The aim of this article is to present the Concept of Perspective Resolution (CoPR). This theoretical model seeks to identify the conditions under which constructive discourse becomes possible - not by eliminating differences between positions, but by articulating them in a way that reveals a shared plane of meaning. CoPR allows one to diagnose the level of generality at which agreement remains attainable by identifying a kind of “least common multiple” of perspectives, i.e. a common ground between divergent standpoints. The proposed method aims to facilitate better mutual understanding in philosophical, political, and interpersonal contexts alike. As a tool for constructive discourse - defined as an exchange in which participants genuinely strive for the best possible agreement - CoPR complements Paul Grice’s theory of communicative cooperation. The article also illustrates how the model can be applied in practice, using examples from key philosophical disputes, including those between Viktor Frankl discussing some views of Sigmunt Freud or Robert Nozick that of John Rawls.

The aim of the article is to present, in my view, the most important problems and ambiguities related to the possibility of achieving mind transfer (mind uploading). The idea of transferring the mind to another medium has been frequently discussed in recent years, particularly by supporters of transhumanism. The discussion is based on arguments that depend on the adopted stance regarding the relationship between the mind and the body. The multitude of views on these connections means that, despite ongoing analyses of the feasibility of such a process, it has not yet been clearly determined whether it could succeed. This article discusses the main assumptions of the concept of mind transfer. Additionally, it presents what I consider to be the most significant problems that make the concept of mind transfer a utopian vision promoted by transhumanists.

The popularization of science, which is socially and culturally significant, sometimes relies on aestheticisation: the presentation of science as beautiful in its content or form. The article briefly presents examples of such strategies from antiquity (Aristotle, Lucretius), through the early modern period (Copernicus), to contemporary popular science literature. A tendency can be observed to identify scientific value with aesthetic value. Many physicists, including Werner Heisenberg and Paul Dirac, have emphasized that good theories should be beautiful. It remains unclear, however, why the category of beauty should occupy such an important place in science, since philosophy has not provided a generally convincing justification for this connection. The paper advances the thesis that the presence of aesthetic criteria in science may be the result of the long-standing tradition of presenting science as a beautiful domain in the course of its popularization. Scientists educated within this tradition may therefore regard the connection between science and beauty as self-evident and continue to reinforce it.

This article reconstructs the significance of the Cynic impulse in the context of contemporary social machines. The starting point is a comparison between the classical figure of the Cynic – as a philosophical gesture breaking free from conceptual constraints – and the logic of operation of structures which Peter Sloterdijk describes as cynical. The author analyses the transformation of a radical existential gesture into a reified ideological form, revealing the mechanism of secondary conceptualisation and its consequences for politicality. In the second part of the work, he juxtaposes this process with the transformation of Christianity – initially understood as a community symbolically liberated from the logic of mediation – into an institutional theological-political system. In Tomasz Polak’s interpretation, Christianity managed for a moment to actualise the logic of a ‘kingdom without intermediaries’, only to be subsequently colonised by the mechanism of intermediation. Thus, kynicism and Christianity are presented as two related yet ultimately hijacked emancipatory orders.

This article argues that Hegelian philosophy is not linguistic, as labeling it as such would distort its dialectical potential. Despite the reformulation that took place between the Jena lectures and the Phenomenology of Spirit, language remained an essential element of Hegel’s system. However, it lost the property of being the metaphysical basis for a philosophical anthropology that relativizes the issues under consideration to their linguistic mediation. The subjective orientation of Hegelian metaphysics establishes the object reference of signs in the concretization of the conceptual structure of the absolute subject. The text analyzes Hegel’s Jena lectures and the Phenomenology of Spirit with particular emphasis on linguistic themes. The conclusions from the change in approach to language during this period of the philosopher’s work are presented in relation to the literature on the subject.

The paper presents a critique of internalism concerning the notion of knowledge by Alvin Plantinga, with a particular emphasis on the cognitive faculties argument. According to this line of reasoning knowledge depends on the way in which we learned to acquire beliefs that fit our experiences. On this basis, one can infer that there is no necessary connection between knowledge and the phenomenal states of the cognitive subject. The author presents and evaluates two possible defence strategies for internalism. One of them – invoking the concept of seemings – is deemed effective in the text. The paper also contains an analysis of the consequences of this approach for the two classical variants of internalism – mentalism and access internalism.

In the article, I analyze the ways of using the Polish connective “aczkolwiek”, and I show that it can be considered the equivalent of the functor of conjunction in logic. I also demonstrate that the connective shows the property of commutativity that is characteristic of this functor. I also analyze the nature of the opposition, suggested by this conjunction, between the contents of the sentences it connects. Finally, I come to the conclusion that the word "aczkolwiek” belongs to expressions used to introduce conventional implicature, and I affirm that this also applies to the expressions synonymous with it.