and civilization progress.[32]

Alumni of Heller's school were dominant in the centre, thus forming its core, but some other Kraków scholars also attended the Center,[33] and so the school

[31] The 1997 regulations of the Center indicate in Article II that "OBI [i.e. Center for Interdisciplinary Research] is a scientific and research unit, with some elements of autonomy, but organizationally functioning at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Kraków" (OBI jest jednostką naukowo-badawczą, posiadającą pewne elementy autonomii, lecz organizacyjnie funkcjonującą na Wydziale Filozoficznym Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie). *Regulamin Ośrodka Badań Interdyscyplinarnych przy Wydziale Filozoficznym PAT w Krakowie*, 26.05.1997, Archiwum Wydziału Filozoficznego UPJPII w Krakowie, Regulaminy PAT nr 37, pp. 1–2.

[32] "Od samego początku istnienia Ośrodka Badań Interdyscyplinarnych (OBI) w Krakowie […] osobom z nim związanym przyświecały dwa cele: (1) rozwijać współczesną filozofię przyrody, tzn. nawiązując do dynamicznie rozwijających się nauk przyrodniczych, zapewnić współczesnemu człowiekowi użyteczne narzędzie rozumienia świata i siebie samego w tym świecie; (2) dać studentom oraz osobom pozostającym w kręgu oddziaływań OBI wykształcenie filozoficzno-przyrodnicze na miarę współczesnych potrzeb, tzn. z jednej strony zakorzenione w wielkiej tradycji filozoficznej Zachodu, a z drugiej strony otwarte na wyzwania, jakie niesie postęp naukowy i cywilizacyjny." M. Heller, J. Mączka, *Początki filozofii przyrody w Ośrodku Badań Interdyscyplinarnych w Krakowie*, op. cit., p. 49.

[33] The 1997 regulations, Article IX, par. 1: "Ordinary members of OBI [Center for Interdisciplinary Research] can be both employees and students of PAT [Pontifical Academy of Theology] in Kraków, as well as all persons engaged in research or activities of an interdisciplinary nature, also outside the Academy, expressing a willingness to cooperate closely" (Członkami zwyczajnymi OBI mogą być zarówno pracownicy jak i studenci PAT w Krakowie oraz wszystkie osoby zajmujące się badaniami czy działalnością o charakterze interdyscyplinarnym, także poza Akademią, wyrażający gotowość ścisłej współpracy). *Regulamin Ośrodka Badań Interdyscyplinarnych*, op. cit., p. 4.

naturally evolved into a philosophy circle.[34] The group was therefore linked both by master–student and peer-to-peer relationships, with Heller deliberately striving to cultivate the latter by introducing a friendly, informal atmosphere and encouraging collaboration among subgroups for selected topics.[35] Heller therefore played the role of both mentor and animator of the circle's activities. In fact, the school and the centre were mutually supportive of each other's goals, although there are admittedly problems when trying to analyze this symbiotic relationship. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that for Heller, the logical clarity of organizational structures came second to finding opportunities for fruitfully using bootstrapping strategies to help progress both the school and the centre.

Today, the Center for Interdisciplinary Research's role has since been assumed by two institutions: the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Research, which was established in 2008 based on the Center for Interdisciplinary Research,[36] and the Commission for the Philosophy of Science at the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences. The latter was founded in 2012 by Michał Heller by merging the existing "Fides et Ratio" Commission and the Commission for the Philosophy of Natural Sciences. It acts as a forum for the exchange of ideas and discussions, continuing the traditions of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research and providing an important venue for the school's members to collaborate.

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[34] In this way, Heller, initially together with Życiński, played the authority role for the school and the environment, with him performing the three most important functions identified by Gościkowski – namely, master/teacher, educator (*wychowawca*), and manager/leader. See J. Gościkowski, *Funkcje autorytetów w społeczeństwie nauki*, "Teksty: Teoria Literatury, Krytyka, Interpretacja" 1977, Vol. 1 (31), pp. 37–38. However, Heller, like Twardowski, clearly avoided playing the role of an ideologue because this would be incompatible with the accepted concept of philosophy.

[35] The importance of developing peer-to-peer rather than master–student relationships was emphasized, e.g., by Kazimierz Kuratowski, a prominent mathematician and member of the Warsaw School of Mathematics. He also emphasized the crucial nature of peer-to-peer relationships for developing a scientific school: "The sooner that teacher and pupil become partners in their work, the greater are the prospects for the school's successful development." I. Stasiewicz-Jasiukowa et al., eds., *The Founders of Polish Schools and Scientific Models Write about Their Works*, Ossolineum, The Polish Academy of Sciences Press, Wrocław 1989, p. 10; I. Stasiewicz-Jasiukowa, *Rozmowy i refleksje o polskich szkołach i modelach naukowych*, "Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki" 1988, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 771.

[36] The foundation of the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies was possible due to Heller being awarded the Templeton Prize in 2008; for more on this topic, see a special issue of "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" – Vol. 43 (2008), https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/issue/view/18.

The journal "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" (ISSN 0867-8286) also played a significant role in shaping the school, as well as the centre. Indeed, it was the forum in which the concept of *philosophy in science* was developed, such that even in the first issues, the English title "Philosophy in Science" was used alongside the Polish title "Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce." From the very beginning, the journal also served as a medium for publishing other works by members of the school, starting with an article written by Krzysztof Turek,[37] a physicist who was the first doctor of philosophy to be promoted by Heller at the Pontifical Academy of Theology.

Unlike Twardowski's school, in the Kraków school, the boundaries between it, the centre (and its descendants), and the *privatissimum* were fluid. The informality and the avoidance of a rigid organizational framework also makes it difficult to describe and analyze this phenomenon. Indeed, meetings were often held in cafes, and Heller founded the café-bookstore De Revolutionibus, or DeRevo for short, especially for this purpose. This again highlights how the style of the Kraków school is close to that of the pre-World War II Lvov school of mathematics, and again, this similarity is not accidental.

6. Perspectives on the Development of Philosophy within the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science

Philosophy at the Kraków school is closely tied to science, but we found a diverse range of interests among its members, such as the more traditional philosophy of nature (e.g., problem of the rationality of the world), the philosophy of physics and cosmology (e.g., unification of physics by using formalism of the noncommutative geometries, philosophical issues in quantum mechanics), the philosophy of mathematics (e.g., study of category theory and its consequences for foundations of mathematics), logic and the philosophy of logic (e.g., categorical logic, studies of logics involved in theology), the methodology of sciences (e.g., impact of digital technologies on the methodology of sciences), the history of science (e.g., reception of new physical theories, such as Einstein's special and general relativity), the science–religion relation (e.g., theology of science), and selected is-

[37] K. Turek, *Filozoficzne aspekty pojęcia informacji*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 32–41.

sues of the philosophy of the mind (e.g., research on the origins of mathematical thinking). If we wanted to single out a "universal" problem the school sought to address, it would probably be the problem of a mathematical nature.

Specific to the Kraków school were studies of the scientific challenges for Christianity, especially for philosophy developed under the influence of Roman Catholic theology, as well as science–religion studies.[38] In this context, Heller started a project related to the *theology of science*.[39] Nowadays, existing fields of research, such as the philosophy of physics (Wojciech Grygiel, Łukasz Mścisławski, Andrzej Koleżyński, et al.), are continued within the school. Directly linking to the traditions of the LWS is the ongoing research about the Kraków Circle, a branch of the LWS that was formed in the 1930s by, among others, Józef Bocheński and Jan Salamucha, who used modern logical tools in theology and became the forerunners of analytical Thomism. Today, the most important subject for consideration is the role of logic in theology.[40]

Among the new threads that have emerged as extensions of previous research areas that can be indicated, we could, for example, refer to:

- studies about transforming the methodology of sciences in the age of digitalization;
- adaptations of the concept of philosophy in science to research in the area of the philosophy of technology (i.e., philosophy in technology);

[38] F. Krauze, *Jedna prawda, dwie księgi: nauki przyrodnicze a teologia w Ośrodku Badań Interdyscyplinarnych Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej w Krakowie*, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2008; T. Obolevitch, *Problem relacji pomiędzy nauką i wiarą w OBI*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2012, Vol. 50, pp. 75–84; T. Obolevitch, *The Relationship between Science and Religion in the Copernicus Centre in Krakow (Michael Heller, Józef Życiński and Others)*, "European Journal of Science and Theology" 2015, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 1–11; B. Brożek, M. Heller, *Science and Religion in the Kraków School*, op. cit.; P. Polak, J. Rodzeń, *The Science-Religion Relationship in the Academic Debate in Poland*, op. cit.; P. Polak, J. Rodzeń, *The Theory of Relativity and Theology*, op. cit.

[39] M. Heller, *The New Physics and a New Theology*, Vatican Observatory, Vatican City 1996; for the analysis and development of the concept, see W.M. Macek, *Teologia nauki według księdza Michała Hellera*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, Warszawa 2010; J. Mączka, P. Urbańczyk, eds., *Teologia nauki*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2015; see also M. Oleksowicz, *Do We Need a Theology of Science? / ¿Necesitamos una teología de la ciencia?*, "CAURIENSIA. Revista anual de Ciencias Eclesiásticas" 2020, Vol. 15, pp. 755–770; M. Oleksowicz, *Teologia della scienza. Lo status quaestionis e possibili sviluppi ulteriori*, "Aisthema, International Journal" 2019, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 203–227.

[40] See, e.g., A. Olszewski, *Negation in the Language of Theology – Some Issues*, "Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)" 2018, Vol. 65, pp. 87–107.

– historical-philosophical research, with the main emphasis currently being on studying Kraków's philosophy in the context of science from the beginnings of the 19th century; and
– the history of science–faith relations in post-war Poland.

This all shows that the school is still alive and developing Heller's concepts, despite Heller, as professor emeritus, currently playing less and less of a direct role in shaping the school's subsequent generation.

7. Conclusions

The Kraków School of Philosophy in Science can be regarded as a successful adaptation of the Lvov-Warsaw School model, thus demonstrating how the open and flexible concept of a school created by Twardowski could continue to contribute to philosophical development. The many peculiarities of the Kraków school derive from strong local traditions, and this case shows that a philosophical school is still needed for philosophical development, because it supports the building of long-term research programmes. The cases of the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Kraków school also demonstrate how schools need not be rooted in a set of theses that must be shared by all members. Instead, sharing fundamental methodological assumptions and focusing on similar areas of interest is sufficient for achieving the typical goals of such schools, so members can jointly undertake long-term research programmes.

The two discussed schools also demonstrate that personal ties are crucial, even if they are hard for historians of philosophy to identify and analyze. This suggests that some aspects of sociology may be relevant to discussions of philosophical schools.[41] The geographical location of a school, which is generally a key historiographical criterion for describing and analyzing a school, is also worth briefly mentioning. With modern telecommunications technologies, collaborative meetings can now be held online, and so a modern school can also operate through a network of virtual ties (e.g., Łukasz Mścisławski at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Jacek Rodzeń at Kielce University). With such remote collaboration, geographical location will become less important

[41] See, e.g., the interesting remarks in J. Gościkowski, *Funkcje autorytetów w społeczeństwie nauki*, op. cit.

for a school, with it approaching Derek de Solla Price's idea of the invisible college.[42] Nevertheless, the Kraków school still makes strong use of local traditions and personal ties, and being so embedded in a traditional context and bound by friendship prevents, for now, a complete virtualization for this school of philosophy.

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[42] See, e.g., D.J. De Solla Price, D. Beaver, *Collaboration in an Invisible College*, "American Psychologist" 1966, Vol. 21, No. 11, pp. 1011–1018.

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From Capitalism to Modernity and Back: Adventures with the Budapest School

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Abstract: The moment of the Budapest School in Australia was vital, for the visitors and for us. Was it still then a school? This is an open question. Here I focus on Melbourne, and on the work and influence of Ferenc Fehér and Ágnes Heller. I will use two essays to focus on the mutual interaction: *Class, Democracy, Modernity* (1983) and *Why We Should Maintain the Socialist Objective* (1981/1982). Fehér and Heller made the decisive, in effect Weberian, move away from the category of capitalism to that of modernity as the overarching horizon. At the same time, Heller offered a forgotten political intervention into the discourse of the Australian Labor Party, on the necessity of claims to the values of socialism. Four decades on, the latter essay seems arcane, while the former retains its potency, but is also pressured by the revived centrality of capitalism. After both cases, the core value given to democracy might now also come under question, forty years on.

Key words: Budapest School, Fehér, Heller, socialism, ALP, modernity

1. Prelude: Back to School?

Was the Budapest School ever a school? Ferenc Fehér said to me often enough that all good questions had at least two answers: yes, and no. Taking his cue, I have offered some reflections on this question in an earlier essay, *The Budapest School – Travelling Theory?*[1] Does anything much come of the question? Maybe not. Perhaps, to simplify and condense, we could say that with Georg Lukács' response to the *Times Literary Supplement* in 1971, the Budapest School was an invention – Lukács' invention. Or we could defer to common sense, and say it was a convention, a figure of speech which we use and understand among ourselves, to mean both something special and at the same time to imply very little more

[1] P. Beilharz, *The Budapest School – Travelling Theory?*, in: *Critical Theories and the Budapest School*, eds. J. Pickle, J. Rundell, Routledge, London 2018, pp. 15–33.

than perhaps a small group of friends as intellectuals being thrown together by the whirlwind of history in that moment. Without too much loitering, we might add that this school had some standard defining characteristics: common themes and approaches; collective forms of operation; and some sense of the transgenerational. They may not have had all that much in common with Lukács, after all, but they were the Lukács School. A further thought follows. Perhaps we are, now, after schools. We may still have cultural carriers, platforms like, for example, "Thesis Eleven," but schools? Perhaps the age of the school has passed; perhaps it was only ever an ambition, a statement of intention. That might take us to other issues, such as those of generation, and also to larger environmental factors, such as the liquid modern or postmodern, call it what you will. The culture of social acceleration and turbulence is not kind to ideas like the school. Modernity wreaks havoc with its claimed continuities, collectivity, shared concerns, the inheritances of transgenerationalism and so on. Schools are old school.

Were we, then, at "Thesis Eleven," part of the Budapest School, or was there a Bundoora School? Here one answer will suffice: no. Yet the issue remains, as to what we learned from the Budapest School in its time in Australia, from 1978 to 1986 in Melbourne, and further thereafter with the Márkuses in Sydney. As I have suggested elsewhere, the vitality of that moment was in its generational fix: Ágnes Heller was entering her fifties, we were in our middle twenties. Ferenc Fehér and Heller, in Melbourne, were ready to share, gladly to teach, and we, almost a generation down, were keen to learn, both from the text and its ambience – from these intellectuals as subjects who had come to share with us. There were many texts, and especially books, like *Renaissance Man* and later *Dictatorship Over Needs*, that we devoured. But the Hungarians were also essayists, and some of the greatest inspirations for us then were indeed essays. Here, in this paper, I discuss two such essays: *Class, Modernity, Democracy*, from 1983, and Heller's advice delivered to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in 1981, contained in her lecture *Why We Should Maintain the Socialist Objective*.

2. *Class, Democracy, Modernity*

This is, at first sight, an unconventional piece for Fehér and Heller, for whom the essay form was more often literary rather than programmatic. Who was its

addressee? Was it a manifesto for their next phase, the new concerns of life entering the so-called democratic world and its left or radical movements? This exercise was a blitz, coordinated by Fehér, the organizer. The essay was published in three places at once; in English in "Theory and Society," in French in "Les Temps Modernes" and in Italian in "La Critica Sociologica." Uncommonly, for our authors, it followed the strict social-science format: 3.1.1, 3.1.2, sections right through to 5.5.3.5, and so on.[2]

Class, Modernity, Democracy could be viewed as a manifesto for Weberian Marxism. For its most crucial gesture was in expanding the Marxian optic, from capital and capitalism, to the broader horizons of modernity. Scale and complexity meant that base and superstructure would never do. The local effects of this thinking for us, on and around the formative journal "Thesis Eleven" (b. 1980), were significant. Julian Triado, my youthful co-founder of "Thesis Eleven," took its cue to follow with a leading essay called *Corporatism, Democracy and Modernity*, its own triad following that of the Hungarians' essay. Triado sought to connect up these broader horizons for thinking about modernity to the local path of development in Australian corporatism, with a sideways glance at Western Europe and Scandinavia.[3] At the same time, Julian and I edited the English version of the Fehér–Heller–Márkus book *Dictatorship Over Needs*. Editing, like translation, can be a transformative experience. The single most telling gesture in the Fehér–Heller paper was its expansion to centre on the state, and bureaucracy. Henceforth, the view of critical theory would need to take in both power and culture. To take the state more fully seriously would necessitate pluralizing conceptions of power and culture. The message of Max Weber mattered. This was one point of continuity with Lukács, or at least the reification essay of 1923.

The approach of the Hungarians here was to open the field of modernity conceptually by introducing the idea of different and sometimes competing organizational and institutional logics. Though Heller was to vary these later across the path of their writing, the logics of modernity here were presented as those of capitalism, industrialization and democracy. Analytically separable, these logics might also work together in tension. There was an in-principle tension or struggle between capitalism and democracy; and often a collusion between capitalism and

[2] F. Fehér, Á. Heller, *Class, Democracy, Modernity*, in: *Eastern Left, Western Left*, eds. F. Fehér, Á. Heller, Polity, Oxford 1987, pp. 201–242.

[3] J. Triado, *Corporatism, Democracy, Modernity*, "Thesis Eleven" 1984, Vol. 9, pp. 33–51.

industrialization, though industrialization could also exist independently of the logic of capitalism: ergo the peculiarities of Soviet-type societies, which could not adequately be subsumed under the logic of capitalism as, for example, state capitalism.

Modernity is the unstable dynamic that holds these trends or logics together; but not every nation state, or empire, is animated by the same configuration or even the very same dynamics. In Soviet-type societies it was the dictatorship over needs and state paternalism that stood instead of any democratic impulse, however weak or strong.

The state capitalist critique of Soviet-type societies always had punch, but as the Hungarians claimed, it was prone to laziness, or, as Cornelius Castoriadis used to say, it always ran the risk of scholasticism, of telling us more about the pages of *Das Kapital* than about the experiences or institutions of the new regimes. Another parallel here might be with the sympathies in the work of Zygmunt Bauman, as in his 1983 *Memories of Class*, with the difference that the work of the Hungarians is typically more textually internal in its own way here: the novelty of the case about modernity and Soviet modernity was only to follow with *Dictatorship Over Needs*. Here, in *Class, Modernity, Democracy*, the initial frames of reference remain Marx and Weber.

Fehér and Heller work carefully through Marx and Weber towards their object, via Alvin W. Gouldner, Ralf Dahrendorf, E.P. Thompson, Perry Anderson and Stanisław Ossowski. The larger shadow text behind their work is Karl Polanyi's *Great Transformation*, for after Polanyi it is difficult indeed to cast the state as derivative of capital. It was not enough to talk with Nicos Poulantzas, of the relative autonomy of the state. Rather the approach followed Weber, and the idea of the at least analytical separation of spheres of value. The systematic cast of the essay, and its implicit interest in systems theory and its subsystems, is suggestive of the growing interest here of Niklas Luhmann, though Jürgen Habermas and the notion of legitimation crisis is a conspicuous absence from these pages.

In contradistinction to Marx, and in sympathy with Weber, they insist on differentiating political and socioeconomic classes. Interests may rule, rather than material or ideal factors alone, but politics is not the simple reflection of economic interest. Fehér and Heller did not here directly enter into the soon-to-emerge discourse concerning citizenship, but they were anticipating it.

Triado's extension of the Fehér–Heller approach into the Australian setting made it plain that the problems of class politics were insuperable, from the viewpoint of this radical horizon. Corporatism was not open to the possible prospects of citizenship and democracy; it could at best reproduce or promote the politics of production and of producer groups, at the expense of citizens and others, outsiders, the disenfranchized. In the Australian context, this meant that that labour and the state could no longer be advanced as the solution. In league with capital, they were the problem. Labour was an intra-systemic actor, rather than a vital force for social change.

The idea of corporatism came to significantly influence left debate in Australia in this period. This is interesting for many reasons, not least that it signals the Hungarian enthusiasm for the articulation of norms and values that informed our differing political stands, and it intersected with growing West European interest in corporatism, as in the work of, for instance, Walter Korpi or Philippe Schmitter, as well as the local patterns of development with the ALP-ACTU Accord or social contract in Australia from 1983.[4] These patterns of confluence and coincidence in thinking were, as Fehér liked to say, no accident (he was a master of irony). The social democratic, and Jacobin–Bolshevik projects are also present in these pages, representing the hegemonic left alternatives. They were hegemonic, but unappealing, each less than sufficiently radical in different ways. Into the 1980s, there was still hope, and hope for social alternatives.

3. Socialism and the Australian Labor Party

This brings us to the doorway of our second essay, Ágnes Heller's *Why We Should Maintain the Socialist Objective*. This is an iceberg essay, in contrast to *Class, Modernity, Democracy*. Privately published, it was registered for a larger audience for example in my essay on Australian labourism in the 1985/1986 "Socialist Register." More recently, it has attracted essay-length analysis by Ziyi Fan in a forth-

[4] In 1983 the industrial and political wings of the labour movement formalized their relationship in a document called the Accord. This raised imagined left hopes for power or influence, as though this might be the opening to a new path to socialism in Australia.

coming "Thesis Eleven," where we also republish Heller's essay as a companion document.[5]

Heller delivered this lecture at the invitation of the Kooyong branch of Federal Electoral Association (FEA) of the ALP in 1981. The FEA, via the offices of Michael Underdown, then published the lecture as a pamphlet in 1982. Plainly the actors involved saw this as a significant intervention in the politics of Australian labour. Headline: Hungarian dissident now living in Melbourne gives green light to those on the left of the party who remain committed to the idea of socialism, however defined. This was of course Heller's tack, to engage with the historical definition of socialism and to suggest something newer, at the same time more opaque and more promising because more open, more processual, less determined by party minutes and practices, the counting of numbers and branch stacking.

The oddity of this intervention is apparent in its aging, or its distance from our present. It feels like another universe, when socialism was routinely part of labour lexicon. Heller's views are delivered regardless of the fact that the ALP was never socialist in any robust manner, even if there was debate and even a kind of historic consensus that there should be a socialist objective since 1920. As she understood, this was the maximum programme, like the Sunday china of the SPD. But even this world was well after that of Bad Godesberg, or Clause 4 of the British Labour Party. As Heller understands, the core commitment and definition of socialism into the 1980s is progressive taxation. Roll over Marx, and classical Marxism; no place for talk about the capital relation, freedom or equality here! Her own hope is cultural rather than ideological or institutional, that to keep any focus on socialist values may be a part of a possible process of maintaining and developing a live national citizenry. Socialism, in other words, is to be valued not as a slogan or a tribal politics, but rather indirectly for the role its values may play in helping keep society and its broadly political cultures alive.

It is useful to remember the immediate setting: 1981; Australia; Western Europe, and shadow of Eastern Europe. As Heller argues, there are two socialist choices, conventionally understood: social democracy, or communism. Both are discredited, in different ways. Ergo the period enthusiasm for third ways, most

[5] Z. Fan, *Agnes Heller: Changing Aspects of Her Socialist Theory in the 1980s,* "Thesis Eleven" 2022, Vol. 171, No. 1, pp. 58–77; A. Heller, *Why We Should Maintain the Socialist Objective* (1981/1982), reprinted in "Thesis Eleven" 2022, Vol. 171, No. 1, pp. 91–101.

evidently in this moment the hopes assembled around the prospects of Eurocommunism. As the leading Eurocommunist Fernando Claudin famously put it, socialism would be democratic or it would not be at all. Announced with confidence, this epithet plainly pointed in the other direction… not at all.

4. And Then? And Now?

Over the decade that follows, to condense, democracy is substituted for socialism, a process accelerated by the collapse of communism itself. Socialism gives way to democracy, which gives way to liberalism.

Heller's pitch in 1981 was distinct. She was, of course, inclined rather to argue for the radicalization of democracy. The role of the party in this way of thinking was to help cultivate a citizenry with imagination. Its purpose would be cultural rather than narrowly or institutionally political, in order to do this work within different zones of conflict. The argument is interesting and suggestive, even if it has almost no connection to the ALP at all. The broader point is that Heller anticipates a core problem as the depoliticization of citizens. He own goal, rather, is to follow the hope of social self-management. She closes her speech in company with Rosa Luxemburg. Socialism demands free pluralism; democracy always exists for those who disagree.

Forty years on, we see in global politics both depoliticization and repoliticization, the latter in league with the revival of populism and its new forms of antipolitics. Here politics is not unhooked from interests, so much as subordinated to its renewed forms, based often on anger and fear, resentment or entitlement.

Forty years later, modernity remains our frame, analytically speaking; but in its new configurations, capital still rules. Inequality pervades, and its political manifestations may frequently be toxic. Further, as we anticipated above, socialism has dissolved, and democracy is in crisis. Whether this crisis is reversible is yet to become clear. Can we still stand with Rosa Luxemburg when freedom may exist for those who hate us? Who want to harm us? Or to put it differently, what hope is there for solidarity in a world built on civil war as a norm and violence as an everyday fact?

In Australia, as the novelist Michelle de Kretser puts it in her book *Scary Monsters*, our core values are no longer socialism, freedom or equality, or even the

durable carryall of mateship, but home improvement and household debt. The best we can hope for from the ALP is calm social management, moderated with some attention to pressing local and global issues. Even progressive taxation is unspeakable.

This, finally, is the context in which we can return to the place of schools in our intellectual lives. Today, already, we inhabit a different cultural universe to that of the Budapest School in the moment of their Australian exile. In the flow-time of liquid modernity, forty years is a long time. Capital returns as a major frame, not least via financialization, along with modernity as a sociological horizon. Socialism remains peripheral, in contrast to various kinds of radicalism, including its populist and sometimes neofascist forms. The prospect of tribalism looms large. Even the feasibility of democracy is under question, both the very idea and its actually existing electoral forms. There is not much left, except resistance and refusal. Back to school.

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Contemporary Critical Theory

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Abstract: This paper employs the work of Ágnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér as a characterization of a contemporary critical theory. Critical theory is not "an argument across the ages" nor another attempt at traditional metaphysics. Like modern thinkers G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx, influenced by the French Revolution, the critical theory tradition endeavours to practically engage with the present and inches towards an undetermined future. Ágnes Heller and György Márkus fuse knowledge of the modern sciences with a historical anthropology that becomes an agent of practical transformation. These émigrés from Budapest took the opportunities of the capitalist West against modern societies' fault lines to theorize a potential better future. They marshal modern knowledge against existing social reality towards a present, still typically irrational society. Contemporary critical theory has this intent and occupies this space.

Key words: critical theory, Ágnes Heller, Ferenc Fehér, Budapest School in Australia

It has often been said that the philosophical School has disappeared, and modern philosophy has become more subjectivized and associated with the signature of an individual concept or problem. Against such characterizations, Márkus used to say that philosophy involves the "debate between the philosophical schools." Despite the demise of "philosophical schools" in terms of the original meaning, this continues to be a good working definition of the ongoing history of philosophy. Unlike an understanding of philosophy as an "argument across the ages" or a discipline that attempts to distil some of the more general ideas gleaned from the contemporary physical and social sciences, critical theory is typically an essentially historical discipline, which always "expresses its age" in various ways, with the additional thought that philosophy is more engaged with the present. This is an intervention into the world and not just mere speculative thoughts. Its essential aspiration is to change its object, in a way that edges towards progress. Márkus drew on the rigour of analytical philosophy but always wanted to

achieve more. This ambition requires the employment of the most general truths of the contemporary sciences but also adheres to a philosophy of history or an anthropology with some general ideas about the possibility of progress. While such thoughts today cannot remain naïve about the ambiguity of "modern progress," this remains a good working definition of critical theory. This belief in progress cannot today merely be a "fact" but rather a "wager" upon a hoped future.

A contemporary critical theorist must always assess the current temperature of the present social and historical currents of our world. Certainly, this world has an irradicable natural foundation of material conditions, but these conditions are always changing. Unlike traditional philosophy that operates in an almost stationary conceptual universe within the practice of modern science, modern critical theorists remain attune to changing times. New problems are always emerging. One only needs to think of issues like globalization, postmodernism or political populism, climate change or pandemics as new urgent problems confronting the modern citizen as burning practical issues that cannot be ignored. The "novel" is always present as new issues that demand our attention. Ágnes Heller had a great capacity to read movements in contemporary culture and society and turn them to advantage for philosophical inspiration and conceptual guidance. Some of the most fertile and striking ideas in her late books and writings stem from the observation of contemporary cultural and political trends. Her idea of "the bird of paradise" registers the change in the contemporary character of modern philosophy with the shift from a Hegelian-style single direction and location in European nations. Contemporary history has no single and progressive direction but a more open and volatile face that is announcing new locations, voices and audiences. The Budapest School emerged firstly in Hungary as one of these new locations of a new critical philosophical spirit. Relocated to Melbourne, Heller took advantage of the new openness in Western societies to initiate novel ideas like "multiple modernities" and the "cultural transfusion," taken from the French literary theorist and philosopher Jacques Derrida, which allow us to see the present with new eyes and renewed focus on our most pressing contemporary tasks.

Unable to find permanent work in Australia and less well known in Western academic circles, Fehér's treatment of biopolitics was both incidental and completely characteristic. These quintessential European intellectuals had only recently moved to Melbourne because they had suffered intellectual exclusion by

the communist regime in their native Hungary. In a late career, Fehér's transition from literary theory to a hybrid form of contemporary political commentary came to fruition in a series of books and articles, mostly co-authored with Heller. These were focused mainly on the events and developments that culminated in the completely unexpected dissolution of the USSR after 1989. Even such perspicacious scholars of the "dictatorship over needs" in 1982, along with Márkus, could have hardly imagined that this decline would be so rapid and definitive. For Fehér and Heller, the major message of a series of political analyses in the 1980s cautioned the political left in Western countries against the early peace movements' vehement anti-Americanism. As political dissidents from Eastern Europe, they felt it was a still a great mistake to underestimate the danger represented by contemporary totalitarianism to the delicate dynamics of modernity. Fehér and Heller shared a capacity both for turning everyday life into philosophy and for bringing philosophy to bear on everyday life. In his case, it was heightened by the fact that contemporary political developments in the Soviet orbit had now become Fehér's principal interest. The move to New York also brought these thinkers to the very epicentre of the ferment engulfing American political and academic life around issues of the Vietnam War, feminism, abortion, race, and ecology. These issues had taken on especially combative forms with the emergence of positive discrimination for Afro-American students at university admission, the rapid development of women's and gender studies as recognizable academic disciplines and sexual politics on the campus. These debates provide the rich sociological and cultural material taken up in their version of bio-politics that they popularized. However, what is most decisive is that they bring a distinctively Eastern European slant to their analyses. They argue that the "dictatorship over needs" is characterized by the "total" character of its politics. While they applauded the fact that second-wave feminism's understanding of politics had breached the protective limits that modern liberalism had placed around the personal space of the individual, they were still wary of the impact of total politics on the prospects for freedom in the modern world. This concern took on an identifiable shape within a short time of their sojourn in the United States with the experience of "political correctness" in the academy.

I recall a conversation with Fehér after he and Heller had been living in New York for a few years. I asked him how he was finding New York, and he replied to me with just one word: "Tocqueville." As he later expressed it in a more con-

sidered form, Tocqueville was an "evergreen" because he was the first to capture the totalitarian potential that existed in the culture of American democracy.[1] The climate of "political correctness" that he found frequently in the New York academic scene evoked Tocqueville's "tyranny of the majority." Here we have some of the background existential and contemporary political ingredients that informed their substantial analyses of biopolitics.

The historical background of this analysis is the modern history of the body. One of the most impressive features of Heller and Fehér's treatment of contemporary biopolitics is that it assesses the politics of the various biopolitical movements. For these authors, the two aspects of "freedom" and "life" are only analytically separable but must be thought of as in unity to correctly estimate both the significance and the potential of these new biopolitical causes. For them, the contemporary manifestations of biopolitics also needed to be viewed through a longer historical perspective of disappointed Enlightenment hopes. On the brink of the multiple revolutions that would reconfigure the *ancien régime* and see the birth of the modern world in the 19th century, the Enlightenment has promised the complete mastery of nature. Yet, 200 years later, contemporaries still needed to learn the virtue of circumspection. The great historical landmarks of the 20th century have demonstrated only too clearly that while the modern sciences can be a vehicle of human liberation, they can also have ambiguous, destructive and oppressive results that can neither be ignored nor minimized.[2]

To underscore the shift of perspectives between Enlightenment hopes and the need for contemporary sobriety, Heller and Fehér focused their special attention on the promise to liberate the body. The new spirit, which energized the young radicals of the post-revolutionary epoch, included the expectation that secular integration would abolish the Christian duality of body and soul and open the road to political and religious autonomy. Hegel's philosophy of spirit was just one expression of this optimistic mood, which prophesied a historical evolution raising humanity to the level of spirit. Leaping forward to our own time, Heller and Fehér employed the views of Michel Foucault, the father of contemporary biopolitics, to exemplify the illusory character of such hopes and to underscore that all such extravagant predictions had shown to be completely empty. Foucault

[1] F. Fehér, *Redemptive and Democratic Paradigms in Radical Politics*, "Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary" 1985, No. 63, pp. 147–156.

[2] Á. Heller, S. Puntscher Riekmann, F. Fehér, eds., *Biopolitics: The Politics of the Body, Race and Nature*, Averbury, Aldershot 1996.

is especially caustic when it comes to the genealogy of the modern soul. Rather than a vehicle in the programme of human emancipation, the modern soul "is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy" in which "the soul is the prison of the body."[3]

At the very centre of Heller's theory of modernity is her contention that the values of freedom and equality (in the sense of life chances) have become the universal value ideals of modernity.[4] Well acquainted with the brutal political realities of "really existing socialism" and the Cold War, Fehér and Heller were especially attuned to the potentially volcanic tension between these universal values. For example, it is easy to sacrifice the value of freedom in favour of comfort in respect to material "life chances." For them, this tension constitutes the defining political terrain of modern biopolitics, and its resolution provides the key normative standard on which this politics must be judged. The authors reminded us that there is nothing intrinsic to the politics of the body favouring its alignment to the value of freedom. In fact, the history of the 20th century confirms that biopolitics made its entry into world politics on the side of racism. Only the defeat of fascism and the resulting post-war consensus that democratic politics must serve both supreme values finally dictated that biopolitics would also need to find a place for itself on this democratic terrain. Nevertheless, adopting this consensus does not mean that biopolitics has now forever repudiated its inauspicious initial appearance in the grand drama of modern politics. Accepting the supreme value of the ideals of freedom and life does not determine which values are likely to ultimately prevail.[5]

To emphasize the priority accorded by fascist politics to the value of "life" over "freedom" is not a historically irrelevant curio. Heller and Fehér turn their attention to the vehement contemporary US debate over abortion in the late 1980s, a topic that continues to remain a political issue in current US politics as the Republicans attempt to reverse the 1973 Roe v Wade Surpreme Court judgement in favour of legal abortion rights. They contended that both the pro-choice and pro-life camps viewed themselves as resolute defenders of the body: however, in each case, the parties chose to align themselves with different bodies. The pro-life groups adopted the cause of the foetus and the value of life in the sense of the

[3] F. Fehér, Á. Heller, *Biopolitics*, Avebury, Aldershot 1994, p. 22.
[4] Á. Heller, *Can Modernity Survive?*, Polity, Cambridge 1990, pp. 145–159.
[5] F. Fehér, Á. Heller, *Biopolitics*, op. cit., p. 22.

survival of its unborn potential and autonomy, whereas the pro-choice defenders chose the woman's body and the defence of its autonomy and freedom of individual woman.[6] While our authors' sympathies are clearly on the pro-choice side, their reasons are especially revealing. In the case of abortion, the woman making the choice is or should be the "custodian" of the potential new life; she is the one who is inevitably confronted with the practical choice. This practical dimension of the question reinforces Heller and Fehér's axiomatic opposition to "substitutionalist" politics. They utterly reject the idea that one party, typically more organized, knowledgeable, and well-funded, should take it upon itself to speak on behalf of others.[7] However, it remains a fact that the West has been unable to reconcile its own leading values with absolute consistency.[8] Our authors focus on the question of how to reconcile the values of freedom and life. They locate the origins of contemporary biopolitical struggle between these values almost a decade before Giorgio Agamben nominates the question of the fate of "bare life" as the key biopolitical question of our age in *Homo Sacer*.[9]

It is the election of Ronald Reagan and the programme to install Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe that brought about a regeneration of the anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s. For Fehér and Heller the movement had seriously miscalculated in viewing the Soviet Union as "a peace-loving power being threatened by American aggression."[10] The proposal that the American missiles be withdrawn – with its possible consequence of committing the West to a policy of unilateral disarmament – was, according to them, a naïve capitulation to Soviet manipulation. For Fehér and Heller, this crucial episode of biopolitics signified a failure of courage on the crucial value question of modernity. The anti-nuclear spokespersons had demanded that not freedom, but life be given priority.[11] Opting for life against liberty was a drastic departure from the legacy of modernity. These advocates had simply not considered whether modernity could be sustained without freedom. This miscalculation was not a contingent misjudgement but flowed from the deepest interstices of the anti-nuclear movement and its bio-

6 Ibid., p. 23.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1998.
10 F. Fehér, Á. Heller, *Biopolitics*, op. cit., p. 22.
11 Ibid.

political perspective.[12] The basis for this withering critique lies in twin assertions. First is the claim that the strategy of biopolitics is based not on dialogical politics but on a "politics of self-enclosure."[13] This means several things. First, it means that the subject of biopolitics is, in fact, a symbolic body – the body of nature. This recourse to a symbolic subject is an ideological move that invites political substitution. Any politics that allows the voice of concrete political agents to be usurped by another party claiming to speak on their behalf is rife for manipulation. In this case, the idea that the anti-nuclear movement should take upon this role claiming to speak on behalf of the human species or nature is a sophistic ploy that robs the real historical agents of the opportunity to make their own real choices. Second, a "politics of self-enclosure" is derived from the militancy or radicalism of this perspective. For the activists of biopolitics, the achievement of legal reforms is only the first step. To achieve the movement's real goals, past cultural traditions cannot be allowed to obstruct the path.[14]

Heller and Fehér acknowledge that contemporary biopolitics has very little institutional imagination and "almost never proposed (major institutional changes)."[15] From the perspective of the radicals of 1968, this meant new social communities, sexual liberation and attacks on "consumer society." Such an imaginative deficit only serves to underscore the apocalyptic aspirations of this movement. As Agamben will later clearly exemplify, if the problem is an exclusionary logic of the whole Western political tradition, then the "politics to come" "remains largely to be invented."[16] In the face of a truly messianic task, the problem of institutional imagination is simply dwarfed by the scale of the redemptive challenge. Students of the Budapest School will recall the distinction Fehér introduced between "democratic" and "redemptive politics": the redemptive paradigm is characterized by a reduction of the complexity of modernity, the homogenization of the intrinsic heterogeneity of such societies, and the dismissal of rational and predictable institutions and a preference for pseudo-religious solutions.[17] It should be noted that biopolitics shares all these characteristics. However, in this instance, it is the idea of a messianic decisionism on which all fates depend that

[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., p. 24.
[14] Ibid., p. 27.
[15] Ibid., p. 34.
[16] G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, op. cit., p. 11.
[17] F. Fehér, *Redemptive and Democratic Paradigms*, op. cit.

clearly allots the anti-nuclear movement to this paradigm. Heller and Fehér's repudiation of biopolitics contains some valuable political insights. Their critique of redemptive politics clearly undermines the theoretical and practical options taken by later advocates of biopolitics.

Before we follow the further adventures of biopolitics, one aspect of Heller and Fehér's critiques requires a closer review. This concerns their interpretation of the fundamental tension between the values of freedom and life in modernity. While the normative dimension of their theory of modernity is an instructive point of orientation in assessing the strengths and weakness of biopolitics, it needs to be interpreted with extreme rigour. This becomes evident when we take a closer look at the politics of the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s. Heller and Fehér admonished the anti-nuclear movement for its critique of US foreign policy and its benign assessment of its Soviet competitor. As they see it, the desire for unilateral disarmament was unambiguously a vote for life over freedom and therefore a betrayal of the deepest aspirations of modernity. Needless to say, this type of analysis operates at a very high level of abstraction. When the key issues are approached more concretely, its shortcomings become obvious. The anti-nuclear movement's proposal that missiles be withdrawn from Europe is hardly a vote for totalitarianism. Rather, it is primarily a vote against nuclear annihilation. This vote does give priority to the value of life, but can there be any freedom after mutually assured destruction?

Heller and Fehér refused to compromise with totalitarianism and viewed it rightly as the antithesis of freedom. However, does this mean that, in practice, it is better to choose nuclear annihilation? If the value of freedom is a crucial constitute of the "good life," it remains true that this "good life" presupposes "life." Totalitarianism may be a scourge to the prospects of freedom but, as we have seen in the post-Second World War epoch, societies can recover from totalitarianism and go on to build the institutions of freedom. What does the future look like after nuclear Armageddon? Clearly, political rhetoric and abstraction have triumphed over precise analysis. Fehér and Heller suggest that the exclusive value choice that biopolitics makes for "life" over "liberty" precipitates the real danger of overbalancing the delicate pendulum of modernity. As good former Marxists, they should have known that even the singular and unmediated choice of the value of freedom is not without problems. The value of life cannot simply be taken for granted, and these two values must be carefully mediated in all instances.

The critical power of Foucault's late works was underscored by emphasizing its differences from the Marxism that dominated the critical discourse of the Western left to the end of the 1970s. If the neoliberal project involved an expanded notion of political rationality by incorporating biological life into its calculations, contemporary critique needed to cover this evolution in governmental strategy by turning its critical attentions to the normalizing conditions that produced productive economic subjects acclimatized to the demands of the new neoliberal world. Expanding our understanding of government allows us to enter a terrain that previously lay beyond the compass of the Marxian critique.

Heller first met Foucault in New York at a social event after a conference and found a shared interest in ancient Stoicism, and later Foucault invited her and her son to his apartment for dinner in Paris. Heller was subsequently to write an appraisal of his work that has never been published, entitled "Michael Foucault: The Personal Thinker."[18] Foucault's work was not concerned with individualism but with the modern destruction of traditional metaphysics. Subsequent thinkers like Hegel and Marx had sought to create a new many-sided individuality beyond metaphysics. Foucault's exploration of the later liberal tradition was very much in keeping with Heller's own critique of contemporary liberalism and its disfigurements.

This late paper of Heller and another on the Frankfurt School are most pertinent to the shape of a contemporary critical theory.

In a short lecture I will be brief.

In the paper on the Frankfurt School, she focuses on the role of Max Horkheimer during the two phases of his intellectual career. The first after the ascension of Hitler to power in Germany after 1933 and the second, when he and Theodor Adorno returned to Germany after the Second World War and played key roles in the higher education system as the heads of J.W. Goethe University. Heller stresses that in this early first phase Horkheimer was an outsider: a Jew, a radical, influenced by the works of Marx and leading a group of like-minded Jews who were critical of contemporary capitalism and wanted to play a practical role in transforming contemporary society for the better. The solidarity of this group led Horkheimer to depart from orthodox Marxism in response to the changed historical conditions. Linkage to the organized working class was no longer an option in fascist Germany. Horkheimer now emphasizes the role of the

[18] Á. Heller, *Michel Foucault: The Personal Thinker*, "Thesis Eleven," forthcoming.

independent critical intellectual and this was manifest in the pessimism of thinkers he shared with Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, who could see no progressive elements in the working class and were even more critical of contemporary mass culture. In the second phase after the Second World War, Horkheimer retreated from the intellectual field and adopted a more conservative position. He became one of the pillars of the new Germany after the democratic reconstruction and became the *Rektor* of the J.W. Goethe University and he repudiated his old works and language. Only the publication of Martin Jay's *Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950*[19] would again popularize these early works in resonance with the rise of the cultural revolution in America during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite his intellectual reticence, Horkheimer continued to assert his authority as the Head of the Frankfurt School and the financial control of the chair that had been established by Felix Weil's wealthy father in 1923. He continued to demand a high degree of orthodoxy from his colleagues and their students in terms or control of their journal and famously he rejected Jürgen Habermas's dissertation and he was required to *Habilität* at Marburg. Heller also mentions the fact that Horkheimer did not support Adorno's full professorship until 1957. For Heller this was another example of "the school" still surviving past its useful historical life.

Another contrary example is the career of Michel Foucault. For Heller, Foucault is a "personal thinker." Heller believes he will be continually read by contemporary audiences because he was the first to "reject 'isms,' schools and represented his own personal philosophy."[20] This has nothing to do with pride or individualism but a response to historical exigency and an answer to the present philosophical situation.[21] Heller goes on to analyze Foucault's response to Kant's diagnosis of a contemporary "immaturity" at the time of the Enlightenment and the need to break from this imposed political authoritarianism. Heller reinforces that from an early age Foucault always tested authorities. In tracing Foucault's later career, Heller stresses his resistance to the fashions of the time and the standard interpretations of his works, like the frequently invoked view that he was a "structuralist" or "an anti-humanist." He proclaims the Enlightenment ideal to "Dare to know!" against such authorities. Foucault was never interested in con-

[19] M. Jay, *Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950*, Little Brown, Boston, MA, 1973.

[20] Á. Heller, *Michel Foucault*, op. cit., p. 1.

[21] Ibid.

structing a system and saw himself as a post-metaphysical thinker.[22] To commit to the Enlightenment required the recognition that both "humanism" and "anti-humanism" were now defunct discourses. For Heller, the contemporary critical theorist must find their own individual path and dispense with the theoretical crutches that past epochs have relied upon.

Contemporary critical theory at its best could take the path revealed by Fehér and Heller. Fehér's comments to me that American democracy was best understood by Tocqueville as a tyranny of the majority, a condition that remains so fascinating and infuriating both for commentators and even many of its citizens. To live in a democracy is a wild ride and a wager that often leads to frustration and disappointment. For the critical theorist it must produce new voices and new audiences and employ the latest scientific and humanistic knowledge of history and society. However, its practical aim is to diagnose the present and to locate its key weaknesses and fault lines. Consider the most recent issues of climate change or pandemic in a globalized capitalist economy and the rise of the economic and political power of modern China as challenges to the hegemony of the United States since the end of the Second World War. In this context, critical theory has a unique combination of intellectual fire power to sustain a continuing intellectual relevance and practical impact for old and new audiences into the future.

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[22] Ibid., p. 4.

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From the Budapest School to Intellectual Friendships: Reflections with Ágnes Heller and Immanuel Kant

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Abstract: Rather than considering those thinkers identified with the Budapest School in institutional terms, this paper suggests that the notion of friendship is a more appropriate way to consider the thinkers formerly associated with such a "school." This paper explores the condition and disposition of friendship through the works of Ágnes Heller and Immanuel Kant, especially, to throw light on the notion and practice of modern friendship in the context of the historical dissolution of philosophical schools, including the Budapest School. This paper explores how modern friendship – its cultivation and dispositions – might be understood.

Key words: Budapest School, Budapest friends, Ágnes Heller, Immanuel Kant, friendship

1. Introduction

Rather than considering those thinkers identified with the Budapest School in institutional terms, this paper suggests that the notion of friendship is a more appropriate way to consider the thinkers formerly associated with such a "school." This paper explores the condition and disposition of modern friendship through the works of Ágnes Heller and Immanuel Kant, one of her three main intellectual companions apart from Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. By drawing on their work (and viewing them as "contemporaries") we can throw light on the notion and practice of modern friendship in the wake of the historical dissolution of philosophical schools, including the Budapest School.[1] This paper,

[1] In friendship to Peter Beilharz, Sergio Mariscal, Peter Murphy, and David Roberts. Thank you to Danielle Petherbridge and the anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions that have strengthened the paper.

though, is not a biographical study of either the Budapest School or the friendships that continue after its dissolution.[2]

Whilst this paper is not biographical, some context gives the Budapest School its contours: the short-lived and failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution, their close ties to Georg Lukács, their exclusions from academic positions in the wake of the re-Sovietization afterwards during their time in Hungary, and their critiques of Soviet-type societies and migrations. Peter Beilharz provides a narrative of the School's membership and the drama of living under "really existing socialism" during the Budapest years, of exclusions and censorship. He also lays down an equally important second path by examining what happens to the notion and experience of a school when some of its members relocate, first to Australia and then in the case of Heller and Fehér in their subsequent move to New York. What remains of the Budapest School is in fact not a school at all, but something of equal importance – enduring deep friendships during ongoing intellectual innovation.[3] In amongst this a movement occurs from the Budapest School to what might be termed "Budapest friends."

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[2] The Budapest School was a group of intellectuals whose identity initially revolved around their association with Georg Lukács, and, at least in their native Hungary, of being oppositional and dissident figures. The core group included Ágnes Heller, Ferenc Fehér, György Márkus, and Mihály Vajda; Maria Márkus, Ivan Szelenyi, Andreas Hegedus were associated with the School; and János Kis, Sandor Radnoti, and György Bence were postgraduates at the time. Unlike the three generations of the Frankfurt School, which principally focused on Western European modernity, including Nazism, the Budapest School was also framed by their experience of an Eastern European totalitarianism of the Soviet type (what they came to call "the dictatorship over needs"). It was the latter to which their dissident, critical and oppositional work was directed while they were living in Hungary. See n. 10 for further details. See also the excellent paper by Katie Terezakis on Heller's use of Kierkegaard and the notion of "existential leap" in her *Existential Choice as Existential Comedy: Agnes Heller's Wager*, in: *Critical Theories and the Budapest School*, eds. J. Pickle, J. Rundell, Routledge, London 2018, pp. 217–238. See also S. Mariscal, *The Image of the "Good Friend" in Heller: A Bridge between Everyday and Transcendence*, in: *Critical Theories and the Budapest School*, eds. J. Pickle, J. Rundell, Routledge, London 2018, pp. 262–282. As indicated, the focus of this paper is not biographical. It is a textual reconstruction of what happens to schools once they dissolve, and friendships remain or take their place. As such, the paper asks the question "What is friendship?" through a meditation on the works of Heller and Kant. There is a vast scholarly literature in philosophy and sociology on modern friendship, including its digital forms and mass cultural representations, but for the purposes of this paper I will concentrate on Heller's and Kant's works. For a wonderful intellectual/biographical self-portrait, see Heller's *A Short History of My Philosophy*, Lexington, Lanham, MD, 2011.

[3] See P. Beilharz, *The Budapest School: Travelling Theory?*, in: *Critical Theories and the Budapest School*, eds. J. Pickle, J. Rundell, Routledge, London 2018, pp. 15–33. See also n. 9.

2. School, Critique, Home

Ágnes Heller's own remarks on the Frankfurt School are instructive because they throw into relief not only the contours of schools in general, including the Budapest School to which she belonged, but also the relationships between members once a school no longer self-identifies as a school. They point to a movement from institutions of philosophical schools to enduring intellectual friendships, which also indicates something specific about the nature of friendship itself.

According to her analysis, modern philosophical schools are anachronistic. Premodern ones were orientated around the dynamic of the master–pupil couplet, the pursuit of truth, and/or the pursuit of a particular understanding of philosophy or science, and the pursuit of a particular style of thinking and even style of life.[4] Schools share some common characteristics: "reflective isolation, opposition, a sense of superiority, knowing things better or entirely different to the rest, being the repository of truth."[5] In summary, then, a philosophical school is a self-instituting body, often organized around a charismatic (philosophical) personality, and this body can function as either an institution or a community, or both.

According to Heller, the truth of the Master is no longer passed down in the context of the formation of modern systems of knowledge. Rather, instead of a textual-interpretative transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next that preserves the "truth" or the Master and/or the School, the intergenerational as well as extra-generational sense for the moderns is one of critique and thus an internal dynamic of destruction, rather than preservation, of the Truth (of the Master).[6]

Notwithstanding the disintegration of schools and a distaste for them in the modern period (and for schools of aesthetics from the Renaissance onwards), Heller notes that, nonetheless, the Frankfurt School (and by implication, the Bu-

[4] A. Heller, *The Frankfurt School*, in: *Rethinking the Frankfurt School: Alternative Legacies of Cultural Critique*, eds. J.T. Nealon, C. Irr, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 2002, pp. 211–212. For the most comprehensive account of the Frankfurt School, see R. Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School*, MIT, Boston, MA, 1995. Heller's own analysis begins and ends with the question "What is a school?"

[5] A. Heller, *The Frankfurt School*, op. cit., p. 211.

[6] Ibid., pp. 211, 213, 217. The formation of *professional* schools within the Academy, if they occur at all, follows the modern specialization and differentiation of knowledge.

dapest School) had two qualities that marked it as a school: its commitment to a cause and a sense of solidarity. In Heller's view, the cause and sense of solidarity was centred around the practice of critique, and this is what made it modern. For the Frankfurt School at least, critique took the form of an imminent critique of both theory and practice, which led its members to a politico-theoretical critique of practice, and a theoretical critique of theory itself – that is, a critique of basic concepts of not only "traditional" theory, but also of "critical theory." For Theodor Adorno, for example, Heller suggests, this cause of critique sublated friendships (and antagonisms) between individuals who were extremely creative and productive. Neither taste nor mutual sympathy could be the basis of friendship within the "hothouse" of critique, critical subversion and even resistance. Heller notes: "*the cause was substituted for truth*. Sure, the cause has to do something with truth, because the conviction 'we know better' can also be read in a way that we are the ones who know the truth. Yet not quite. For in a modern school the *truth is not something we receive from the hand or the mouth of the master but is understood as the avenue whereon we need to tread in order to arrive at the truest insights*."[7] In addition, the road travelled – the cause *qua* critique – also produced a sense of solidarity, of "us," which could speak with one voice, rather than individualized voice of the "I." This also meant that a distinction between "us" and "them" could emerge.[8]

Heller suggests that the slow demise of the Frankfurt School began when Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno returned to Germany, the institution of the University, and took their own paths of intellectual work and curiosity (especially on the part of Adorno, whom Heller views as the preeminent intellect). What waned was the sense of "the cause," and Horkheimer's commitment to it (whom Heller views as a central organizing figure). This sense of "cause" *qua* critique, although passed to the succeeding generations, became loosened and individualized, which meant that the main successor figures, especially Jürgen Habermas and later Axel Honneth, followed their own paths.

Something similar could be said about the Budapest School. It was self-created around the figure of Georg Lukács, and motivated by both a deep sense of loyalty to the figure (if not the work) of Lukács, and a critique of really existing

7 Ibid., p. 213. Italics in the original.
8 Ibid., p. 209.

socialism.[9] However, there were not only loyalties but also intellectual divisions within the Budapest School that are partly framed by the Lukácsian and Soviet contexts that reflected on the critiques of the theoretical paradigms the participants drew on and developed to explain them. As Waldemar Bulira and János Kis separately explain, after Lukács' death the Budapest School was in crisis driven by the theoretical divergences among its principal members, as well as between the older and the younger generations. In part, the disagreements concerned the realizability and form of democratic socialism and renewing what the School saw as an ethical core of Marxist philosophy, that is, in continuing the project of humanizing Marxism. The latter also involved continuing critical reflections on core categories within Marxism and historical materialism, such as labour, production, need, objectivation, culture, reification and alienation.[10]

In 1978 Ágnes Heller, Ferenc Fehér, György Márkus, and Maria Márkus emigrated to Australia – Heller and Fehér to Melbourne and then to New York before returning later to Budapest; the Márkuses to Sydney. Their migrations are not only geographic; they are also narratives about intellectual journeys from humanist Marxism to post-Marxism that incorporated insights from competing theoretical traditions in ways that result in arrivals, reflections, contours

[9] The group (rather than School) around Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort and the journal "Socialism or Barbarism" was also concerned with the critique of orthodox Marxism and Soviet-type societies as well as capitalist modernity. Parenthetically, one can suggest that it is not Fehér, Heller and Márkus's *Dictatorship Over Needs* that could provide a continuing legacy of geopolitical critique of our current period, especially the war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine. Unexpectedly three texts by Heller and Fehér, especially, leap out and form an interpretative arc – *Hungary 1956 Revisited*, *Doomsday or Deterrence*, and *From Yalta to Glasnost*. When read as a series of interconnected texts regarding the geopolitics of Eastern, Central and Western Europe, the key event of the 1945 Yalta agreement between the USSR's Stalin, the USA's Roosevelt and the UK's Churchill again gains prominence as a hermeneutic key to understanding the current events of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yalta's key moment of organizing central and outer Eastern Europe as part of a Soviet satellite system is revisited by the Putin regime from a position of an enclosed re-statement of Russian internal historical self-understanding without a sense that the world has changed. Russia under the "new" regime (really the old regime that reaches back to Peter the Great if we also follow the work of Richard Pipes) means continued mobilization of state security services, oligarchies, and imperial power.

[10] W. Bulira, *The Budapest School on Totalitarianism: Toward a New Version of Critical Theory*, in: *Critical Theories and the Budapest School*, eds. J. Pickle, J. Rundell, Routledge, London 2018, pp. 65–81; J. Kis, *Preface*, in: G. Márkus, G. Bence, J. Kis, *How Is Critical Economic Theory Possible?*, Brill, Leiden 2022, pp. xi–xxiii. See also F. Fehér, A. Heller, G. Márkus, *Dictatorship Over Needs*, Blackwell, Oxford 1983; F. Fehér, A. Heller, *Eastern Left, Western Left*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986.

and departures. They confronted new languages and intellectual vocabularies that included their own "critical criticism" of all "isms" as an expression of their continuing commitments to the values of freedom and life. Once held together as a coherent entity by the intellectual presence of Lukács, and of critique and dissidence, the sense of a school weakened with migratory distance, changing intellectual orientations, including postmodernism and the later post-1989 experiences.[11]

However, their migration was also more than "intellectual." It was also existential. Finding home, being at home and returning is difficult. The contingent fracturing of the modern condition and its often temporary nature makes it dif-

[11] For Beilharz, the crucial part of the history of the Budapest School is found neither in Budapest nor in New York, nor even now arguably in China where a new reception is gaining traction; rather it is found in Australia where cultural traffic and transmission always occurred unexpectedly, quickly and continuously, which allows for intellectual innovation not indebted to an Eastern European context. For Beilharz, the cultural traffic and cross-fertilization of intellectual currents via the Budapest School's Australian migration is now multi-generational. It is also multi-thematic, which points well and truly beyond the Eastern European origins of the school to explore topics central to contemporary critical theories, such as contours and imaginaries of contemporary modernity and the comic rather than tragic condition as central to critical perspective and critique. There are also reflections on something that goes to the heart of any human condition worth its name – friendship. It should be pointed out, though, that there is a continuing interest in Lukács' philosophical legacy by Heller, Fehér and Márkus even during this period of migration. To be sure, they would side with Adorno's criticism of Lukács in *Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukács' Realism in Our Time* and would not view Adorno as residing in "Grand Hotel Abyss." For them and notwithstanding the Romantic and redemptive currents in his early work, the young Lukács' so-called Heidelberg aesthetics period, which includes *Soul and Form* and *The Theory of the Novel* and precedes his turn to Marxism and *History and Class Consciousness*, is the point of reference and of continuing interest and inspiration. Lukács' Heidelberg aesthetics enables Fehér, Heller and Márkus, in their own ways, to develop different versions of modern aesthetics than either the later Lukács (of which they are very critical) or Adorno (of whom they are less so). See P. Beilharz, *The Budapest School: Travelling Theory?*, op. cit.; A. Heller, ed., *Lukács Revalued*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1983; F. Fehér, A. Heller, eds., *Reconstructing Aesthetics*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986; A. Heller, *A Short History of My Philosophy*, op. cit.; F. Fehér, A. Heller, *The Grandeur and Twilight on Radical Universalism*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NY, 1991; G. Márkus, *Culture, Science and Society: The Constitution of Cultural Modernity*, Brill, Leiden 2011; J. Rundell, ed., *Aesthetics and Modernity: Essays by Agnes Heller*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2011; P.U. Hohendahl, *The Theory of the Novel and the Concept of Realism in Lukács and Adorno*, in: *Georg Lukács Reconsidered: Critical Essays in Politics, Philosophy and Aesthetics*, ed. M.J. Thompson, Continuum, London 2011, pp. 75–98; B. Szabados, *Georg Lukács in Heidelberg: A Crossroads between the Academic and Political Career*, "Filozofia" 2020, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 51–64; F. Qilin, *On Ágnes Heller's Aesthetic Dimension: From "Marxist Renaissance" to "Post-Marxist" Paradigm*, "Thesis Eleven" 2014, Vol. 125, No. 1, pp. 105–123.

ficult to imagine a home across a lifetime and in one place. Being a member of the Budapest School with its own activity of critique provided such a home. For Heller, though, there was another home – that of culture in which intellectual friendships could be welcomed and find their place, despite geographical dislocation.[12] In Heller's view, friendship is beyond the logics of *technè*, function, political power, the polis and its publics. The public worlds of work and politics do not portray the sense of where modern friendship might reside. In addition, modern friendship under the differentiating conditions of autonomy and distancing relinquishes the presumption of solidarity, the "us" and the combination of cause and truth, which are some of the hallmarks that also indicate the attributes of schools. The home for friendship is highly personal and yet it is also not identified by Heller with the private sphere.

In addition, friendships can range between acquaintances and friends. Acquaintances are often contextualized and characterized by context, role, occupation (professional or otherwise), and even the valour and mateship of "brothers in arms" in times of war. Friends, though, are characterized by density, ethicality, endurance, and emotional, "spiritual," and intellectual affinities. This latter grouping (including emotional, "spiritual" and intellectual friendships) is sometimes included under the more general terms of intimate friends, and it is this that makes them more than mundane – they are extra-ordinary.[13]

For Heller, the cultivation of friendship is a cultural activity. For her, friendships and "home" coalesce in a world of culture, rather than in a school, work, politics or even in everyday life, although she never discounted the latter. To be sure, there are contingent strangers who are creatively productive, and may or may not form friendships. But the formation of friendships, especially between

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[12] A. Heller, *Where Are We at Home?*, in: *Aesthetics and Modernity: Essays by Agnes Heller*, ed. J. Rundell, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2011, pp. 203–222. For Heller, home is not identified as a private space or the private sphere. It is more than that and includes not only the space of culture but also the space of politics, although her preference is ultimately for the former. These two spaces are quite different and cannot be collapsed into one another, for Heller. On forms of modern friendship, see M. Márkus, *Lovers and Friends: "Radical Utopias" of Intimacy?*, "Thesis Eleven" 2010, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 6–23; H. Blatterer, *Everyday Friendships: Intimacy as Freedom in a Complex World*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2015; P. Johnson, *Images of Intimacy in Feminist Discussions over Private/Public Boundaries*, in: *Modern Privacy: Shifting Boundaries, New Forms*, eds. H. Blatterer, P. Johnson, M. Márkus, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010, pp. 39–58.

[13] See F. Alberoni, *Friendship*, transl. H. Blatterer, S. Magaraggia, Brill, Leiden 2016.

those who are creatively productive, requires cultivation and a disposition to practise the art of friendship. This makes friendship more than mundane; it is extraordinary-in a world of difficulties and difficult contingent strangers who are no longer united and formed through a cause.

Friendships, especially extraordinary ones, require cultivation and disposition through which their nuances, joys and disappointments can be reflected on. For Heller, and to extrapolate further, culture provides the model for a different type of home and homely experience in which intellectual and intimate friendships come to the fore. Intellectual and intimate friendship and culture combine in a way that is conversational rather than argumentative. As Maria Márkus also notes, it is derived from "a lived experience not because it necessarily comes from 'experiencing together,' it is also lived by recollecting together and exchanging memories."[14] A cultural ethos is important as a place of homeliness, for Heller, because of its hermeneutic, heterodox sensibilities that combine constant interpretation with creativity in the form interpretations and perspectives. It is this combination of interpretation and creativity that is important here, for, as Heller notes, the density of intellectual friendships is constituted through sensuous satisfaction and not only the cognitive reward of intellectualization.[15] In this way, Heller can further argue that even in the condition of contingent modernity social life and action has not been emptied of relational content, concrete orientative practices, depth and meaning, because friendships matter and continue across both a life time and the distance of space.

In other words, for Heller, the homely spaces for creative engagement are not only ones of the metropole, of aesthetic experience, or of publics. There is also the space of culture through which the formation, continuity, and practice of modern contingent intellectual and intimate friendships can occur, including those between highly creative individuals. In this way, friendships remain, new ones can be formed, and each friendship can be cultivated, not in the manner that a school cultivates a cause, but in the manner that competing perspectives can be explored in ways that sensibilities can be looked after – through cultivation in ac-

[14] M. Márkus, *In Search of a Home: In Honour of Agnes Heller on Her 75th Birthday*, in: *Contemporary Perspectives in Critical and Social Philosophy*, eds. J. Rundell et al., Brill, Leiden 2004, pp. 391–400. Homeliness can also be a cause of anxiety and disruption. See D. Petherbridge, *Exile, Dislocation, and Home-Spaces: Irish Narratives*, in: *Philosophical Perspectives on Contemporary Ireland*, eds. C. Fisher, Á. Mahon, Routledge, New York 2019, pp. 195–212.

[15] A. Heller, *Where Are We at Home?*, op. cit., pp. 210–214.

commodating contexts and the practice of friendship itself. To paraphrase Kant, rather than Heller in this context, one way of enjoying friendships and establishing new ones is to cultivate them and ourselves.[16]

3. Cultivating Friendships: Kant's Luncheon

As indicated above, in Heller's view "common causes" are no longer the bases of friendships, not "the kinds that are significant enough to cement the friendships of [people] of high creativity, to make them endure censure, occasional injustice, and constant interference. Yet, there are still friendships, and since they exist they are possible."[17] We can go on to ask: how are friendships possible? How do they exist?

I will address these questions by not only drawing on Heller's work, but also, and not unexpectedly, on Kant's. Heller and Kant provide a way to reflect upon the "Budapest friendships," as intellectual friendships within the sphere of culture with its intellectual conversations, which are different in nature to the ones of a "school" and even a "public sphere." Both writers address the possibility of friendships and their conversations in the modern world. Indeed, Heller construes a witty and highly imaginative setting for conviviality when she "accepts" Kant's "invitation" to lunch in her *Culture, or Invitation to Luncheon by Immanuel Kant*. This essay is instructive as it outlines the cultivation of friendship alongside her commitment to a "home" of culture, as well as alerts us to her warmth and debt to Kant's work and its legacy, which occurs throughout her work as a whole.

Surprisingly – but not trivially – a model for the cultivation of modern contingent, yet intellectual and intimate or extra-ordinary friendships is the luncheon (or dinner) for both Kant and Heller.[18] The luncheon is not so much a context for the

[16] See I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, transl. and ed. R.B. Louden, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, p. 132.

[17] A. Heller, *The Frankfurt School*, op. cit., p. 208.

[18] I. Kant, *Doctrine of Virtues*, in: I. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 2nd ed., ed. M. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, p. 254, §37. The following discussion of Kant draws on my *Kant: Imagination, Anthropology, Freedom* (Routledge, London 2021). As I will indicate below, Kant, in similar vein to Heller, is anything but the cold rationalist or philosopher of moral duties. He is concerned about the "width" (or really the depth) rather than the narrowness or shallowness of the subject. The orientating and indeed bridging category between Kant and Heller, and within their respective works, regarding the problem of sociable sociability, is that of

cultivation and practice of friendship; it is a stand-in for a cultural model, the other one for which was the eighteenth-century salon.[19] The luncheon can be viewed as a paradigm for Kant's idea of friendship, as distinct from the activity only of argument in the salon, the public sphere or politics. It is a specific space in which the contours of friendship and its cultivation can be explored. On one level the luncheon appears to be an overly constrained setting to explore the complexity of modern contingent friendships, especially intimate ones.

Yet, this impression trivializes it. The luncheon also stands in the wake of a great classical, philosophical discursive tradition of Greek and Roman antiquity, especially that of Plato's *symposia*. The luncheon is where friends – the Budapest friends, for example – meet around the table and not in a public sphere where they simply argue. In addition to political matters, the luncheon guests discuss matters of intellectual interest and cultural taste and can argue about these as part of the cultivation of culture more generally.[20] But it has a greater significance.

To be sure, in her essay Heller points to the empirical difficulties of the luncheon as a model for friendship (in *Beyond Justice* she had privileged Jean-Jacques Rousseau's depiction of a group of friends in the garden of Clarence in his *Nouevelle Heloise*). As she notes, among the 1003 "sociological" impediments to using the luncheon as a model for friendship there are the compatibility or otherwise of the guests in the midst of modern contingency – we all have different jobs and perform different roles; we have different tastes; we have different personalities. A dinner can also be prestigious; a status; strategic "business" where deals and donations are made.[21] It can be utilitarian or commercial.

Nonetheless, for both Heller and Kant the luncheon is a paradigm for modern contingent friendships through which we also can learn more than simply the

friendship. For both Kant and Heller friendship can provide a bridge between the phenomenal and the transcendental (Kant) or the everyday and the historically created values of freedom and life (Heller).

19 See J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, transl. T. Burger with the assistance of F. Lawrence, Polity Press, Oxford 1989; H. Arendt, *Rahel Warnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, ed. L. Weissberg, transl. R. Winston, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2000.

20 Heller takes Kant's lead here too. See her *Culture, or Invitation to Luncheon by Immanuel Kant*, in: A. Heller, *A Philosophy of History in Fragments*, Blackwell, London 1993, pp. 136–175. Jonathan Pickle highlights the aspect of the cultivation of culture in his unpublished *Diderot as Heller's Guest to Kant's Luncheon: Bringing A Spiritual Attitude for Justice to Cultural Discourse*.

21 See A. Heller, *Culture, or Invitation to Luncheon by Immanuel Kant*, op. cit., pp. 160–161.

deportments of being civil in modern civil society. As Heller notes as she unequivocally accepts Kant's invitation, "before joining Kant for luncheon, we need to become familiar with the four basic rules of such a meal set by our host. First, the subject matter for the discussion needs to be chosen in such a way that every invited person could contribute to the discussion and add his or her voice to the rest. Second the discussion can only stop for a very short time […] one should not jump too quickly from one subject to another. Third, self-righteousness or showing off are entirely out of place in a good conversation. Fourth, during the serious contestation, our mutual respect and goodwill for the people whose judgements we contest should always shine through our words. The tone is as important as the content."[22] In this way, Heller extrapolates the inner life of a cultural home for intellectual friendships, where the luncheon is the alternative cultural model to that of a school. "Budapest friends" (and they can be any friends) meet here rather than in a school or political/institutional setting, including the public sphere. The "luncheon" *qua* cultural model provides the space and a slower time for the cultivation of depth, meaning and personality beyond the worlds of roles, power and politics.

Let's follow Kant rather than Heller here, in order to draw up a "menu" for cultivating intellectual friendships between contingent strangers, including the "Budapest friends." According to Kant, friendship can be cultivated when one participates in a meal with others who are also autonomous persons and can be themselves. Kant muses that eating alone is unhealthy. He goes on to say, "the way of thinking characteristic of the union of good living with virtue in *social intercourse* is *humanity*."[23] He continues, "The good living that still seems to harmonise best with true humanity is *a good meal in good company* (and if possible, also altering company)."[24] One should savour the meal and the company and so cultivate taste in the double meaning of the word – of the cuisine and its subtleties and delights (as a synonym for culture more generally), of the company and their perspectives and insights. Cultivation of taste thus includes the development of conversation, laughter, wit and good judgment, according to Kant. For him, these are more than simply the development of aesthetic taste, or the arts of

[22] See ibid., p. 153.

[23] I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, op. cit., p. 178, §88.

[24] Ibid., p. 179, §88. His *Anthropology Mrongovius (1784–1785)*, in: I. Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*, eds. A.W. Wood, R.B. Louden, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 335–509, gives a more fulsome description of the importance of the paradigm of the meal together.

politesse and forms of dissembling. Rather they are deeply imbedded in friendship itself and its maxim of not using another as mere means and treating the other as an end in him or herself.

4. The Disposition of Friendship

Apart from the *cultivation* of the culture and spaces of friendship, one can also have a *disposition* towards its practice. For Kant, friendship *qua* conversation is not a monologue, but "moderates the egoism of human beings."[25] According to him, it involves speaking about matters that might interest everyone, not – as Heller too has noticed – showing off, not allowing a deadly silence so that conversation can continue quickly, not becoming cantankerous or argumentative, and so when one argues one is mindful of tone of voice and choice of words.[26] Kant could have also suggested that one can learn to listen to other guests and even remain silent, paradoxically, in order to maintain the conversation. One can also be playful in conversation and by so doing one can also be witty, laugh and enjoy laughter, not at another's expense and not to produce shame. Wit and laughter are different to being clever, ridiculing or being sarcastic to others.[27] Rather wit and laughter (comedy) can be aids to practical reasoning in that they can enhance the power of judgment by assisting "the power to connect representations."[28] This enhancement can occur by bringing unexpected and even paradoxical representations to the fore and bringing the imagination closer to understanding. "Wit allows the mind to recover because judgment on its own is fatiguing."[29]

Conversation, wit and laughter, for Kant, are central dispositions for a successful and culturally rich social gathering. As he again surprisingly notes in deference to Plato's symposia, "as one of Plato's friends from his symposium said, a social gathering must be such that it delighted him not only at the time he enjoyed it, but also every time [and] as often as he thought about it."[30]

[25] I. Kant, *Anthropology Mrongovius*, op. cit., p. 462.

[26] Ibid., p. 462.

[27] Ibid, pp. 387–394, 451–452; I. Kant, *Doctrine of Virtues*, op. cit., p. 258, §44.

[28] I. Kant, *Anthropology Mrongovius*, op. cit., p. 387.

[29] Ibid., pp. 388–399.

[30] Ibid., p. 390. In His *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* Kant summarizes his sociable sociability of the dinner party as composing three stages/courses: narration, arguing, jesting; see p. 181, §88. See also P. Murphy, *The Comic Political Condition: Agnes Heller's Philosophy*

As Kant also suggests, luncheon guests *qua* intimate friends can also reflect, when needed, on moral matters and concerns. Here one combines one's silent (or soliloquized) inner voice, one's spoken voice and the voices of others to consider and contemplate the most difficult and disturbing moral matters. What is of equal importance is a deportment and disposition that welcomes and enables such reflections in a way that deepens the friendship. The generosity of mutual friendship and mutual respect enables mutual confidences to be exchanged and kept. There is a mutual trust between friends which is different to the trust between contingent strangers who are kept further apart because of a necessary indifference. This mutual trust means that one keeps one's word and does not disclose confidences or dissemble. Friendship, for Kant, calls for mutual self-containment rather than either gossip or mergence.[31]

Kant's and Heller's concerns are quite different to the political character of the literary salon (which for Habermas, for example, was a precursor of the public sphere) and even the symposium. For Heller and Kant, the luncheon is beyond the political. It is here that intellectual friendships can be viewed as intimate ones that are more open, do not dissemble and continue the deep and enduring personal ties that have been built over many years. It is the union or conjunction of respect and benevolence or mutual love. The conjunction entails that love draws two people together and respect keeps them at a proper distance. There is neither mergence nor repulsion; nor mutual self-interest nor advantage or disadvantage. Friendship is not strategic but moral, generous and mutually trustworthy.[32]

There is a necessary and sensitive balance between involvement and indifference or distance, between semblance and disclosure, between holding back or stating that which then becomes a confidence, something that is intimately revealed. Yet, there is, for Kant, a limit to friendship as one should not disclose everything, and thus one lives with a tension about what one can reveal and what should remain one's own. As Kant indicates, everyone has his or her own secrets and "dare not confide blindly in others, partly because of a base cast of mind in most [people] to use them to one's disadvantage and partly because many people

of Laughter and Liberty, in: *Critical Theories and the Budapest School*, eds. J. Pickle, J. Rundell, Routledge, London 2018, pp. 239–261.

31 I. Kant, *Doctrine of Virtues*, op. cit., p. 263, §47.

32 Ibid., pp. 261–264, §46–47; I. Kant, *Anthropology Mrongovius*, op. cit., p. 482. See A. Heller, *The Beauty of Friendship*, "South Atlantic Quarterly" 1998, Vol. 97, No. 1, pp. 5–22.

are indiscreet and incapable of judging and distinguishing what may or may not be repeated."[33]

Complete revelation paradoxically increases the tension and places a burden on friendship itself. In other words, for Kant, there is a distinction between aesthetic friendship (mergence) and moral friendship. One can sympathize within the limits of practical reason rather than on the basis of passions or feelings. Complete sympathy and enthusiasm produce an excess of feeling and make bad or no judgment possible where good or cautious judgments might be called for. As Kant points out, friendships can be sacrificed on the altar of enthusiasm.[34]

Importantly for Kant, friendship is the most open, deep, cherished but necessarily imperfect form of moral sociable sociability. To put it slightly differently, the cultivation of friendship and its disposition and practice go hand in hand. As Kant and Heller note, intimate friendships occur between those seeking a home so often against the grain and not necessarily at luncheons or dinner parties but in everyday settings where we can be momentarily "at home."

5. Flowering among the Thorns: Friendships that Blossom and Endure

The culture and disposition of friendship belongs to the complex and unfinished condition of the human being and thus the possibility that there are manifold and competing dimensions to personhood. As we have seen through the model of the luncheon, friendship requires both time and even a special place within the

[33] I. Kant, *Doctrine of Virtues*, op. cit., p. 263, §47; I. Kant, *Anthropology Mrongovius*, op. cit., p. 481; I. Kant, *Anthropology Friedländer (1784–1785)*, in: I. Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*, eds. A.W. Wood, R.B. Louden, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, p. 75.

[34] I. Kant, *Doctrine of Virtues*, op. cit., p. 262, §46. As Kant states, "a completely perfect friendship, where one confesses to the other all his faults and shortcomings and as it were, reveals his whole heart, would not last long in the world. We must always be somewhat reserved. Fantasts in principle are enthusiasts" (*Anthropology Mrongovius*, op. cit., p. 404); see also *Anthropology Friedländer*, where he states: "such enthusiasm produces great excesses, so than one who is enthused by this idea [for example patriotism, for Kant – J.R.] sacrifices both friendship as well as natural connection, and everything," p. 95; see also pp. 159–164. It is in the context of tensions, luncheons, conversations, judgments, friendships, saying and not saying that orientation to practical reason comes to the fore. Orientation and good judgment require the work of faculty of reason. But they also require the work of the creative, productive, non-functional schematicizing imagination, even more so.

everyday and outside professional life to be cultivated. It also requires a disposition and practice that takes us beyond ourselves. Like Kant, for Heller, we too are flawed creatures and (modern) friendships can stand alongside the flaws and even outshine them. As indicated above, peoples' lives in modernity exist in the context of many contingencies that are dissimilar. Modernity is pluralistic, and this pluralism and dissimilarity changes rather than disables or dismantles the paradigm of friendship. In Heller's view, it is no longer necessary to make a classical choice between truth or friendship *à la* Plato or Aristotle. For Heller, both Plato and Aristotle are outmoded and do not speak to moderns. Modernity is grounded on difference rather than similarities and this is nowhere more so than in the friendships that moderns have and make. In addition to being an enthusiastic guest at Kant's luncheon, Heller embraces Horatio's friendship with Hamlet in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* as the other modern example, and argues that "the more modern life unfolds, the more likely it becomes that differences, sometimes grave differences of opinion and judgment, will develop between even the best of friends. Truthfulness requires us to speak such differences freely, and friendship requires the perseverance of absolute mutual trust. One need not choose between justice and friendship, for friendship not only allows justice, but encourages it."[35] For Heller, friendship is combined with truth, differences, depth, appreciation, and emotional attachment. It is more than an intellectual friendship with its affinity between a perspective and a "cause," and its agreements and disagreements, loyalties and betrayals.

For Heller and Kant, friendship is beautiful; it is also reflexive and limiting.[36] One could also term their type of friendship "spiritual" in the way that Francesco Alberoni conveys this term. They could also be termed extra-ordinary whereby friends remain distinct personalities and the friendship serves to enhance each personality and helps to complete the process of individuation. As Alberoni goes on to note, with the intimate or extra-ordinary friendship "none was superior or inferior,

[35] A. Heller, *The Beauty of Friendship*, op. cit., pp. 5–22; A. Heller, *My Best Friend: For György Márkus*, "Thesis Eleven" 2015, Vol. 126, No. 1, pp. 123–127.

[36] A. Heller, *The Autonomy of Art or the Dignity of the Artwork*, in: *Aesthetics and Modernity: Essays by Agnes Heller*, ed. J. Rundell, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2011, pp. 47–64; A. Heller, *My Best Friend*, op. cit.; A. Heller, *Gyorgy Márkus' Concept of High Culture: A Critical Evaluation*, "Thesis Eleven" 2015, Vol. 126, No. 1, pp. 88–99.

there was no disequilibrium of power. They preserved a freshness and creativity of spirit. They renewed each other, invented new [philosophical] formulas."[37]

This paradigm of friendship, its cultivation and disposition, emotional richness and endurance, is well illustrated by Heller in her very personal tribute to Gÿorgy Márkus and her astute and sensitive reading of Márkus' work.[38] In the former text Heller makes it clear that the Budapest School dissolved. In its midst and in its aftermath – or after school – is friendship. As she says, friendships are unique, and they can even add new colours and new leaves over time. For her there was always Gÿorgy – her fortress, her rock, her certainty.[39]

In Heller's view, the School and its "cause" have been replaced by friendships. Modern intellectual and intimate friendships are deep and can reside within a cultural household that can be cultivated irrespective of where we reside. Moreover, because friends connect a sense of time, they also connect a sense of modern lives that have become fragmented. They not only endure the differences of personality, judgement and opinion but also differences caused by diremption of time and space. Intimate and intellectual friendships, like those of the Budapest friends, continue, and new ones are formed regardless, and not because of modernity's complexity.

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[37] F. Alberoni, *Friendship*, op. cit., pp. 118–119.

[38] See A. Heller, *My Best Friend*, op. cit.; A. Heller, *Gyorgy Márkus' Concept of High Culture*, op. cit.

[39] A. Heller, *My Best Friend*, op. cit.; A. Heller, *Gyorgy Márkus' Concept of High Culture*, op. cit.

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Being Oneself: Encountering Ágnes Heller and the Budapest School

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Abstract: The Budapest School of philosophers and sociologists formed around the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács in the 1960s and dissipated when many of its members went into exile from Hungary in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A number went to Australia, and the last collective works of the Budapest School were produced there just as the cooperative intellectual impetus of the group dissolved. One of the Budapest School philosophers, Ágnes Heller, took up a lecturing post at La Trobe University where she supervised the PhD of the author of this paper, Peter Murphy. The paper explores Heller's trajectory out of group philosophy into an existential view of philosophy as a "truth for me," and Murphy's philosophical relationship with Heller, with the idea of a school of philosophy, and with the notion of a personal philosophy.

Key words: Budapest School, Ágnes Heller, Georg Lukács, communism, Hungary, freedom, life, beauty, Renaissance, irony, paradox, pendulum, equilibrium, dissatisfaction, happiness, Australia

The Budapest School of philosophers and sociologists formed around the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács in the 1960s and dissipated when many of its members went into exile from Hungary in the late 1970s, early 1980s. A number went to Australia, and the last collective works of the Budapest School were produced in Australia just as the cooperative intellectual impetus of the group dissolved.

I first heard of the Budapest School in 1978 or 1979 when I read the multi-authored Budapest School volume *The Humanisation of Socialism*, which was published in English in 1976. I also came across the name Ágnes Heller in essays she wrote for the American journal "Telos" in the late 1970s. Her article *Marxist Ethics and Eastern Europe* made a particular impression on me. It echoed a lot of thoughts that I had had, albeit impressionistically. I began to look around for a PhD supervisor after I finished my honours year at La Trobe University in Mel-

bourne in 1979. In January of 1980, I was astonished to discover that Ágnes had taken up a lecturing appointment at La Trobe. She took me on as a PhD, her first. We had an elective affinity for wide-ranging intellectual discussion. I was an omnivorous reader and an animated talker. We got on well.

In her interesting philosophical autobiography, *A Short History of My Philosophy*, Ágnes observed that the Budapest School came to end when several of its leading figures migrated to Australia, effectively expelled from Hungary. At an oblique angle, I watched the genteel fading of the Budapest School in the 1980s. It had existed as a fertile moment in the intellectual history of a small nation. While small nations lack the mass intellectual bulk and resulting visibility of large nations, some of them, and arguably Hungary is one of them, tend to punch intellectually above their weight. Switzerland, Denmark, Australia, and the Netherlands are other examples of the same phenomenon. In the case of the Budapest School, its existence was a by-product of Hungary's communist era. The School's core consisted of a group of Hungarian intellectuals connected to (and to a degree protected by) Georg Lukács in the 1960s. Lukács' philosophical persona bridged the worlds of official and dissenting Marxisms along with Western and Eastern Marxisms. As a global phenomenon, Marxism reached its peak intellectual influence around 1980. After that, it was downhill. In the 1970s the Budapest School was a nationally framed intellectual cohort, with a core and a periphery, united by opposition to the ossification of Hungarian society. The School stood for the humanization of socialism and for some kind of sociological realism about Hungarian society under communism.

In other words, the Budapest School was of its time and place. It was an episode in an unfolding national story. Like all such episodes, the existence of the School was time limited. The expatriation to Australia of four of its principals (Ágnes and her husband, the culture critic Ferenc Fehér, along with the Polish-born sociologist Maria Márkus and her husband, the philosopher George Márkus) brought the School to an end. A fifth principal, Mihály Vajda, went to Germany, the United States and Canada. Heller, Fehér and Vadja would eventually return to Hungary after the fall of the communist regime. Nonetheless, the expatriation of the core group ran against the grain of an intellectual school that was intertwined with a shifting national story. Moreover, the ubiquitous sunniness of Australia meant that it was not a place where the spirit of seeking emancipation from communist lugubriousness could be sustained.

To compound matters, the grip of the old communist world began inwardly to disintegrate at the moment its power outwardly appeared to peak. In the course of a decade, the infatuation of the world with socialism and Marxism, and their innumerable intellectual cousins, collapsed in both the East and the West. That was the story of the 1980s. The spirit of the times was changing. There was no longer a point in humanizing a previously pervasive despotic ideology that now, suddenly, was no longer pervasive. The gap between the fantasy of communism and its ugly reality became too much even for intellectuals. Almost overnight, the intellectuals who had idolized Marx – and the innumerable versions of Marx – moved on. The future turned into the past. Emancipation morphed into nostalgia. Thought became amnesiac. Old illusions were buried.

Observing her at close quarters, Ágnes seemed almost untouched by this. She had actively engaged with Marxism in the 1970s in short works like *The Theory of Needs in Marx* (1976). However, these engagements were surrogates or proxies for her own underlying worldview that was deeply rooted in the Renaissance and that she had set out in great detail in her first major work, *Renaissance Man*, in 1966. Her "Marx" was like a character who had accidentally walked into a play by Shakespeare. Accordingly, she transitioned out of the Marxist 1970s effortlessly. It left little philosophical impression on her work. The 1980s for her was a time to curate the Budapest School. Some of its collective writings were archived in collections she edited and contributed to – *Lukács Revalued* (1983) and *Reconstructing Aesthetics* (1986). Amongst the core and peripheral members of the Budapest School, old friendships born of difficult times remained. However, their erstwhile intellectual cooperation diminished and evaporated. Philosophically each person went their own way.

The impulse to "go your own way" intellectually appeared to me to be entirely apposite. I was not by nature a joiner or a team player. It never occurred to me to want to be part of a philosophical "school." I had had more than enough of schooling when I was at school. "Schooling" was something I thought was lifeless, boring and reductive. From the age of fifteen, I was instinctively attracted to thinkers – and as it turned out thinkers who possess a highly personal philosophy. Ágnes was among these. She observed late in life that Michel Foucault, whom she had a great affection for, had a personal philosophy. In hindsight, she thought that Foucault, the post-metaphysical thinker, had rejected all isms and embraced the maxim "Dare to know." Thinking back all those years, Ágnes' account of the

encounter between these two personal philosophers, herself and Foucault, rings true. I remember her talking to me animatedly about Foucault in 1982. She talked about him not without philosophical reservations but really about her discovery of another philosopher with a personal star that he followed, like her.

For myself, I never had any taste for Foucault's philosophy even though I shared Ágnes' and Foucault's love of the Stoics. What I was drawn to was not an outlook – and certainly not an ism – but rather to a capacious epic scale of thought and the willingness of a thinker to embrace coherently vast swathes of time and space, and to do this responsibly, without descending into fantasy or cruelty. I was not convinced that Foucault was a responsible thinker. I also gradually came to understand all of this in metaphysical rather than post-metaphysical terms. I read closely Ágnes' works of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, as she engaged with post-metaphysical or post-modern styles of thinking in the 1990s (albeit in a personalized existential manner) my interest waned. Later works from the 2000s, on Shakespeare and especially on comedy, revived my interest, though our paths had definitively branched by that stage.

Much later still, in the 2010s, I came to see significantly more of the point of the warm Kierkegaardian light that bathed Ágnes' existential works of the mid-1990s. Little by little, I came to appreciate the importance of existential truths: those edifying, soulful, deeply anchored subjective "truths for me" that animate and bleed through into each personality, each with its unique sense of destiny, difference and universality, however obliquely grasped.

I was always charmed by Ágnes' turn of expression, her way of formulating her own way of viewing the world. Her worldview was pretty consistent from *Renaissance Man* onwards. Charmed though I was by that worldview, I was never seduced by it. Ironically that was because I agreed with it, at least to the extent that I agreed – at first intuitively and only much later in theory – with Ágnes' Kierkegaardian formulation in 1993's *A Philosophy of History in Fragments* and 1996's *An Ethics of Personality* that philosophy is a "truth for me" upon which neither a school, an ism nor a movement can be built.

From day one, and at first unconsciously on some latent, deep ontological level, I acted in accord with this spirit. However, for a long time, I worried that the idea of a personal philosophy, a "truth for me," was too idiosyncratic, too relativistic, too facile. Yet I was never attracted to schools or movements – let alone to parties. Not in the slightest. Yet that only incited in me the question: how can

one meaningfully present a personal theory of the world? If I learned any fundamental lesson from Ágnes, it was how it was possible to be one's self, intellectually. In her philosophical autobiography, Ágnes remarked that "I always loved to swim against the tide." Me too. This contrarian disposition is not a desire to be perverse. It is not contrariness for its own sake. Rather it seems to go hand in hand with an inward sense that is unshakeable or inescapable. This is the feeling that one possesses a "truth for me" that is more a matter of endowment or nature than choice or volition.

In my case, to be myself intellectually, to possess a "truth for me," meant stepping back from several of Ágnes' key premises. In her Australian period, from 1979 to 1986, which was the most visceral period of my interaction with her, she introduced two key ideas: one was that freedom and life were axiomatic values in modernity. The second was the distinction between dynamic, modern, dissatisfied societies and Soviet-type societies dominated by a dictatorship over needs. The dissatisfaction-dictatorship distinction appears in 1982's *A Theory of History* and Ágnes' chapters in 1983's exilic Budapest School volume *Dictatorship Over Needs*; the life-freedom axioms appear in 1985's *The Power of Shame* and 1987's essay collection *Eastern Left, Western Left*, co-written with Ferenc Fehér.

Ágnes' dissatisfaction-dictatorship theory implied a distinctive theory of modernity. That theory had already been formulated in her 1966 *Renaissance Man* volume. Its premise was that the deepest roots of what we call modernity lie in the European Renaissance – not, as Cornelius Castoriadis, Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss among others contended, in classical antiquity. Though Ágnes made exceptions for her beloved Stoicism and Epicureanism and late in life for a kind of Leibnizian Platonism, what she postulated in her 1966 work remained her overriding view – namely, that modernity is distinguished by dynamism and that its peculiar dynamism is first observable in the European Renaissance.

As it turned out, I ended up disagreeing with the dissatisfaction-dictatorship, life-freedom, and dynamic-modernity theories, though perhaps it was more a case that I departed from them rather than I disagreed with them. And even though I departed from them, I never set out to do so. Re-reading, fourty years later, my essays from the late 1980s, two of them on Ágnes' thought,[1] I can see

[1] P. Murphy, *Freedom and Happiness: The Pathos of Modernity in Agnes Heller*, "Thesis Eleven" 1987, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 40–55; P. Murphy, *Radicalism and the Spheres of Value*, "Thesis Eleven" 1990, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 39–58.

myself struggling with the three theories, and distancing myself from them, if somewhat reluctantly.

The thing I always felt was missing from Ágnes' philosophy was the idea of happiness. Yes, I accepted that freedom and life were axiomatic modern values. But nagging away at the back of my mind was the idea that happiness also was an axiomatic modern value. I was fully aware that, as a philosophical concept, happiness has fallen out of fashion since the 18th century, and that its persistence in utilitarian and hedonistic theories was less than persuasive. However, not necessarily as an explicit philosophical concept but rather as a generic existential and social value, I could see that happiness was just as axiomatic in modern life as freedom and life were; in fact profoundly so.

It is frequently remarked that there are two kinds of people in the world: happy people and unhappy people. I'd add a third kind: people whose happiness derives from making other people unhappy. Correspondingly there are happy societies, dissatisfied societies, and dictatorships. In her work in the 1980s, Ágnes ably described two out of the three types. Against this backdrop, and for some indefinable reason, I began to tussle with the idea that there was indeed such a thing as a modern happy society. This first occurred to me while I was writing the PhD that Ágnes supervised. During its writing, I wrestled with Immanuel Kant's juggling of the concepts of freedom and happiness. In the end, I was not convinced by Kant's moderately low opinion of happiness.

As a consequence, after my PhD was completed in 1985, I turned to classical antiquity, first to Aristotle, then Plato, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. All of these had enduringly interesting things to say about happiness. The next step I took, though, was less obvious. I began to think that balance and equilibrium also had a lot do with happiness, both individual and social.[2] From that precept, I concluded that the establishing of an equilibrium between opposites was the key to a happy society. By 1991 I had arrived at this conclusion and I spent the next thirty years exploring the idea in numerous contexts. The concept of an equilibrium or union of opposites was developed in volumes that explored the continuities between antiquity and modernity, the imagination, creation, cognition, technology, government and prosperity.

[2] P. Murphy, *Freedom and Happiness*, op. cit.; P. Murphy, *Postmodern Perspectives and Justice*, "Thesis Eleven" 1991, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 117–132.

If Ágnes' underlying pattern of thought was intuitively dualistic, mine was spontaneously tripartite in nature. Ágnes' theory of modern values assumed the pull-and-push of the axioms of freedom and life. In contrast, I thought instinctively in terms of a triptych of freedom, happiness and life. Happiness represents both the balance to be struck between fundamental values and the idea of balance as a valuable state-of-being that human beings seek, whether we are talking about homeostatic bodily balance, the domestic harmony of the sexes, the economic balance of supply and demand, the constitutional balance of powers, or any other of the numerous kinds of tacitly attractive social and personal equilibria.

The happiness-equilibrium idea entailed on my part a particular reading of modernity. For Ágnes, modernity entailed a spirit of dynamism that first appeared in the Renaissance. That dynamism ran parallel with and at times intersected with modernity's proclivity for dictatorship. I could see all that. Yet I thought that the dialectic of dynamism and dictatorship had something fundamental missing: namely, the drive of human beings towards homeostasis, equilibrium and happiness. Beauty figured significantly in this web of ideas as well. From this base, I gradually spun out a Janusian, antinomical, and cyclical view of the world that was different in nature from the worldview of the discontented striving "Renaissance" type of personality whose aspirations in principle were unsatisfiable and whose potential in theory was unlimited.

I thought that the most interesting and appealing bits of modernity, a period filled with greatness and awfulness, are the axiomodern parts, the bits that weave together Axial Age metaphysics, including Greek and Roman philosophies and especially Pre-Socratic ones,[3] with modern social and economic behaviours. I was drawn to the idea of an axiomodernity. This was not conceived in direct opposition to Ágnes' Renaissance-derived model of dynamic-dictatorial modernity – for much of that model, I thought, was empirically true and philosophically persuasive. And yet I also thought that the model lacked something crucial, something essential.

At times, as the 1990s rolled on into 2000s, the branching intellectual paths of myself and Ágnes re-connected in unexpected ways. In *A Theory of Modernity* in 1999 Ágnes talked about the pendulum of modernity, the propensity of modern societies to move in one direction and then in a reverse direction. I thought

[3] P. Murphy, *Civic Justice: From Ancient Greece to the Modern World*, Humanity Books, Amherst, NY, 2001.

this was an interesting way of depicting modern dynamic equilibria. Paradox briefly emerged in her thought as the answer to the question she posed: what is the groundless foundation of a foundation-less dynamic world?

Ágnes' 2005 book on comedy, *Immortal Comedy*, also resonated with me, deeply. The comic propensity for incongruity I think is a fundamental aspect of the human ability to unify opposites. This ability expresses itself through wit, paradox, metaphor and irony. At the same time, Ágnes' book on Shakespeare published in 2000 appealed to me more in principle than in practice. I do love Shakespeare. However, I was reminded when reading her book on Shakespeare that the things that I find compelling about the Renaissance are different from hers. Mine is the Renaissance of paradox and irony, and measure and beauty. Hers is the dynamic "time out of joint."

We differed because we both had a personal philosophy. We were the same because we both had a personal philosophy. I learned eventually to stop worrying that a personal philosophy is not enough. I learned gradually that each of us has to go our own way. Some of us do this in packs and groups and schools, in movements and institutions. But even then, thought is a lonely business – even if it is conducted in the middle of a crowd. At its heart, no matter how seemingly social, thought entails an ipseity, a quality of being oneself. If Ágnes modelled anything for me, above all it was the capacity to be oneself intellectually.

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